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EXECUTIVE	  SUMMARY	  This	  report	  provides	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  Informed	  by	  analyses	  of	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  and	  ninety-­‐five	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  Muslim	  community	  members	  (n=53)	  and	  police	  involved	  in	  delivering	  Prevent	  (n=42),	  it	  seeks	  to	  develop	  an	  evidence-­‐led	  account	  of	  what	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  and	  has	  not	  achieved	  since	  its	  inception	  in	  2003.	  To	  date,	  there	  have	  been	  numerous	  commentaries	  and	  policy-­‐level	  analyses	  of	  Prevent	  and	  of	  the	  legislative	  frameworks	  associated	  with	  it.	  There	  have	  been	  far	  fewer	  fieldwork	  based	  studies	  that	  have	  systematically	  sought	  to	  gather	  evidence	  about	  how	  Prevent	  interventions	  are	  being	  delivered,	  perceived	  and	  experienced	  in	  different	  areas.	  	  	  	  The	  analysis	  combines	  national	  level	  survey	  data	  with	  a	  more	  focused	  investigation	  in	  four	  areas	  of	  England	  and	  Wales:	  South	  London	  and	  Surrey;	  West	  Midlands;	  Greater	  Manchester;	  and	  Cardiff.	  These	  areas	  were	  selected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  different	  demographic	  and	  threat	  profiles,	  thus	  providing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  how	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  being	  implemented	  in	  different	  settings.	  Three	  of	  the	  sites	  were	  also	  the	  focus	  for	  fieldwork	  originally	  conducted	  between	  2003-­‐05,	  thus	  affording	  an	  opportunity	  to	  assess	  how	  the	  implementation	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  been	  developing	  over	  time.1	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  Prevent	  is	  configured	  and	  operationalised	  differently	  across	  the	  research	  sites,	  and	  the	  variations	  in	  key	  processes	  and	  systems	  possess	  different	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  Whilst	  accepting	  that	  the	  operationalisation	  of	  Prevent	  needs	  to	  reflect	  local	  needs	  and	  risks,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  these	  local	  variations	  have	  been	  derived	  from	  evidence-­‐based	  assessments.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  products	  of	  system	  legacies	  and	  opinion.	  	  The	  defining	  quality	  of	  Prevent	  is	  that	  it	  has	  institutionalised	  an	  overt	  counter-­‐terrorism	  policing	  capacity	  focused	  upon	  addressing	  individual	  and	  community	  level	  risks	  in	  a	  predictive	  and	  pre-­‐emptive	  fashion.	  The	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  police	  staff	  suggest	  it	  has	  taken	  some	  time	  to	  establish	  a	  defined	  ‘space’	  for	  Prevent	  in	  the	  policing	  system.	  Most	  officers	  now	  conceptualise	  Prevent	  policing	  as	  a	  blended	  methodology	  integrating	  elements	  of	  traditional	  counter-­‐terrorism	  policing	  with	  practices	  derived	  and	  distilled	  from	  Neighbourhood	  Policing.	  This	  connection	  to	  Neighbourhood	  Policing	  is	  important	  because	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  that	  Prevent	  work	  cannot	  be	  disconnected	  from	  more	  mainstream	  policing	  concerns.	  Rather,	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  enhanced	  and	  may	  even	  be	  dependent	  upon	  the	  efficacy	  of	  more	  routine	  policing	  services.	  	  Reflecting	  this	  genealogy,	  Prevent	  policing	  pivots	  around	  three	  main	  activities:	  	  
• Community	  engagement	  and	  community	  intelligence	  generation;	  	  
• Identifying	  and	  mounting	  disruptions	  against	  presenting	  risks;	  and	  	  
• Community	  impact	  management.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  full	  account	  of	  the	  methods	  used	  and	  the	  constraints	  upon	  the	  analysis	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  Appendix	  to	  the	  main	  report.	  The	  base	  numbers	  for	  all	  Tables	  and	  Figures	  are	  available	  in	  a	  Technical	  Appendix	  available	  upon	  request	  from	  upsi@cardiff.ac.uk.	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Prevent	  policing	  utilises	  two	  principal	  forms	  of	  community	  engagement:	  
• Internal	  engagement:	  where	  Prevent	  officers	  network	  with	  other	  police	  staff,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Units	  and	  Neighbourhood	  Policing	  Teams.	  It	  also	  encompasses	  working	  with	  staff	  across	  different	  partner	  agencies.	  
• External	  engagement:	  is	  more	  public	  facing,	  and	  concerns	  the	  ability	  to	  connect	  directly	  with	  citizens	  and	  with	  civil	  society	  groups.	  Disruptive	  interventions	  are	  identified	  as	  a	  particularly	  important	  component	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  In	  principle,	  they	  provide	  an	  effective	  mechanism	  for	  dealing	  with	  activities	  by	  extremists	  that	  are	  anti-­‐social	  and	  undesirable,	  but	  not	  illegal.	  In	  this	  sense,	  disruption	  constitutes	  the	  ‘harder-­‐edge’	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  	  However,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  awareness	  and	  confidence	  about	  how,	  when,	  where	  and	  why	  to	  engage	  disruptive	  interventions	  was	  sometimes	  lacking.	  Indeed,	  disruption	  as	  a	  viable	  and	  cost-­‐effective	  policing	  tactic	  is	  amongst	  the	  least	  developed	  components	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  There	  has	  been	  considerable	  intellectual,	  political	  and	  economic	  investment	  in	  developing	  and	  enhancing	  Prevent	  activity	  in	  recent	  years.	  Accordingly,	  the	  study	  examines	  how	  Prevent	  policing	  practice	  has	  been	  evolved,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  its	  different	  components	  and	  configurations	  are	  performing.	  To	  facilitate	  this,	  the	  current	  research	  has	  revisited	  three	  sites	  that	  were	  part	  of	  the	  earlier	  2003-­‐05	  study.	  Differences	  in	  methodology	  and	  sampling	  constrain	  the	  comparisons	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  between	  the	  two	  studies,	  but	  this	  approach	  does	  enable	  some	  broad	  patterns	  and	  changes	  to	  be	  inferred.	  Compared	  with	  the	  earlier	  findings	  it	  has	  been	  found	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  has:	  	  
• Matured	  and	  evolved	  in	  terms	  of	  key	  processes	  and	  practices;	  	  	  
• A	  greater	  awareness	  of	  key	  risks,	  threats	  and	  vulnerabilities,	  albeit	  this	  awareness	  is	  unevenly	  distributed;	  	  
• Increased	  capacity	  and	  capability	  to	  respond	  proactively	  and	  reactively	  to	  these	  risks,	  threats	  and	  vulnerabilities.	  	  By	  distinguishing	  between	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  police	  or	  community	  that	  identifies	  and	  defines	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  problem,	  and	  who	  assumes	  principal	  responsibility	  for	  leading	  the	  response,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  four	  key	  intervention	  modes:	  	  	  	  





Protective	   Type	  1	  Co-­‐production	  
Community	  Delivered	  
	  
Type	  2	  Co-­‐production	   Mobilisation	  	  Table	  A:	  The	  Four	  Prevent	  Policing	  Intervention	  Modes	  	  These	  four	  modal	  Prevent	  policing	  interventions	  are	  described	  below:	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• Protective	  –	  is	  where	  the	  police	  ‘own’	  the	  intervention.	  The	  tactics	  they	  engage	  can	  vary	  from	  disruption	  to	  law	  enforcement,	  but	  the	  crucial	  aspect	  is	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  determined	  and	  responded	  to	  by	  police.	  	  
• Mobilisation	  –	  is	  the	  converse	  to	  the	  above.	  In	  effect,	  the	  problem	  is	  identified	  by	  the	  community	  and	  they	  harness	  their	  informal	  social	  control	  resources	  to	  construct	  a	  self-­‐help	  response.	  This	  response	  can	  range	  from	  direct	  community	  interventions	  through	  to	  awareness	  raising.	  Critically	  though,	  police	  and	  their	  local	  authority	  partners	  are	  reduced	  to	  bystanders,	  or	  indeed	  they	  may	  be	  wholly	  unaware	  of	  the	  activity.	  
• Type	  1	  Co-­‐production	  –	  in	  some	  situations,	  the	  police	  act	  to	  deal	  with	  issues	  brought	  to	  their	  attention	  by	  the	  community.	  This	  type	  of	  collaborative	  working	  has	  been	  previously	  documented	  in	  other	  situations	  in	  the	  research	  literature.	  As	  part	  of	  Prevent,	  this	  mode	  is	  engaged	  for	  two	  main	  reasons.	  First,	  because	  a	  problem	  is	  sufficiently	  troubling	  that	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  purely	  community-­‐led	  interventions	  to	  impact	  upon	  it.	  Second,	  on	  some	  occasions	  police	  craft	  a	  response	  principally	  to	  build	  community	  trust	  and	  confidence.	  
• Type	  2	  Co-­‐production	  –	  The	  final	  ideal-­‐type	  is	  where	  police	  identify	  a	  problematic	  issue,	  but	  enable	  or	  encourage	  community-­‐based	  actors	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	  This	  can	  either	  be	  through	  material	  /	  practical	  support,	  or	  more	  tacit	  forms	  of	  backing.	  Engaging	  this	  style	  of	  collaboration	  in	  Prevent	  work	  reflects	  how	  some	  problems	  encountered	  are	  complex	  and	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  treated	  through	  application	  of	  the	  criminal	  law.	  To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  this	  style	  of	  working	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  identified	  by	  researchers.	  Compared	  with	  the	  2003-­‐05	  data,	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  different	  modes	  of	  intervention	  evidences	  a	  more	  complex	  and	  sophisticated	  approach	  to	  delivering	  a	  response	  to	  radicalisation	  risks	  and	  threats.	  The	  interview	  data	  clearly	  capture	  that	  community	  participation	  in	  co-­‐productive	  working	  to	  solve	  problems	  is	  involving	  both	  organisations	  that	  are	  formally	  funded	  by	  Prevent,	  but	  also	  more	  ‘organic’	  forms	  of	  activism.	  	  However,	  reflecting	  a	  key	  finding	  of	  the	  earlier	  report,	  it	  remains	  the	  case	  that	  Muslim	  communities	  continue	  to	  express	  a	  preference	  for	  using	  their	  own	  informal	  social	  control	  resources	  to	  solve	  a	  problem	  when	  this	  is	  (or	  at	  least	  is	  believed	  to	  be)	  feasible.	  	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  the	  capacity	  of	  communities	  to	  self-­‐mobilise	  or	  engage	  in	  co-­‐productive	  working	  may	  be	  shaped,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  by	  the	  presence	  or	  otherwise	  of	  individuals	  with	  professional	  community	  organising	  skills.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  enlisting	  such	  individuals	  at	  a	  local	  level	  into	  the	  Prevent	  agenda	  could	  be	  an	  important	  objective	  for	  the	  police.	  Tensions	  between	  the	  ‘Prevent’	  and	  ‘Pursue’	  strands	  are	  evident	  on	  occasion.	  Where	  this	  happens	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  defer	  to	  Pursue.	  From	  the	  accounts	  provided	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  when	  Pursue	  interventions	  are	  undertaken	  with	  little	  thought	  for	  their	  impacts	  upon	  longer-­‐term	  Prevent	  initiatives	  they	  can	  leave	  a	  difficult	  legacy.	  Where	  communities	  can	  be	  engaged	  in	  influencing	  how	  problems	  are	  addressed,	  then	  any	  longer-­‐term	  repercussions	  may	  be	  less	  pronounced.	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Prevent	  teams	  are	  increasingly	  acting	  in	  a	  ‘consequence	  management’	  role	  for	  Pursue	  operations,	  utilising	  community	  impact	  assessment	  methods.	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  many	  Muslims	  hold	  quite	  complex	  and	  sophisticated	  views	  about	  the	  Prevent	  programme.	  Frequently,	  across	  the	  course	  of	  a	  single	  interview,	  community	  representatives	  talked	  both	  positively	  and	  negatively	  about	  their	  encounters	  with	  Prevent.	  	  To	  understand	  their	  perspectives	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  differentiate	  between	  means	  and	  ends.	  Many	  of	  those	  interviewed	  accepted	  that	  there	  was	  a	  problem	  with	  violent	  extremism	  that	  had	  to	  be	  dealt	  with:	  
• In	  part,	  this	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  of	  the	  12	  Mosques	  and	  Islamic	  societies	  spoken	  to	  as	  part	  of	  this	  study	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  11	  reported	  having	  encounters	  on	  multiple	  occasions	  with	  proscribed	  groups.	  	  Some	  had	  succeeded	  in	  rebuffing	  these	  advances,	  others	  had	  not.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  reservations	  expressed	  about	  Prevent	  policing	  centred	  upon	  the	  means	  sometimes	  implemented.	  In	  particular,	  objections	  were	  registered	  about	  how	  Prevent	  funding	  had	  gone	  to	  groups	  who	  were	  not	  delivering	  much	  practical	  benefit.	  These	  concerns	  were	  reinforced	  by	  the	  wide-­‐ranging	  disposition	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme	  and	  the	  tendency	  for	  it	  to	  define	  Muslims’	  relations	  with	  key	  state	  agencies,	  such	  as	  the	  police.	  	  Overall,	  the	  attitudes	  and	  perceptions	  of	  people	  belonging	  to	  Muslim	  communities	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  main	  positions:	  
• Some	  are	  fundamentally	  ‘anti-­‐Prevent’	  and	  anti-­‐police.	  This	  stance	  views	  the	  entire	  Prevent	  agenda	  as	  flawed	  and	  misconceived.	  Whilst	  this	  ‘strong	  critique’	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  achieved	  some	  political	  traction,	  the	  evidence	  collated	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  mainstream	  or	  majority	  view	  within	  Muslim	  communities.	  
• At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  continuum	  are	  people	  who	  are	  ‘advocates’	  of	  Prevent.	  They	  accept	  the	  premises	  of	  Prevent	  and	  are	  often	  actively	  engaged	  in	  helping	  to	  deliver	  it,	  either	  within	  or	  outside	  of	  formal	  programme	  structures.	  
• In	  between	  these	  two	  positions	  are	  a	  large	  group	  of	  ‘non-­‐aligned’	  Muslims,	  whose	  views	  shift	  according	  to	  the	  unfolding	  of	  events.	  For	  many	  of	  these,	  a	  ‘weaker’	  critique	  of	  Prevent	  does	  have	  some	  resonance	  in	  that	  they	  disagree	  with	  how	  some	  aspects	  of	  it	  have	  been	  delivered,	  but	  accept	  that	  ultimately	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  confronted.	  Their	  concerns	  are	  pragmatically	  grounded	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  interventions	  should	  and	  should	  not	  be	  delivered.	  The	  police	  role	  in	  Prevent	  appeared	  to	  be	  viewed	  more	  positively	  than	  the	  wide-­‐ranging	  remit	  afforded	  to	  the	  local	  authority	  based	  ‘Preventing	  Violent	  Extremism’	  element.	  Overall	  though,	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  sense	  in	  the	  data	  of	  Prevent	  being	  a	  ‘tainted’	  brand’.	  Such	  views	  have	  been	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  legacy	  of	  how	  Prevent	  was	  initially	  introduced	  in	  a	  hurry	  without	  establishing	  clarity	  of	  mission,	  or	  testing	  of	  appropriate	  tactical	  and	  strategic	  interventions.	  These	  concerns	  notwithstanding,	  appropriately	  configured	  targeted	  policing	  interventions	  did	  receive	  community	  support	  and	  backing.	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This	  perhaps	  explains	  why,	  when	  we	  turn	  to	  examine	  the	  national	  survey	  data,	  a	  number	  of	  important	  patterns	  are	  revealed:	  
• Taken	  as	  a	  whole,	  Muslims	  express	  higher	  levels	  of	  trust	  and	  confidence	  in	  the	  police	  than	  do	  the	  general	  population.	  This	  is	  in	  spite	  of	  them	  reporting	  crime	  and	  disorder	  impacts	  more	  negatively	  upon	  them	  than	  do	  the	  general	  population.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  finding	  because	  it	  challenges	  the	  oft	  repeated	  claim	  that	  Muslim	  communities	  in	  the	  UK	  are	  being	  profoundly	  alienated	  and	  disenchanted	  by	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme.	  The	  evidence	  available	  for	  this	  study	  suggests	  that	  the	  actual	  situation	  is	  somewhat	  more	  complex.	  	  
• Time	  trend	  analysis	  of	  a	  number	  of	  general	  policing	  indicators	  contained	  within	  the	  BCS	  covering	  the	  period	  in	  which	  Prevent	  has	  been	  implemented	  shows	  that	  Muslim	  community	  perceptions	  of	  the	  police	  have	  been	  remarkably	  stable,	  and	  largely	  positive.	  	  
• It	  is	  thus	  concluded	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  causing	  widespread	  damage	  to	  police	  and	  Muslim	  community	  relations.	  	  The	  BCS	  data	  are	  important	  in	  this	  respect	  in	  that	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  access	  more	  mainstream	  Muslim	  views	  than	  tends	  to	  feature	  in	  public	  debates	  focused	  explicitly	  upon	  Prevent,	  which	  are	  typically	  conducted	  between	  those	  who	  are	  either	  explicit	  proponents	  or	  opponents	  of	  the	  strategy.	  More	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  shows	  for	  example:	  
• Confidence	  in	  the	  police	  is	  lower	  amongst	  young	  Muslim	  men.	  However,	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  this	  group	  still	  express	  relatively	  high	  opinions	  of	  the	  police.	  This	  pattern	  of	  more	  negative	  views	  amongst	  young	  Muslim	  men	  is	  similar	  to,	  and	  only	  marginally	  more	  accentuated	  than,	  the	  similar	  patterns	  observed	  for	  young	  men	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  
• There	  is	  also	  an	  effect	  amongst	  Muslim	  women	  aged	  45	  plus,	  who	  have	  lower	  confidence	  than	  might	  be	  expected.	  This	  group	  of	  people	  also	  has	  less	  direct	  contact	  than	  any	  other	  in	  the	  Muslim	  faith	  community	  with	  the	  police.	  
• The	  latter	  effect	  may	  result	  from	  women	  experiencing	  policing	  through	  the	  accounts	  of	  their	  sons,	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  more	  police	  attention	  on	  the	  streets.	  Because	  they	  have	  less	  direct	  contact	  with	  the	  police	  themselves,	  they	  are	  more	  susceptible	  to	  their	  views	  being	  negatively	  influenced	  by	  the	  stories	  they	  are	  told.	  This	  latter	  finding	  has	  potential	  practical	  ramifications	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  is	  these	  mothers	  who	  might	  well	  be	  best	  positioned	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  the	  early	  warning	  signals	  when	  young	  people	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  becoming	  involved	  with	  extremist	  groups.	  Aspects	  of	  these	  findings	  are	  summarised	  in	  the	  following	  graph	  based	  upon	  BCS	  data.	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FIGURE	  A:	  Percentage	  of	  Muslim	  Men	  Rating	  the	  Police	  as	  ‘Excellent’	  or	  ‘Good’	  
	  Source:	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  2008/09	  Using	  the	  BCS	  to	  track	  levels	  of	  perceived	  community	  cohesion	  revealed	  an	  interesting	  finding.	  In	  2006/07	  Muslim	  perceptions	  of	  cohesiveness	  declined	  dramatically.	  This	  subsequently	  recovered	  but	  it	  is	  hypothesised	  that	  this	  may	  reflect	  events	  following	  the	  bombings	  in	  London	  in	  2005.	  	  FIGURE	  B:	  Perceived	  Cohesiveness	  Over	  Time	  	  
	  	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  data	  further	  suggests	  that	  Muslim	  communities	  have	  particular	  neighbourhood	  security	  concerns	  about	  the	  prevalence	  of:	  
• Youth	  disorder;	  
• Drug	  use	  and	  dealing;	  
• Burglary;	  
• Hate	  crime.	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It	  was	  found	  though,	  that	  compared	  with	  the	  general	  population	  Muslims	  are	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  report	  crime	  victimisations	  to	  police.	  Configuring	  a	  policing	  response	  that	  deals	  effectively	  with	  these	  key	  concerns	  might	  therefore	  be	  a	  good	  investment	  in	  terms	  of	  building	  trust	  and	  confidence.	  	  	  SUMMARY	  OF	  KEY	  FINDINGS	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  balanced,	  evidence-­‐led	  and	  non-­‐partisan	  assessment	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  and	  its	  effects.	  The	  research	  finds	  that:	  	  	  (1)	  Over	  the	  period	  of	  time	  that	  the	  Prevent	  strategy	  has	  been	  implemented,	  mainstream	  Muslim	  community	  views	  of	  the	  police	  have	  remained	  stable,	  relatively	  positive	  and	  consistent.	  This	  picture	  is	  derived	  from	  analysis	  of	  a	  number	  of	  general	  policing	  indicators	  contained	  in	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey.	  It	  suggests	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  not	  caused	  widespread	  damage	  to	  police-­‐Muslim	  community	  relations.	  There	  is	  a	  potentially	  modest	  effect	  found	  for	  the	  negative	  attitudes	  of	  young	  Muslim	  men	  to	  the	  police,	  but	  this	  is	  only	  slightly	  more	  accentuated	  than	  the	  similar	  pattern	  observable	  amongst	  young	  men	  in	  the	  general	  population	  and	  in	  other	  minority	  ethnic	  groups.	  (2)	  Some	  of	  the	  key	  practices	  and	  processes	  associated	  with	  Prevent	  policing	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  important	  ways	  in	  recent	  years.	  As	  a	  blended	  policing	  methodology	  integrating	  aspects	  of	  traditional	  counter-­‐terrorism	  work	  with	  Neighbourhood	  Policing,	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  acquired	  more	  nuance	  and	  sophistication.	  Its	  particular	  distinguishing	  feature	  is	  that	  it	  has	  institutionalised	  an	  overt	  counter-­‐terrorism	  policing	  capability.	  	  (3)	  By	  attending	  carefully	  to	  the	  complex	  and	  delicate	  issues	  involved	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  Prevent	  policing,	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  where	  its	  delivery	  and	  effectiveness	  could	  be	  improved	  are	  identified.	  The	  social	  problems	  that	  Prevent	  is	  engaging	  with	  are	  immensely	  difficult	  and	  challenging,	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  police	  have	  sometimes	  applied	  inappropriate	  tactics	  and	  strategy.	  	  (4)	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  being	  operationalised	  in	  different	  ways	  across	  a	  range	  of	  settings.	  Innovative	  ways	  of	  doing	  Prevent	  policing	  are	  being	  crafted.	  However,	  the	  processes,	  structures,	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  required	  to	  support	  such	  approaches	  have	  developed	  at	  different	  rates	  across	  individual	  police	  forces.	  A	  degree	  of	  situational	  configuration	  to	  respond	  to	  local	  circumstances	  is	  both	  necessary	  and	  desirable.	  However,	  it	  would	  seem	  appropriate	  to	  try	  to	  arbitrate	  between	  the	  various	  models	  to	  establish	  ‘what	  works’.	  	  (5)	  The	  overall	  quality	  of	  police-­‐community	  engagement	  practices	  can	  be	  assessed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  capacity	  to	  ‘reach	  down’	  and	  ‘reach	  across’	  communities.	  The	  former	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  get	  beyond	  ‘surface’	  level	  contacts	  to	  access	  detailed	  information	  about	  a	  local	  situation.	  In	  contrast,	  reach	  across	  is	  concerned	  with	  establishing	  a	  viable	  community	  intelligence	  network	  that	  connects	  with	  the	  various	  groupings	  that	  collectively	  constitute	  Muslim	  communities.	  At	  a	  local	  level	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  networks	  can	  be	  ‘stress	  tested’	  to	  confirm	  their	  presence	  and	  resilience.	  This	  reflects	  an	  empirical	  finding	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that	  whilst	  police	  are	  visible	  within	  Muslim	  communities,	  they	  are	  not	  translating	  this	  presence	  into	  inter-­‐personal	  engagements.	  (6)	  Disruption	  is	  emerging	  as	  an	  important	  tactical	  policing	  option	  for	  inhibiting	  the	  often	  sub-­‐criminal	  activities	  of	  extremists.	  However,	  to	  date	  the	  processes	  of	  how	  to	  design	  and	  implement	  effective	  disruptive	  interventions	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  relatively	  neglected.	  An	  established	  tactical	  menu	  of	  options	  for	  conducting	  disruptions	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  distilled	  from	  practice.	  (7)	  Four	  key	  intervention	  modes	  for	  Prevent	  policing	  were	  identified	  from	  the	  qualitative	  data.	  Their	  presence	  suggests	  that	  increasing	  direct	  community	  participation,	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  formal	  Prevent	  programme	  structures,	  is	  affording	  a	  more	  nuanced	  set	  of	  responses	  to	  particular	  risks,	  threats	  and	  vulnerabilities.	  	  (8)	  Where	  individuals	  and	  communities	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  local	  Prevent	  interventions	  this	  can	  involve	  exposure	  to	  substantial	  personal	  risks	  or	  retaliation.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  several	  emergent	  challenges	  for	  Prevent	  where	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  how	  effective	  the	  policing	  response	  is.	  The	  ability	  to	  protect	  those	  challenging	  extremists	  is	  especially	  taxing	  when	  this	  happens	  outside	  of	  the	  formal	  structures	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme.	  	  	  	  (9)	  Across	  the	  four	  research	  sites	  there	  were	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  key	  individuals	  residing	  and	  working	  in	  the	  local	  communities	  who	  were	  effective	  social	  networkers,	  displaying	  the	  ability	  to	  connect	  and	  mobilise	  different	  groups	  and	  factions.	  In	  police	  intelligence	  systems,	  ‘high	  value’	  is	  easily	  attached	  to	  ‘what’	  people	  know,	  rather	  than	  ‘who’.	  The	  kinds	  of	  co-­‐productive	  working	  being	  leveraged	  by	  Prevent	  policing	  frequently	  depends	  upon	  the	  participation	  of	  ‘high	  value	  social	  networkers’.	  	  	  (10)	  The	  process	  of	  implementing	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  progressed	  through	  three	  key	  phases.	  The	  first	  related	  to	  the	  initial	  introduction	  of	  the	  cross-­‐government	  CONTEST	  strategy.	  During	  this	  period,	  Prevent	  was	  being	  delivered	  in	  a	  low	  visibility	  manner,	  consistent	  with	  orthodox	  counter-­‐terrorism	  methodology.	  It	  lacked	  both	  capacity	  and	  capability.	  The	  second	  phase	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Prevent	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  shift	  to	  CONTEST	  II	  where	  there	  was	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  assets,	  but	  no	  significant	  innovations	  in	  public-­‐facing	  delivery.	  Here	  there	  was	  the	  growing	  of	  a	  specific	  Prevent	  capacity,	  but	  it	  initially	  lacked	  the	  requisite	  practical	  capabilities.	  Phase	  three	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  occurred	  within	  the	  last	  two	  years	  and	  involves	  the	  development	  of	  more	  transparent	  and	  overt	  forms	  of	  counter-­‐terrorism	  work.	  It	  seems	  that	  as	  Prevent	  has	  bedded	  down,	  and	  officers	  have	  become	  more	  confident	  in	  what	  they	  are	  doing,	  they	  have	  been	  more	  willing	  to	  innovate	  and	  try	  new	  ways	  to	  accomplish	  key	  strategic	  and	  tactical	  objectives.	  This	  has	  seen	  the	  establishment	  of	  defined	  Prevent	  policing	  capabilities	  and	  capacity.	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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  This	  report	  details	  findings	  from	  a	  research	  study	  designed	  to	  assess	  the	  effects	  of	  police	  involvement	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme.	  Prevent	  is	  a	  multi-­‐disciplinary,	  cross	  departmental	  strand	  of	  the	  government’s	  CONTEST	  strategy	  intended	  to	  provide	  a	  holistic	  response	  to	  the	  full	  spectrum	  of	  terrorist	  risks	  and	  threats.	  Originally	  introduced	  in	  2003,	  Prevent	  underwent	  a	  major	  ‘refresh’	  in	  March	  2009	  as	  part	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  CONTEST	  II.	  This	  included	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  specific	  Prevent	  policing	  strategy	  accompanied	  by	  detailed	  implementation	  guidance.	  This	  strategic	  re-­‐orientation	  was	  undertaken	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  original	  formulation	  of	  CONTEST	  had	  significantly	  accented	  the	  Pursue	  strand	  of	  activity,	  and	  failed	  to	  develop	  Prevent.	  CONTEST	  II	  defines	  five	  main	  and	  two	  supporting	  objectives	  for	  the	  Prevent	  programme.2	  These	  are	  to:	  	  
• Challenge	  the	  ideology	  behind	  violent	  extremism	  and	  support	  mainstream	  voices;	  
• Disrupt	  those	  who	  promote	  violent	  extremism	  and	  support	  the	  places	  where	  they	  operate;	  
• Support	  individuals	  who	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  recruitment,	  or	  have	  already	  been	  recruited	  by	  violent	  extremists;	  
• Increase	  the	  resilience	  of	  communities	  to	  violent	  extremism;	  
• Address	  the	  grievances	  which	  ideologues	  are	  exploiting;	  
• Develop	  supporting	  intelligence,	  analysis,	  and	  information;	  	  
• Improve	  strategic	  communications.	  	  In	  practice,	  working	  towards	  these	  objectives	  pivots	  around	  three	  main	  types	  of	  activity:	  
• Counter-­‐radicalisation	  –	  focuses	  upon	  inhibiting	  the	  spread	  and	  influence	  of	  extremist	  ideas	  both	  generally	  and	  in	  specific	  cases;	  
• De-­‐radicalisation	  –	  involves	  acts	  to	  reduce	  the	  influence	  of	  extremist	  ideas	  where	  they	  have	  gained	  traction;	  
• Community	  cohesion	  building	  –	  is	  focused	  upon	  increasing	  the	  resilience	  of	  communities	  so	  that	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  extremist	  views.	  The	  coalition	  government	  is	  currently	  in	  the	  process	  of	  reviewing	  the	  counter-­‐terrorism	  strategy	  and	  a	  revised	  and	  refocused	  formulation	  of	  Prevent	  will	  be	  set	  out	  when	  the	  review	  reports	  in	  May	  2011.	  Strategically,	  the	  current	  iteration	  of	  Prevent	  places	  strong	  emphasis	  upon	  involving	  and	  coordinating	  multiple	  partners	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  including	  police,	  local	  government,	  social	  enterprise	  organisations	  and	  civil	  society	  organisations.	  The	  particular	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  is	  upon	  the	  police’s	  role	  in	  these	  activities	  and	  what	  difference,	  if	  any,	  they	  have	  made.	  Specifically,	  the	  research	  addresses	  the	  following	  questions:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Home	  Office	  (2009)	  Pursue,	  Prevent,	  Protect,	  Prepare:	  The	  United	  Kingdom’s	  Strategy	  for	  Countering	  International	  Terrorism.	  London:	  Home	  Office.	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• Have	  local	  Prevent	  policing	  systems	  and	  processes	  altered	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  public	  to	  pass	  ‘community	  intelligence’	  to	  police?	  
• Have	  the	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  of	  Muslim	  communities	  in	  relation	  to	  crime,	  disorder	  and	  policing	  changed	  in	  recent	  years?	  If	  so,	  are	  the	  trends	  similar	  to	  those	  for	  other	  communities?	  
• Are	  the	  neighbourhood	  security	  needs	  of	  people	  from	  the	  Muslim	  faith	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  people	  from	  other	  backgrounds,	  and	  if	  they	  are	  different,	  are	  these	  differences	  recognised	  in	  local	  service	  delivery?	  
• How	  do	  practitioners	  involved	  in	  local	  Prevent	  delivery	  assess	  the	  relative	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  current	  implementation	  arrangements?	  
• What	  indicators	  are	  available	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  different	  Prevent	  delivery	  mechanisms	  locally?	  In	  engaging	  with	  these	  questions,	  the	  study	  is	  informed	  by	  data	  from	  two	  main	  sources:	  
• Cross	  sectional	  and	  time-­‐trend	  analyses	  of	  several	  sweeps	  of	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  from	  2004-­‐2009;	  
• Semi-­‐structured	  qualitative	  interviews	  with	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent.	  This	  includes	  both	  police	  staff	  and	  also	  representatives	  of	  Muslim	  communities	  who	  have	  been	  ‘recipients’	  of	  Prevent	  services.	  	  These	  data	  afford	  a	  more	  evidence-­‐led	  perspective	  on	  how	  Prevent	  is	  being	  configured	  and	  delivered,	  and	  what	  it	  is,	  and	  is	  not,	  accomplishing.	  This	  is	  significant	  in	  that	  the	  Prevent	  programme	  and	  counter-­‐terrorism	  strategy	  more	  generally	  have	  been	  hotly	  debated.3	  However,	  these	  debates	  are	  often	  based	  on	  little	  more	  than	  anecdote	  and	  opinion.	  In	  contrast,	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  nuanced	  and	  rounded	  view,	  informed	  by	  the	  best	  available	  evidence.	  The	  research	  evidence	  informing	  the	  study	  is	  drawn	  from	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  sources.	  Quantitative	  data	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey.	  Both	  cross-­‐sectional	  data	  (from	  the	  2008/09	  BCS,	  or	  combined	  2007/08	  and	  2008/09	  surveys)	  and	  trended	  data	  (from	  the	  2004/05	  through	  to	  2008/09	  surveys)	  are	  used	  to	  identify	  key	  patterns.	  As	  a	  large	  nationally	  representative	  survey,	  the	  BCS	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  source	  of	  information	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  compare	  Muslim	  attitudes,	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  with	  those	  of	  the	  general	  population.	  In	  the	  2008/09	  survey	  983	  respondents	  self-­‐identified	  with	  the	  Muslim	  faith,	  and	  in	  2004/05,	  2005/06	  and	  2006/07,	  nearly	  1800	  Muslim	  respondents	  were	  sampled.	  	  Because	  of	  how	  the	  BCS	  is	  structured,	  with	  some	  questions	  only	  asked	  to	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  sample,	  on	  occasion	  data	  from	  the	  preceding	  years	  survey	  has	  been	  combined	  to	  permit	  a	  robust	  analysis.	  Where	  this	  has	  been	  done	  it	  is	  clearly	  indicated	  in	  the	  text.	  The	  BCS	  does	  not	  ask	  any	  direct	  questions	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A	  useful	  summary	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  report	  from	  the	  Communities	  and	  Local	  Government	  Committee	  (2010)	  Preventing	  Violent	  Extremism,	  Sixth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2009-­‐10.	  London:	  House	  of	  Commons.	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perceptions	  or	  experiences	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  It	  does,	  however,	  provide	  a	  set	  of	  wide-­‐ranging	  indicators	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  shaped	  by	  such	  dimensions	  of	  police	  practice.	  As	  such,	  and	  as	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  due	  course,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  across	  the	  analyses	  of	  these	  very	  different	  indicators	  a	  strongly	  consistent	  pattern	  emerges.	  These	  patterns	  and	  trends	  are	  confirmed,	  supplemented	  and	  augmented	  by	  analysis	  of	  the	  qualitative	  data.	  The	  in-­‐depth	  qualitative	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  four	  research	  sites.	  Table	  1	  lists	  the	  number	  of	  police	  and	  community	  interviews	  conducted	  in	  each	  area.	  	  
Site	  Name	   No.	  Police	  Staff	  Interviews	   No.	  Community	  Interviews	  	  
West	  Midlands	   12	   20	  
Surrey	  &	  South	  London	   10	   20	  
Greater	  Manchester	   12	   3	  
Cardiff	   8	   10	  	  Table	  1:	  Number	  of	  Interviews	  by	  Site	  	  The	  top	  three	  sites	  were	  selected	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  had	  previously	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  study	  several	  years	  ago	  examining	  the	  policing	  of	  radicalisation	  risks	  (described	  in	  more	  detail	  below).	  Owing	  to	  differences	  in	  methodology	  and	  sampling	  between	  the	  two	  studies,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  draw	  direct	  comparisons	  between	  Prevent	  then	  and	  now	  across	  these	  three	  sites.	  However,	  the	  earlier	  work	  does	  provide	  a	  point	  of	  contrast,	  enabling	  some	  sense	  of	  how	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  evolved	  and	  adapted	  to	  be	  constructed.	  There	  has	  been	  considerable	  intellectual,	  political	  and	  economic	  investment	  in	  developing	  Prevent	  in	  recent	  years,	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  important	  to	  try	  and	  trace	  out	  how	  different	  aspects	  and	  configurations	  are,	  or	  are	  not	  performing.	  The	  Cardiff	  site	  was	  added	  because	  during	  the	  period	  of	  preparation	  for	  the	  research	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  risk	  profile	  in	  the	  City	  was	  changing.	  Police	  intelligence	  was	  suggesting	  that	  although	  historically	  South	  Wales	  had	  seen	  few	  such	  problems,	  it	  was	  now	  being	  targeted	  by	  extremist	  groups	  for	  possible	  recruitment.	  Consequently,	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  conducting	  research	  as	  events	  unfolded	  might	  offer	  unique	  insights.	  The	  data	  and	  method	  underpinning	  the	  study	  are	  described	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  	  	  BACKDROP	  In	  2007	  the	  authors	  published	  a	  study	  commissioned	  by	  ACPO	  (TAM)	  examining	  the	  community	  context	  of	  radicalisation	  and	  counter-­‐radicalisation	  efforts.4	  Based	  upon	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  people	  from	  Muslim	  communities	  conducted	  between	  2003-­‐05,	  this	  earlier	  study	  outlined	  an	  approach	  that	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Innes,	  M.,	  L.	  Abbott,	  T.	  Lowe	  and	  C.	  Roberts	  (2007)	  Hearts	  and	  Minds	  and	  Eyes	  and	  Ears:	  Reducing	  Radicalisation	  Risks	  Through	  Reassurance-­‐Oriented	  Policing.	  London:	  ACPO.	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influential	  in	  shaping	  the	  development	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  strategy.	  	  Informed	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  primary	  research	  data	  and	  a	  review	  of	  available	  secondary	  sources,	  the	  2007	  study	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  interacting	  ‘push’	  and	  ‘pull’	  factors	  that	  render	  certain	  individuals	  more	  susceptible	  to	  extremist	  influences.	  This	  ‘situational	  model	  of	  violent	  radicalisation’	  posited	  that	  it	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  these	  ‘catalysts’	  and	  ‘conditions’	  acting	  in	  concert	  that	  makes	  people	  ‘radicalisable’.	  The	  inculcation	  of	  this	  vulnerability	  may	  be	  time-­‐limited	  and	  some	  individuals	  will	  only	  ever	  be	  subject	  to	  ‘shallow	  radicalisation’,	  whereas	  for	  others	  it	  will	  involve	  a	  ‘deeper’	  form.	  Importantly	  though,	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  a	  number	  of	  these	  key	  factors	  were	  local	  issues	  and	  as	  such,	  inhibiting	  the	  onset	  of	  radicalisation	  processes	  could	  be	  achieved	  via	  targeted	  local	  interventions.	  Accordingly,	  it	  was	  identified	  that	  an	  effective	  local	  counter-­‐terrorism	  policing	  approach	  should	  combine	  an	  ‘eyes	  and	  ears’	  and	  a	  ‘hearts	  and	  minds’	  strategy.	  The	  former	  is	  concerned	  with	  establishing	  channels	  for	  communication	  between	  police	  and	  local	  community	  members.	  A	  predicate	  of	  effective	  counter-­‐terrorism	  policing	  is	  that	  mechanisms	  should	  be	  in	  place	  so	  that	  police	  can	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  concerns	  and	  issues	  that	  are	  being	  picked	  up	  by	  a	  local	  community.	  The	  capacity	  and	  willingness	  of	  local	  communities	  to	  function	  as	  the	  eyes	  and	  ears	  of	  the	  police	  though,	  is	  enhanced	  by	  and	  possibly	  even	  dependent	  upon	  the	  workings	  of	  a	  ‘hearts	  and	  minds’	  strategy.	  This	  is	  about	  shaping	  the	  community	  context	  in	  order	  that	  people	  are	  persuaded	  of	  the	  necessity	  and	  desirability	  of	  conveying	  any	  suspicions	  or	  concerns	  to	  the	  police.	  	  There	  was	  evidence	  in	  the	  original	  study	  that	  even	  when	  confronted	  with	  evidence	  that	  extremist	  groups	  were	  active	  within	  their	  communities,	  people	  saw	  the	  police	  as	  a	  last	  resort.	  Reflecting	  comparatively	  high	  levels	  of	  collective	  efficacy,	  they	  preferred	  to	  try	  and	  manufacture	  community-­‐based	  solutions	  to	  any	  difficulties	  being	  encountered	  and	  would	  only	  tend	  to	  involve	  the	  police	  where	  these	  community	  efforts	  had	  failed,	  or	  possible	  threats	  were	  imminent.	  This	  preference	  for	  community	  solutions	  was	  compounded	  by	  the	  repercussions	  that	  they	  perceived	  would	  follow	  if	  their	  suspicions	  or	  allegations	  proved	  unfounded.	  They	  were	  not	  keen	  to	  provide	  information	  to	  police	  where	  there	  were	  uncertainties	  about	  its	  accuracy.	  In	  sum,	  the	  balance	  of	  evidence	  suggested	  that	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  Prevent	  was	  failing	  to	  gain	  traction.	  The	  communities’	  hearts	  and	  minds	  had	  not	  been	  won,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  they	  did	  not	  feel	  compelled	  to	  act	  as	  the	  eyes	  and	  ears	  of	  the	  police	  in	  terms	  of	  communicating	  community	  intelligence	  about	  when	  and	  where	  new	  risks	  and	  threats	  might	  be	  presenting.	  One	  aspect	  of	  the	  current	  research	  is	  to	  assess	  what	  progress	  is	  being	  made	  in	  moving	  past	  these	  inhibitors.	  As	  such,	  the	  study	  is	  positioned	  to	  attend	  particularly	  closely	  to	  how	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  being	  delivered	  ‘on	  the	  ground’.	  Attending	  to	  the	  local	  dimension	  is	  important,	  both	  in	  reflecting	  the	  evidence	  derived	  from	  the	  earlier	  study	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  catalyses	  and	  provides	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  onset	  of	  radicalisation,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  importance	  the	  Prevent	  Policing	  strategy	  has	  placed	  upon	  local	  action.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Preface	  to	  the	  ACPO	  Implementation	  Plan	  (2008:4),	  Sir	  Norman	  Bettison	  asserts	  that,	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CHAPTER	  2:	  THE	  ORGANISATION	  AND	  DELIVERY	  OF	  PREVENT	  POLICING	  In	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  framework	  for	  assessing	  its	  effects,	  this	  Chapter	  examines	  how	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  organized.	  For	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  Prevent	  policing	  and	  its	  association	  or	  otherwise	  with	  a	  range	  of	  outputs	  and	  outcomes,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  craft	  an	  understanding	  of	  its	  key	  processes	  and	  structures.	  Drawing	  in	  particular	  upon	  the	  qualitative	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  police	  officers	  and	  staff	  engaged	  in	  delivering	  Prevent	  services,	  the	  Chapter	  examines	  how	  police	  self-­‐assess	  the	  benefits	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  are	  currently	  organized.	  It	  should	  be	  clarified	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  discussion	  is	  not	  to	  inspect	  the	  quality	  of	  key	  processes	  and	  systems,	  nor	  to	  identify	  best	  practice	  recommendations.	  Rather,	  the	  aims	  are	  to:	  
• Describe	  the	  arrangements	  that	  underpin	  how	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  being	  delivered	  and	  explain	  why	  some	  of	  the	  key	  variations	  observed	  have	  been	  introduced;	  
• Use	  insights	  from	  police	  officers	  to	  construct	  some	  assessment	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  modes	  of	  organization,	  and	  their	  respective	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses;	  
• Develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  where	  there	  are	  opportunities	  for	  improvements	  to	  be	  introduced	  in	  processes	  and	  systems,	  in	  order	  for	  Prevent	  work	  to	  be	  delivered	  more	  effectively.	  The	  Chapter	  identifies	  some	  of	  the	  key	  themes	  relating	  to	  how	  police	  officers	  and	  staff	  involved	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  conceptualise	  and	  conduct	  this	  work.	  	  	  PREVENT	  AND	  COUNTER-­‐TERRORIST	  POLICING	  Following	  the	  attacks	  in	  America	  in	  2001,	  Madrid	  2004	  and	  London	  2005,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  attempted	  but	  disrupted	  plots,	  the	  organization	  and	  principal	  methodologies	  of	  counter-­‐terrorism	  work	  have	  been	  undergoing	  significant	  reform.	  In	  the	  UK	  much	  of	  this	  innovation	  has	  taken	  place	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme.	  The	  other	  strands	  of	  the	  cross-­‐government	  CONTEST	  strategy	  have	  effectively	  evolved	  out	  of	  and	  continued	  the	  kinds	  of	  working	  practices	  associated	  with	  established	  counter-­‐terrorist	  methods.	  The	  Prevent	  element	  is	  more	  distinctive.	  There	  are	  two	  dimensions	  that	  define	  the	  unique	  properties	  of	  Prevent	  policing:	  it	  institutionalizes	  logics	  of	  prevention,	  preemption	  and	  precaution;	  and	  it	  establishes	  a	  wide-­‐reaching	  ‘overt’	  CT	  capacity.	  	  Compared	  with	  the	  approach	  adopted	  by	  Prevent,	  the	  traditional	  model	  of	  CT	  policing	  was	  far	  more	  narrowly	  conceived	  and	  placed	  more	  accent	  upon	  the	  need	  for	  ‘covert’	  activity.5	  In	  effect	  it	  was	  predicated	  upon	  a	  threat-­‐centric	  model.	  That	  is,	  the	  principal	  focus	  was	  upon	  intercepting	  and	  interdicting	  motivated	  offenders.	  Much	  police	  activity	  was	  designed	  to	  be	  conducted	  in	  a	  comparatively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Innes,	  M.	  and	  D.	  Thiel	  (2008)	  ‘Policing	  terror’,	  in	  T.	  Newburn	  (ed.)	  The	  Handbook	  of	  Policing	  (2nd	  edn.).	  Cullompton:	  Willan.	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low	  visibility	  fashion.	  Within	  this	  framing	  preventative	  measures,	  were	  largely	  about	  disrupting	  plots	  and	  plotters.	  Relatedly,	  there	  was	  a	  more	  or	  less	  explicit	  focus	  upon	  the	  key	  individuals	  engaged	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  political	  violence,	  or	  those	  providing	  direct	  support	  to	  them.	  Under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  CONTEST	  strategy,	  this	  focus	  is	  now	  largely	  the	  preserve	  of	  the	  ‘Pursue’	  strand,	  which	  is	  envisaged	  as	  functioning	  in	  interaction	  with	  the	  Prevent	  programme.	  	  Though	  the	  above	  is	  a	  somewhat	  simplified	  and	  superficial	  depiction	  of	  Pursue,	  the	  key	  point	  is	  that	  compared	  with	  this	  orthodox	  model	  of	  CT	  policing	  the	  Prevent	  programme’s	  rationale	  was	  both	  ‘wider’	  and	  ‘deeper’	  in	  its	  reach.	  It	  was	  predicated	  upon	  the	  notion	  that	  reducing	  the	  risks	  of	  violent	  extremism	  involves	  two	  distinct	  sets	  of	  actions:	  
• General	  community	  level	  interventions	  designed	  to	  inhibit	  and	  decay	  existing	  and	  potential	  social	  support	  for	  violent	  extremist	  ideologies.	  Thus	  Prevent	  is	  as	  much	  concerned	  with	  the	  social	  environment	  in	  which	  risks	  and	  threats	  are	  propagated,	  as	  with	  threats	  themselves.	  It	  seeks	  to	  address	  vulnerabilities	  and	  enhance	  community	  resilience.	  
• Nested	  within	  these	  community	  level	  interventions	  there	  is	  of	  course	  a	  more	  specific	  targeted	  focus	  upon	  preventing	  the	  radicalisation	  of	  individuals	  and	  small	  groups.6	  Looking	  across	  the	  data	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  for	  those	  involved	  in	  delivering	  Prevent	  it	  has	  not	  always	  been	  clear	  where	  the	  balance	  between	  these	  two	  dimensions	  should	  be	  and	  how	  much	  resource	  should	  be	  attributed	  to	  each.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  changes	  induced	  by	  Prevent	  has	  been	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  aspects	  of	  CT	  work	  have	  been	  rendered	  more	  overt.	  Countering	  terrorism	  necessarily	  requires	  a	  degree	  of	  secrecy	  and	  much	  of	  what	  takes	  place	  does	  so	  out	  of	  public	  view.	  However,	  programs	  such	  as	  Prevent	  have	  necessarily	  rendered	  certain	  aspects	  much	  more	  publicly	  visible	  and	  accessible.	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  Prevent,	  this	  more	  visible	  and	  overt	  approach	  was	  not	  a	  notable	  feature,	  but	  rather	  is	  something	  that	  has	  been	  developed	  as	  the	  field	  methods	  used	  by	  police	  officers	  and	  staff	  have	  evolved.	  In	  so	  doing,	  it	  has	  helped	  to	  circumvent	  some	  long-­‐standing	  criticisms,	  “Because	  with	  Prevent	  there	  was	  rumours	  that	  we	  were	  spies,	  but	  you	  can’t	  spy	  when	  you’re	  actually	  going	  up	  to	  somebody	  and	  saying	  ‘Hi,	  I’m	  from	  the	  counter-­‐terrorism	  unit’.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐12)	  As	  the	  most	  public-­‐facing	  component	  of	  the	  CONTEST	  strategy,	  the	  Prevent	  work	  stream	  in	  particular	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  considerable	  public	  debate.	  	  Critics	  of	  the	  approach	  adopted	  have	  contended,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  that	  it	  has	  captured	  resources	  that	  might	  otherwise	  have	  been	  used	  for	  more	  mundane	  policing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Central	  to	  this	  aspect	  of	  Prevent	  is	  the	  Channel	  Project.	  Channel	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  process	  protecting	  vulnerable	  people,	  from	  any	  faith,	  ethnicity	  or	  background,	  who	  are	  assessed	  as	  vulnerable	  to	  risks	  of	  radicalization.	  This	  report	  does	  not	  address	  the	  workings	  of	  Channel	  in	  any	  detail.	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needs,	  and	  that	  it	  risks	  constructing	  certain	  groups	  as	  ‘suspect	  populations’.7	  	  However,	  we	  should	  not	  neglect	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Prevent	  approach	  self-­‐defines	  as	  instigating	  a	  marked	  change	  in	  strategy	  from	  how	  previous	  terrorist	  threats	  have	  been	  responded	  to.	  A	  common	  theme	  evident	  across	  the	  interviews	  with	  police	  staff	  engaged	  in	  delivering	  Prevent	  was	  that	  they	  all	  offered	  the	  view	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  this	  approach	  to	  CT	  policing	  has	  taken	  time	  to	  develop.	  Several	  respondents	  talked	  about	  policing	  having	  to	  work	  through	  a	  complete	  change	  of	  ‘mindset’	  in	  terms	  of	  positioning	  Prevent	  and	  understanding	  what	  it	  involves.	  Others	  intimated	  that	  at	  the	  outset,	  problems	  were	  encountered	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  in	  terms	  of	  systems,	  processes	  and	  tactics.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  due	  course,	  these	  early	  teething	  problems	  may	  have	  left	  a	  ‘toxic	  legacy’	  for	  the	  future.	  In	  part	  though,	  the	  early	  difficulties	  may	  simply	  have	  been	  something	  that	  had	  to	  be	  worked	  through	  with	  communities.	  As	  one	  officer	  describing	  the	  initial	  introduction	  of	  Prevent	  and	  the	  early	  interactions	  with	  communities	  put	  it,	  “This	  became	  the	  opportunity	  to	  take	  all	  of	  your	  frustrations	  and	  your	  anger	  and	  the	  vitriol	  and	  the	  things	  that	  have	  been	  pent	  up	  for	  a	  long,	  long-­‐time.	  That	  was	  undoubtedly	  challenging	  for	  the	  officers	  who	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  that	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  almost	  every	  relationship	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  forge.	  However,	  it	  was	  cathartic	  for	  the	  individual…and	  it	  was	  only	  once	  you	  had	  let	  that	  occur	  that	  you	  could	  then	  start	  to	  build	  a	  constructive	  relationship.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐24)	  Most	  of	  those	  interviewed	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  progressively	  the	  work	  of	  Prevent	  was	  being	  better	  conceptualized	  and	  some	  practical	  methodologies	  were	  being	  established	  across	  the	  community	  of	  practice.	  Enabling	  this	  ‘venting’	  of	  frustration	  is	  part	  of	  this.	  A	  critical	  factor	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  securing	  a	  ‘space’	  for	  Prevent.	  That	  is	  understanding	  how	  it	  is	  positioned	  somewhere	  between	  traditional	  models	  of	  ‘pursue’	  counter-­‐terrorist	  policing,	  and	  the	  work	  of	  Neighbourhood	  Policing	  teams	  on	  the	  other.	  Many	  interviewees	  felt	  that	  defining	  the	  ‘Prevent	  space’	  internally	  within	  the	  police	  organisations	  had	  probably	  had	  negative	  implications	  for	  external	  public-­‐facing	  relations	  with	  the	  public.	  Developing	  this	  theme	  a	  number	  of	  Prevent	  police	  officers	  cogently	  articulated	  how	  their	  work	  is	  shaped	  by	  a	  complex	  of	  forces.	  Sometimes	  these	  are	  coherent	  with	  each	  other,	  but	  at	  other	  times	  in	  tension.	  The	  Prevent	  teams	  are	  seeking	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  networks	  of	  contacts	  within	  the	  community.	  But	  they	  also	  have	  to	  act	  as	  a	  bridge	  internally	  between	  neighbourhood	  and	  Counter-­‐terrorism	  policing	  assets.	  	  	  	  	  The	  dynamics	  of	  the	  intra-­‐organisational	  relationships	  between	  Prevent,	  neighbourhood	  and	  CT	  officers	  is	  interesting	  to	  look	  at	  in	  more	  detail	  for	  a	  moment.	  The	  Prevent	  Implementation	  Plan	  (Restricted	  Version	  1.2)	  envisaged	  two	  counter	  terrorism	  roles,	  that	  of	  Counter	  Terrorism	  Field	  Intelligence	  Officer	  and	  a	  Community	  Engagement	  Officer.	  Many	  of	  those	  officers	  now	  engaged	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	  for	  example	  Pantazis	  and	  Pemberton	  (2009)	  ‘From	  the	  old	  to	  the	  new	  suspect	  community’,	  British	  Journal	  of	  Criminology,	  49:	  646-­‐66;	  and	  some	  of	  the	  submissions	  reported	  on	  pages	  8/9	  Communities	  and	  Local	  Government	  Committee	  (2010)	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these	  roles	  have	  come	  from	  a	  NPT	  or	  training	  background,	  but	  see	  their	  current	  role	  as	  different.	  	  Intriguingly,	  there	  are	  some	  clear	  variations	  apparent	  in	  how	  the	  different	  forces	  have	  organised	  to	  deliver	  these	  roles.	  In	  Surrey	  and	  Manchester,	  the	  community	  engagement	  officers	  who	  undertake	  much	  of	  the	  work	  of	  interacting	  with	  members	  of	  communities	  are	  civilian	  employees,	  rather	  than	  police	  officers.	  	  Called	  Community	  Relations	  Officers	  in	  Manchester,	  these	  staff	  members	  regard	  CT	  as	  part	  of,	  rather	  than	  all	  of,	  what	  is	  described	  by	  their	  role.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  Cardiff	  and	  Surrey.	  Not	  all	  of	  the	  forces	  studied	  were	  clear	  that	  staff	  engaged	  in	  Prevent	  activities	  should	  be	  open	  with	  the	  public	  about	  who	  they	  were	  and	  what	  they	  do.	  Consequently,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  this	  public	  visibility	  was	  enacted	  varied.	  The	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Field	  Intelligence	  Officers	  in	  GMP	  for	  example,	  had	  only	  recently	  shifted	  to	  an	  overt	  role	  “I’m	  now	  overt…Now	  that	  has	  only	  just	  changed	  recently	  and	  it’s	  only	  in	  the	  last	  two	  or	  three	  weeks	  that	  we’re	  getting	  to	  a	  position	  where	  I	  am	  now	  going	  out	  and	  introducing	  myself	  as	  a	  field	  intelligence	  officer	  from	  the	  counter-­‐terrorism	  unit…at	  the	  moment	  I	  haven’t	  come	  across	  anybody	  that	  has	  a	  real	  problem	  with	  the	  role	  at	  all.	  Everybody	  that	  I’ve	  spoken	  to	  has	  been	  very	  supportive.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐04)	  As	  this	  officer	  details,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  positive	  public	  response	  to	  this	  more	  open	  way	  of	  working.	  In	  part,	  the	  officer’s	  positive	  commentary	  on	  this	  reform	  may	  reflect	  how,	  prior	  to	  working	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  officers	  were	  having	  to	  negotiate	  some	  complex	  ‘back-­‐stage’	  and	  ‘front-­‐stage’	  arrangements,	  “Initially	  we	  were	  covert.	  So	  that	  came	  with	  problems,	  because	  being	  on	  division	  you	  were	  overt	  to	  the	  police	  officers	  and	  the	  police	  staff…you	  had	  to	  stress	  to	  the	  officers	  when	  they	  were	  doing	  their	  enquiries	  don’t	  be	  telling	  this	  person	  that	  you’re	  talking	  to	  that	  I’m	  now	  going	  to	  go	  back	  and	  liaise	  with	  the	  counter-­‐terrorism	  officer	  on	  division.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐04)	  This	  description	  affords	  some	  insight	  into	  the	  complex	  considerations	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  adopting	  a	  more	  covert	  role	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  The	  strong	  consensus	  across	  the	  data	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  the	  more	  transparent	  approach	  that	  has	  been	  developed	  circumvents	  many	  of	  these	  issues	  and	  is	  actually	  valued	  by	  the	  public.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  aspects	  of	  counter-­‐terrorism	  policing	  can	  be	  delivered	  overtly,	  but	  such	  arrangements	  should	  be	  restricted	  to	  where	  they	  are	  absolutely	  necessary.	  The	  natural	  disposition	  for	  officers	  drawn	  from	  a	  CT	  background	  is	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  low-­‐visibility	  fashion,	  but	  by	  blending	  aspects	  of	  CT	  and	  Neighbourhood	  Policing	  methods	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  broad	  public	  acceptance	  for	  Prevent	  being	  delivered	  more	  openly.	  	  Reflecting	  their	  status	  as	  civilian	  employees,	  the	  Prevent	  operatives	  in	  Surrey,	  and	  Manchester	  did	  not	  wear	  police	  uniforms.	  Neither	  did	  the	  community	  engagement	  police	  officers	  in	  Cardiff	  except	  when	  a	  specific	  task	  required	  it.	  Contrastingly,	  in	  Birmingham	  the	  officers	  interviewed,	  called	  Security	  and	  Partnership	  Officers	  thought	  it	  important	  for	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  public	  that	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they	  conducted	  their	  work	  in	  uniform.	  They	  were	  unique	  across	  all	  forces	  studied	  in	  that	  the	  SPO	  role	  combines	  both	  CTFIO	  and	  CEO	  roles	  into	  one.	  This	  was	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First	  it	  was	  felt	  to	  clarify	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  form	  of	  ‘spying’,	  and	  was	  in	  fact	  legitimate	  policing	  activity.	  Second,	  they	  believed	  that	  by	  being	  open	  they	  were	  in	  fact	  signaling	  clearly	  and	  unambiguously	  to	  the	  communities	  they	  were	  in	  direct	  contact	  with	  who	  to	  contact	  should	  the	  need	  arise.	  Officers	  in	  the	  West	  Midlands	  had	  arguably	  taken	  public	  visibility	  the	  furthest	  with	  their	  Security	  and	  Partnerships	  Officers.	  Their	  role	  was	  described	  as,	  “…based	  locally	  in	  uniform	  and	  overtly	  counter-­‐terrorist,	  so	  they	  will	  state	  who	  they	  are.”	  (Police,	  2611-­‐11)	  It	  was	  notable	  that	  when	  they	  introduced	  themselves	  to	  members	  of	  the	  public	  they	  would	  say	  that	  they	  were	  ‘counter-­‐terrorism	  officers’	  where	  all	  other	  forces’	  officers	  would	  not.	  Additional	  reasons	  for	  adopting	  this	  approach	  were	  articulated.	  First,	  and	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  due	  course,	  they	  felt	  that	  ‘Prevent’	  was	  a	  ‘tainted	  brand’.	  As	  such,	  being	  labeled	  as	  a	  ‘Prevent	  officer’	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  something	  that	  would	  hinder	  rather	  than	  progress	  their	  relations	  with	  members	  of	  the	  public.	  Whilst	  recognising	  that	  there	  was	  a	  certain	  ‘shock	  value’	  in	  public	  interactions,	  at	  least	  initially,	  the	  WMP	  officers	  view	  was	  that	  self-­‐defining	  as	  counter-­‐terrorism	  officers	  provided	  an	  honest	  and	  transparent	  basis	  for	  dialogue	  with	  the	  public.	  A	  small	  number	  of	  community	  respondents	  explicitly	  commended	  and	  supported	  this	  approach,	  “I	  think	  they’re	  getting	  more	  out	  of	  people	  when	  they’re	  being	  transparent…Simple,	  if	  I	  know	  exactly	  where	  you’re	  coming	  from	  I	  am	  going	  to	  be	  less	  defensive	  when	  I’m	  speaking	  to	  you.”	  (Community,	  2654-­‐01)	  The	  accounts	  provided	  by	  Prevent	  officers	  clearly	  convey	  a	  strong	  belief	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  evolved	  rapidly	  over	  the	  past	  three	  years.	  Albeit	  there	  is	  not	  an	  established	  doctrine	  for	  Prevent,	  an	  increasing	  sense	  of	  definition	  about	  how	  to	  do	  Prevent	  is	  in	  evidence.	  But	  this	  progress	  has	  induced	  new	  concerns:	  “I	  think	  we’ve	  got	  to	  a	  stage	  where	  we’ve	  got	  the	  real	  issue	  around	  Prevent	  now.	  Where	  do	  we	  go	  with	  this,	  and	  I	  think	  we	  will	  need	  guidance	  on	  how	  you	  do	  that.	  What	  are	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  for	  intervention	  providers?...I	  think	  there	  are	  lots	  of	  areas	  that	  we’ll	  need	  to	  develop.”	  (Police,	  2611-­‐12)	  As	  this	  officer	  intimates,	  on	  the	  ground	  there	  is	  some	  concern	  about	  the	  alignment	  between	  the	  strategic	  positioning	  and	  understanding	  of	  Prevent,	  and	  the	  ‘state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art’	  in	  terms	  practice.	  A	  similar	  view	  was	  articulated	  by	  several	  police	  staff.	  	  COMMUNITY	  ENGAGEMENT	  Engagement	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  Prevent	  is	  designed	  to	  perform	  two	  main	  functions.	  First,	  it	  should	  provide	  a	  communication	  channel	  in	  order	  that	  individuals	  and	  groups	  can	  convey	  their	  concerns	  to	  the	  police	  in	  the	  form	  of	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community	  intelligence.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  though,	  engagement	  should	  be	  used	  by	  police	  to	  inform	  and	  reassure	  communities	  about	  their	  activities.	  Looking	  across	  the	  four	  sites	  there	  were	  clear	  divisions	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  engagement	  activities	  were	  being	  conceived	  and	  performed.	  	  	  In	  GMP	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  Prevent	  engagement	  activity	  was	  being	  performed	  by	  the	  Neighbourhood	  Policing	  Teams	  (NPTs)	  and	  a	  small	  team	  of	  Borough	  based	  Community	  Relations	  Officers	  (CROs)	  as	  described	  above.	  	  It	  was	  suggested	  that	  NPTs,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  embedding	  in	  neighbourhoods,	  already	  have	  the	  kinds	  of	  connectivity	  that	  enable	  them	  to	  know	  about	  much	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on	  within	  and	  across	  particular	  communities.	  Rather	  than	  introducing	  an	  additional	  layer	  of	  police-­‐community	  interactions,	  a	  decision	  had	  been	  taken	  that,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  it	  was	  better	  to	  harness	  the	  inter-­‐personal	  communication	  networks	  that	  were	  already	  established.	  The	  role	  of	  CRO	  in	  Manchester	  pre-­‐dates	  the	  introduction	  of	  Prevent	  by	  several	  years.	  Similar	  to	  the	  rationale	  invoked	  for	  trying	  to	  harness	  NPTs,	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  rather	  than	  re-­‐inventing	  established	  systems,	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  re-­‐purpose	  those	  already	  in	  situ.	  As	  such,	  Prevent	  engagement	  in	  GMP	  involved	  a	  series	  of	  intermediaries,	  rather	  than	  involving	  Prevent	  officers	  in	  direct	  contacts	  themselves.	  At	  a	  practical	  level	  though,	  concerns	  were	  evident	  in	  some	  of	  the	  comments	  made	  by	  GMP	  officers	  about	  the	  adequacy	  of	  their	  communication	  networks.	  For	  example,	  one	  officer,	  when	  discussing	  how	  communities	  were	  often	  expelling	  radical	  individuals	  without	  police	  assistance	  noted	  that,	  “The	  mainstream	  Mosques	  are	  expelling	  and	  saying	  you’re	  not	  welcome	  here…I’m	  seeing	  that	  not	  through	  the	  individuals	  I	  am	  talking	  to,	  but	  as	  a	  result	  of	  other	  intelligence	  reporting.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐03)	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  local	  Mosques	  were	  actively	  engaged	  in	  managing	  the	  problem	  is	  obviously	  a	  strong	  point.	  However,	  it	  is	  potentially	  somewhat	  worrying	  that	  such	  interventions	  were	  not	  being	  brought	  to	  police	  attention	  through	  their	  community	  contacts.	  	  Cardiff’s	  approach	  was	  both	  similar	  to	  and	  different	  from	  the	  arrangements	  observed	  in	  GMP.	  Their	  Prevent	  policing	  officers	  were	  mostly	  drawn	  from	  established	  NPTs,	  prior	  to	  being	  seconded	  to	  the	  new	  unit.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  initially	  helpful	  in	  that	  these	  individuals	  already	  had	  established	  networks	  of	  community	  contacts	  that	  they	  could	  use	  in	  their	  new	  role.	  However,	  when	  interviewed	  these	  officers	  acknowledged	  that	  whilst	  they	  had	  good	  working	  relationships	  with	  some	  communities,	  they	  had	  been	  less	  successful	  in	  engaging	  with	  newer	  and	  emergent	  communities	  in	  the	  City.	  The	  insight	  this	  affords	  i	  that	  ‘good	  community	  contact’	  is	  not	  equivalent	  to	  the	  capability	  to	  engage	  with	  plural	  communities.	  These	  two	  examples	  help	  to	  clarify	  an	  important	  conceptual	  distinction	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  community	  engagement	  work.	  We	  can	  distinguish	  between	  the	  ‘reach	  down’	  into	  a	  community	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  ‘reach	  across’	  different	  communities:	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• ‘Reach	  down’	  refers	  to	  whether	  the	  relations	  with	  particular	  groups	  are	  sufficient	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  obtain	  community	  intelligence	  about	  what	  is	  really	  going	  on	  within	  a	  specific	  group.	  This	  involves	  being	  able	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  community	  leaders	  and	  gatekeepers	  and	  to	  access	  information	  about	  those	  individuals	  who	  might	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  extremist	  influences.	  	  
• In	  contrast,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘reach	  across’	  seeks	  to	  recognise	  that	  although	  references	  are	  often	  made	  to	  the	  Muslim	  community,	  such	  statements	  are	  largely	  misleading.	  People	  from	  the	  Muslim	  faith,	  just	  like	  individuals	  from	  other	  faith	  backgrounds,	  are	  participants	  in	  a	  number	  of	  overlapping,	  interacting	  and	  fluid	  social	  networks.	  Thus	  an	  effective	  community	  engagement	  strategy	  will	  demonstrate	  a	  capacity	  to	  connect	  with	  all	  of	  the	  major	  identity	  based	  groupings	  in	  an	  area.	  In	  the	  West	  Midlands,	  the	  police	  had	  originally	  envisaged	  pursuing	  a	  similar	  approach	  to	  GMP.	  However,	  they	  concluded	  that	  their	  NP	  assets	  were	  not	  consistently	  of	  sufficient	  quality	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  participate	  effectively	  in	  delivering	  Prevent	  activities.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  within	  the	  Prevent	  component	  of	  the	  CTU	  staff,	  they	  introduced	  their	  own	  engagement	  processes	  and	  officers.	  This	  has	  they	  assert,	  afforded	  them	  a	  high	  quality	  form	  of	  community	  engagement	  focused	  upon	  Muslim	  communities.	  This	  was	  different	  from	  Surrey	  where	  civilian	  Community	  Engagement	  Officers	  (CEOs)	  were	  responsible	  for	  developing	  and	  sustaining	  a	  network	  of	  contacts,	  whereas	  separate	  police	  intelligence	  officers	  were	  tasked	  to	  use	  these	  contacts	  to	  generate	  intelligence.	  Such	  considerations	  resonate	  with	  comments	  made	  by	  some	  of	  the	  community	  members	  interviewed	  for	  the	  study.	  There	  were	  repeated	  mentions	  of	  having	  multiple	  contacts	  with	  police	  officers	  drawn	  from	  different	  units.	  So	  one	  day	  they	  might	  talk	  to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  NPT,	  on	  another	  day	  it	  might	  be	  someone	  from	  the	  CTU	  or	  the	  Security	  Service.	  	  Many	  people	  said	  they	  found	  this	  confusing	  and	  their	  preference	  would	  be	  for	  a	  single	  point	  of	  contact.	  There	  is	  also	  an	  information	  control	  point	  relating	  to	  such	  an	  approach.	  Members	  of	  the	  public	  frequently	  intimated	  that	  they	  assumed	  that	  if	  they	  had	  told	  something	  to	  one	  officer,	  then	  officers	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  organisation	  would	  be	  made	  aware	  of	  this.	  However,	  previous	  experience	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  assumptions	  cannot	  be	  made	  that	  information	  will	  be	  internally	  channeled	  to	  where	  it	  needs	  to	  go.	  In	  the	  preceding	  section	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  officers	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  tensions	  to	  arise	  between	  their	  overt	  work	  and	  the	  more	  clandestine	  activities	  of	  other	  agencies.	  Importantly	  though,	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  tensions	  were	  evident	  in	  communities.	  Respondents	  in	  both	  Surrey	  and	  the	  West	  Midlands	  talked	  in	  detail	  in	  their	  interviews	  about	  these	  issues	  and	  the	  negative	  repercussions	  they	  had	  upon	  their	  motivation	  to	  engage	  with	  police	  more	  generally.	  As	  they	  argued,	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  engage	  through	  Prevent	  with	  the	  police	  precisely	  because	  it	  was	  transparent	  and	  because	  it	  was	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do	  to	  protect	  their	  community.	  There	  was	  some	  evidence	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  tensions	  some	  individuals	  were	  disengaging	  from	  the	  police	  and	  it	  appeared	  that	  often	  the	  Prevent	  officers	  were	  unaware	  of	  the	  reasons	  why.	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Of	  the	  four	  forces	  examined,	  WMP	  probably	  evidenced	  the	  most	  robust	  approach	  to	  community	  engagement.	  To	  a	  large	  part	  this	  reflected	  how	  they	  had	  specifically	  set	  out	  to	  construct	  a	  community	  intelligence	  network.	  Over	  a	  twelve	  month	  period	  officers	  from	  the	  Prevent	  office	  of	  the	  CTU	  had	  undertaken	  to	  deliberately	  establish	  contacts	  across	  a	  range	  of	  different	  groups.	  It	  was	  a	  process	  that	  according	  to	  the	  local	  Chief	  Inspector	  had	  yielded	  important	  benefits,	  “Internally	  the	  role	  very	  quickly	  began	  to	  justify	  itself.	  The	  uplift	  in	  community	  contacts	  in	  community	  intelligence	  was	  significant.”	  [Police,	  2659-­‐24]	  This	  suggests	  that	  establishing	  a	  systematic	  and	  structured	  network	  of	  contacts	  combining	  reach	  down	  and	  across	  communities	  can	  do	  much	  to	  improve	  the	  situational	  awareness	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  	  The	  network	  that	  has	  been	  constructed	  has	  been	  managed	  in	  a	  deliberate	  and	  careful	  way,	  as	  described	  by	  a	  female	  officer	  who	  has	  been	  pivotal	  in	  its	  inception,	  “We	  never	  ask	  any	  of	  our	  contacts	  to	  give	  us	  intelligence,	  we’d	  never	  task	  them…however	  if	  you	  have	  something…”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐15)	  As	  this	  quotation	  conveys,	  the	  police	  have	  been	  careful	  not	  to	  ‘task’	  or	  ‘ask’	  these	  community	  contacts	  for	  intelligence.	  Rather	  the	  approach	  works	  by	  establishing	  communication	  channels	  that	  can	  be	  harnessed	  as	  and	  when	  they	  are	  required.	  There	  is	  considerable	  effort	  involved	  in	  maintaining	  these	  inter-­‐personal	  communication	  networks,	  but	  there	  is	  an	  acceptance	  that	  these	  communication	  channels	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  always	  ‘on’.	  They	  are	  turned	  ‘off’	  and	  ‘on’	  in	  response	  to	  community	  needs.	  Police	  also	  utilize	  them	  to	  ‘push’	  relevant	  information	  out	  into	  communities.	  Whilst	  the	  WMP	  approach	  displays	  a	  sophisticated	  understanding	  of	  community	  dynamics	  and	  how	  people	  interface	  with	  police	  around	  some	  sensitive	  and	  difficult	  issues,	  we	  should	  not	  over-­‐state	  what	  has	  been	  accomplished.	  As	  will	  be	  detailed	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  there	  are	  suggestions	  that	  WMP’s	  reach	  across	  some	  relevant	  community	  groups	  remains	  partial.	  Arguably	  even	  more	  significantly	  though,	  in	  spite	  of	  these	  networks	  of	  community	  contacts,	  the	  police	  engaged	  in	  an	  initiative	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  significantly	  undermine	  the	  good	  work	  they	  have	  conducted.	  As	  has	  been	  widely	  reported	  in	  the	  national	  media,	  Project	  Champion	  was	  publicly	  presented	  as	  a	  scheme	  to	  introduce	  a	  sophisticated	  network	  of	  CCTV	  and	  Automatic	  Number	  Plate	  Recognition	  (ANPR)	  cameras	  into	  a	  particular	  area	  of	  Birmingham	  to	  help	  prevent	  crime.	  These	  cameras	  were	  not	  supported	  by	  Prevent	  policing	  funds,	  but	  a	  public	  scandal	  arose	  though	  when	  it	  was	  revealed	  that	  the	  funding	  for	  these	  cameras	  was	  coming	  from	  a	  counter	  terrorism	  budget,	  with	  the	  strong	  implication	  being	  that	  the	  cameras	  were	  designed	  for	  CT	  surveillance	  rather	  than	  general	  crime	  prevention.8	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  A	  more	  detailed	  account	  is	  provided	  in	  Sara	  Thornton’s	  review	  available	  at	  www.west-­‐midlands.police.uk/latest-­‐news/Champion_Review_Final_30_09_10	  	  accessed	  01/04/11.	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During	  the	  interviews	  with	  local	  Prevent	  police	  staff	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  they	  had	  been	  surprised	  by	  the	  events	  around	  Project	  Champion	  and	  that	  they	  were	  unaware	  that	  the	  cameras	  were	  being	  paid	  for	  by	  wider	  counter-­‐terrorism	  funds.	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  even	  within	  a	  single	  police	  force,	  different	  police	  teams	  are	  not	  necessarily	  joined-­‐up.	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  them	  suggested	  that,	  contrary	  to	  reports	  in	  some	  national	  newspapers,	  the	  fabric	  of	  trust	  with	  local	  communities	  had	  not	  been	  irreparably	  damaged.	  Indeed,	  they	  claimed	  that,	  for	  example,	  there	  had	  not	  been	  a	  dramatic	  fall-­‐off	  in	  the	  number	  of	  community	  intelligence	  submissions.	  The	  validity	  of	  such	  a	  claim	  is	  hard	  to	  establish,	  however,	  some	  community	  representatives	  were	  more	  equivocal	  about	  the	  repercussions.	  For	  example,	  one	  man	  who	  had	  been	  working	  closely	  with	  the	  police	  for	  several	  years	  told	  how,	  “We	  felt	  totally	  betrayed.	  Well	  we	  couldn’t	  walk	  away	  because	  we’d	  worked	  quite	  hard	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  it	  was	  to	  stand	  and	  fight	  it,	  and	  deal	  with	  the	  situation….The	  relationship	  between	  the	  police	  and	  the	  community	  was	  severed,	  you	  know	  there	  was	  a	  void	  left	  there,	  it	  was	  like	  total	  mistrust.”	  (Community,	  2654-­‐04)	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  although	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  police	  has	  now	  been	  repaired	  a	  bit,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  it	  was.	  He	  articulates	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  how	  a	  number	  of	  community	  representatives	  recognise	  that	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  problem	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  and	  as	  a	  consequence,	  even	  when	  things	  go	  badly	  wrong,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  appropriate	  to	  disengage	  from	  the	  police.	  The	  repercussions	  associated	  with	  this	  particular	  high-­‐profile	  case	  shines	  a	  light	  upon	  some	  of	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  trust	  relationships	  that	  are	  built	  between	  police	  and	  communities.	  The	  picture	  that	  emerges	  is	  of	  individuals	  and	  groups	  trusting	  particular	  individual	  officers,	  whilst	  displaying	  distrust	  of	  the	  police	  as	  an	  institution.	  	  THE	  CONSEQUENCES	  OF	  VISIBLE	  PREVENT	  POLICING	  It	  has	  been	  identified	  that	  one	  of	  the	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  its	  overt	  nature.	  All	  of	  the	  forces	  studied	  were	  clear	  that	  Prevent	  was	  a	  public-­‐facing	  aspect	  of	  policing.	  They	  all	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  engagement	  as	  part	  of	  their	  visible	  presence	  and	  had	  processes	  in	  place	  to	  support	  this	  activity.	  However,	  a	  recurrent	  theme	  in	  many	  of	  the	  community	  interviews	  was	  that	  whilst	  the	  police	  are	  visible,	  they	  have	  been	  less	  successful	  in	  establishing	  and	  embedding	  engagement	  networks.	  	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  this	  concern	  in	  more	  detail,	  we	  conducted	  a	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  (BCS)	  data.	  The	  BCS	  includes	  the	  question	  ‘how	  
often	  do	  you	  see	  a	  Police	  Officer	  or	  PCSO	  on	  foot	  patrol?’	  	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  responses	  to	  this	  shows	  that	  police	  have	  greatest	  visibility	  for	  Muslim	  respondents.	  	  Muslims	  were	  twice	  as	  likely	  as	  the	  general	  population	  to	  see	  police	  or	  PCSO’s	  in	  their	  area	  ‘once	  a	  day	  or	  more’	  -­‐	  20	  percent	  and	  10	  percent	  respectively.	  	  Only	  1	  in	  10	  Muslims	  responded	  that	  they	  ‘never’	  see	  a	  police	  presence	  in	  their	  area	  compared	  with	  approximately	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  general	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population.	  	  	  The	  high	  visibility	  of	  police	  for	  Muslim	  respondents	  did	  not,	  however,	  co-­‐exist	  with	  familiarity.	  	  	  Only	  6	  percent	  of	  Muslims	  knew	  a	  police	  or	  PCSO	  officer	  by	  name	  and	  sight	  compared	  with	  14	  percent	  of	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Despite	  reporting	  frequent	  sightings	  of	  police	  on	  foot	  in	  their	  area,	  the	  percentage	  knowing	  a	  name	  or	  recognising	  a	  face	  was	  also	  substantially	  lower	  than	  for	  the	  general	  population.	  	  However,	  it	  holds	  for	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people	  do	  not	  report	  any	  familiarity	  with	  police	  or	  PCSO	  officers	  in	  their	  area.	  Figure	  1:	  Police	  and	  PCSO	  familiarity	  	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2008/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  Taken	  in	  conjunction	  with	  some	  of	  the	  qualitative	  interview	  comments,	  these	  results	  suggest	  that	  whilst	  police	  are	  visible	  in	  many	  Muslim	  communities,	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  converting	  this	  into	  being	  engaged	  with	  these	  communities.	  Potentially	  this	  points	  to	  some	  limitations	  with	  how	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  being	  conceptualized	  and	  practiced.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  local	  publics	  interpret	  such	  patterns	  of	  activity	  as	  policing	  of	  rather	  than	  for	  their	  community.9	  Overall,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  nuance	  pertaining	  to	  how	  police	  self-­‐assess	  the	  value	  added	  by	  their	  engagement	  and	  visibility	  activities.	  The	  social	  science	  literature	  on	  the	  workings	  of	  social	  networks	  distinguishes	  between	  ‘strong’	  and	  ‘weak’	  ties.	  Strong	  ties	  are	  based	  upon	  a	  deep	  connection	  often	  between	  individuals	  predicated	  upon	  high	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐personal	  trust.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  ‘weak	  ties’	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  numerous,	  more	  ephemeral,	  and	  more	  fragile.	  However,	  they	  can	  be	  very	  useful	  in	  that	  they	  facilitate	  a	  degree	  of	  connectivity	  across	  disparate	  social	  groups.	  Assessing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  different	  organisational	  approaches	  to	  engagement	  and	  visibility	  it	  appears	  that	  police	  were	  better	  able	  to	  evidence	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  ‘strong’	  community	  contacts	  with	  a	  small	  number	  of	  people,	  rather	  than	  a	  widespread	  network	  of	  weak	  ties.	  Ideally	  an	  effective	  approach	  to	  Prevent	  policing	  would	  combine	  strong	  and	  weak	  ties.	  	  Practically	  though,	  given	  constraints	  upon	  time	  and	  resources,	  this	  does	  suggest	  that	  in	  some	  areas	  police	  slightly	  loosening	  ties	  with	  some	  established	  community	  contacts	  could	  be	  beneficial	  in	  releasing	  capacity	  to	  develop	  some	  new	  weak	  ties.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	  authors	  are	  grateful	  to	  Mike	  Levi	  for	  this	  distinction.	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A	  second	  constraint	  with	  the	  delivery	  arrangements	  for	  Prevent	  policing	  relates	  to	  the	  preponderance	  of	  interest	  and	  attention	  having	  been	  given	  to	  establishing	  new	  systems	  and	  structures.	  The	  variations	  in	  on	  the	  ground	  practice	  highlighted	  above,	  are	  suggestive	  that	  perhaps	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  ‘recipe	  knowledge’	  about	  how	  to	  practically	  do	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  required.	  For	  example,	  how	  to	  construct	  a	  network	  of	  community	  contacts	  based	  upon	  both	  strong	  and	  weak	  ties	  is	  clearly	  a	  question	  that	  could	  be	  addressed.	  	  From	  the	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  Prevent	  staff	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  many	  of	  them	  felt	  they	  were	  frequently	  improvising	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  complex	  problems	  and	  circumstances	  encountered.	  Many	  of	  them	  described	  innovative	  and	  effective	  examples	  of	  practical	  problem-­‐solving.	  Equally	  however,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  these	  kinds	  of	  practical	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  were	  partial	  and	  not	  available	  in	  a	  central	  repository	  or	  ‘how	  to’	  manual	  of	  key	  tasks	  associated	  with	  Prevent	  policing.	  One	  officer	  involved	  in	  Prevent	  activities	  described	  how,	  “…we	  were	  then	  tasked	  to	  deal	  with	  people	  who	  fell	  out	  of	  that	  operation	  and	  that	  has	  been	  problematic	  in	  that	  we	  have	  had	  no	  specific	  training	  for	  carrying	  out	  that	  intervention.	  How	  do	  you	  go	  to	  somebody	  who’s	  believed	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  a	  group…and	  say	  to	  them	  ‘what	  grievance	  have	  you	  got,	  what	  are	  your	  worries,	  talk	  to	  us’	  when	  they	  already	  possibly,	  are	  well	  down	  the	  path	  of	  radicalisation?	  So	  how	  do	  we	  get	  trained	  into	  that?	  How	  do	  we	  manage	  that	  process	  and	  how	  do	  we	  deal	  with	  that?”	  (Police,	  2611-­‐12)	  The	  expression	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  confidence	  was	  striking	  given	  that	  in	  some	  other	  sites	  officers	  seemed	  far	  more	  comfortable	  and	  experienced	  in	  doing	  precisely	  this	  kind	  of	  activity.	  	  RELATIONS	  WITH	  PARTNERS	  As	  was	  noted	  in	  the	  Introduction	  to	  this	  report,	  Prevent	  is	  a	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  endeavor	  requiring	  the	  involvement	  of	  many	  agencies.	  Many	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed	  commented	  upon	  how	  much	  time,	  resource	  and	  effort	  was	  going	  in	  to	  supporting	  partnership	  working.	  In	  describing	  their	  work	  patterns	  and	  routines,	  many	  police	  staff	  intimated	  that	  they	  were	  investing	  heavily	  in	  managing	  partnership	  activity.	  The	  concern	  with	  this	  is	  that	  these	  inward	  directed	  conversations	  are	  only	  useful	  if	  they	  are	  adding	  value	  to	  the	  public	  facing	  delivery	  of	  Prevent.	  It	  was	  not	  always	  clear	  that	  this	  was	  the	  case.	  Overall,	  across	  the	  four	  research	  sites,	  the	  picture	  was	  mixed.	  	  Some	  interviewees	  described	  strong	  and	  resilient	  partner	  relations.	  However,	  in	  other	  areas	  these	  were	  depicted	  as	  much	  more	  fragile.	  For	  example,	  Surrey	  officers	  reported	  that	  their	  contacts	  briefing	  a	  private	  contractor’s	  dustbin	  men	  had	  been	  very	  positive.	  But	  the	  experience	  of	  briefing	  local	  council	  staff	  much	  less	  so.	  An	  awful	  lot	  of	  time,	  resource	  and	  energy	  is	  being	  directed	  to	  developing	  partnership	  working,	  but	  a	  robust	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  on	  the	  outcomes	  being	  derived	  from	  such	  investments	  is	  probably	  warranted.	  A	  number	  of	  police	  interviewees	  intimated	  that	  in	  reality	  they	  were	  spending	  the	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majority	  of	  their	  time	  working	  with	  and	  through	  partners,	  rather	  than	  in	  a	  more	  directly	  public-­‐facing	  way.	  Effective	  partnership	  working	  is	  critical	  to	  Prevent,	  but	  the	  evidence	  collated	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  wide	  variations	  in	  the	  costs,	  efficacy	  and	  value	  being	  added	  by	  some	  local	  arrangements.	  	  What	  this	  moves	  us	  towards	  is	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  understanding	  of	  the	  diverse	  range	  of	  engagement	  activity	  being	  undertaken	  by	  Prevent	  officers.	  Although	  it	  is	  the	  most	  visible	  manifestation	  of	  CT	  policing,	  much	  of	  this	  activity	  is	  still	  ‘backstage’	  in	  that	  it	  is	  largely	  removed	  from	  public	  view.	  Prevent	  officers	  are	  routinely	  establishing	  and	  maintaining	  networks	  of	  contacts	  ranging	  across	  the	  following	  groups:	  
• CT	  officers	  
• NP	  officers	  
• Partner	  agencies	  
• Private	  contractors	  
• Local	  businesses	  
• Community	  leaders	  
• ‘Ordinary’	  citizens	  As	  Prevent	  has	  matured	  and	  developed,	  and	  as	  the	  threat	  environment	  has	  adapted	  so	  connections	  to	  new	  partners	  have	  been	  formed.	  For	  example	  in	  the	  West	  Midlands,	  reflecting	  increasing	  concern	  about	  the	  potential	  for	  ‘Lone-­‐Wolf’	  extremists,	  increasing	  work	  has	  been	  done	  to	  involve	  Mental	  Health	  specialists	  and	  local	  partners.	  The	  research	  was	  not	  able	  to	  assess	  the	  efficacy	  of	  such	  an	  approach,	  but	  a	  potential	  for	  ‘net-­‐widening’	  should	  be	  guarded	  against.	  The	  key	  learning	  point	  though	  is	  that	  Prevent	  partnerships	  between	  police	  and	  others	  need	  to	  be	  conceived	  as	  responsive	  and	  adaptive,	  rather	  than	  being	  based	  upon	  a	  fixed	  format	  and	  membership.	  Mechanisms	  need	  to	  be	  introduced	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  partners	  being	  engaged	  in	  the	  Prevent	  process	  possess	  the	  skills	  and	  expertise	  required	  to	  service	  local	  needs.	  This	  could	  be	  accomplished	  by	  requiring	  all	  Prevent	  partnerships	  to	  undertake	  a	  periodic	  assessment	  of	  their	  exposure	  to	  particular	  vulnerabilities	  and	  threats,	  and	  whether	  current	  partnering	  arrangements	  fit	  with	  these.	  In	  sum,	  Prevent	  policing	  engages	  in	  two	  main	  forms	  of	  community	  engagement:	  
• Internal	  engagements:	  that	  network	  Prevent	  officers	  with	  others	  within	  the	  police	  organisation,	  and	  also	  with	  local	  authority	  partners.	  
• External	  engagements:	  are	  more	  public	  facing	  and	  involve	  connecting	  with	  citizens	  and	  civil	  society	  groups	  more	  directly.	  	  	  DISRUPTION	  AND	  CONSEQUENCE	  MANAGEMENT	  Engagement	  is	  a	  key	  activity	  for	  Prevent	  policing.	  However,	  it	  has	  a	  more	  direct	  interventionist	  dimension	  as	  well.	  These	  interventions	  were	  undertaken	  to	  inhibit	  and	  disrupt	  the	  potential	  for	  radicalisation.	  A	  number	  of	  examples	  were	  described	  by	  police	  respondents	  where	  they	  had	  undertaken	  disruptions.	  For	  example,	  an	  Inspector	  in	  Birmingham	  described	  how,	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“Another	  Mosque	  in	  Alum	  Rock	  rang	  up	  one	  of	  my	  sergeants	  and	  said	  we’ve	  got	  three	  guys	  coming	  here,	  and	  they	  were	  doing	  the	  proper	  radicalization	  thing.	  They	  were	  trying	  to	  draw	  kids	  in,	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  have	  little	  meetings,	  they	  were	  being	  quite	  radical.	  We’d	  appreciate	  your	  support	  if	  you	  could	  come	  and	  help	  us,	  and	  speak	  to	  these	  three	  individuals	  because	  we	  don’t	  want	  them	  here	  but	  we’re	  a	  little	  bit	  concerned.	  So	  [Name]’s	  gone	  down,	  confronted	  the	  three	  individuals.	  The	  Mosque	  don’t	  want	  you	  here,	  what	  are	  you	  about?	  Do	  you	  want	  to	  talk	  to	  me	  about	  it?	  They	  didn’t.	  They	  went.	  We	  know	  where	  they	  went.”	  The	  Inspector	  went	  on	  to	  recount	  how	  information	  about	  the	  group	  was	  circulated	  more	  widely.	  The	  purpose	  being	  to	  create	  a	  ‘hostile	  environment’,	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  were	  subject	  to	  an	  ongoing	  sequence	  of	  locally	  generated	  disruptions	  and	  thus	  not	  able	  to	  settle	  in	  any	  new	  premises.	  He	  then	  unpicked	  the	  logic	  of	  what	  they	  were	  attempting	  to	  do,	  “It’s	  a	  disruption	  in	  a	  way…[Officer	  name]	  said	  we	  know	  who	  you	  are,	  we	  know	  what	  you’re	  doing,	  we	  will	  not	  tolerate	  what	  you’re	  doing,	  you’d	  better	  start	  thinking	  about	  it.	  Be	  clear,	  we	  are	  watching	  you.	  Now	  that	  is	  an	  intervention	  and	  that’s	  a	  Prevent	  intervention.”	  (2611-­‐11)	  There	  are	  several	  important	  qualities	  illustrated	  by	  this	  case.	  First,	  it	  evidences	  how,	  in	  certain	  circumstances,	  the	  police	  are	  being	  enlisted	  by	  communities	  to	  help	  them	  solve	  their	  problems.	  Second,	  it	  shows	  a	  certain	  style	  of	  overt	  counter-­‐terrorism	  work	  in	  action.	  In	  many	  ways,	  this	  approach	  is	  probably	  archetypal	  of	  what	  the	  designers	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme	  had	  in	  mind.	  Disruption	  is	  an	  established	  policing	  method	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  gaining	  favour	  with	  Prevent	  officers	  as	  an	  effective	  way	  of	  managing	  some	  behaviours	  that	  are	  ‘anti-­‐social’	  and	  indirectly	  increase	  a	  threat,	  but	  do	  not	  involve	  an	  obvious	  infraction	  of	  law.10	  As	  such,	  they	  necessitate	  the	  crafting	  of	  a	  response	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  upon	  the	  provisions	  of	  criminal	  law.	  	  The	  inter-­‐linking	  of	  such	  considerations	  and	  the	  potential	  utility	  of	  overt	  disruption	  for	  delivering	  the	  Prevent	  agenda	  were	  confirmed	  in	  a	  story	  told	  by	  one	  officer	  from	  a	  different	  research	  site	  to	  the	  above	  example,	  “We’ve	  got	  a	  gym,	  but	  it’s	  also	  a	  school,	  it’s	  one	  of	  these	  multi-­‐user	  buildings…and	  there’s	  some	  suggestion	  that	  at	  some	  point	  radicalisation	  may	  have	  occurred…There’s	  some	  other	  reporting	  that’s	  a	  little	  more	  specific…Now	  I’ve	  looked	  at	  that	  and	  thought	  what	  do	  I	  do?	  Do	  I	  send	  a	  UC	  in?	  Do	  I	  try	  and	  recruit	  an	  informant?	  And	  I	  thought	  actually	  I’ll	  just	  go	  and	  see	  them	  and	  wandered	  in	  and	  the	  chap	  that	  I	  met	  was	  very	  compelling	  when	  I	  spoke	  to	  him.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐03)	  	  As	  described,	  engaging	  overtly	  disruptive	  interventions	  provides	  new	  ways	  of	  achieving	  Prevent	  objectives.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  use	  of	  disruption	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  policing	  is	  discussed	  in	  Innes,	  M.	  and	  J.	  Sheptycki	  (2004)	  “From	  detection	  to	  disruption:	  some	  consequences	  of	  intelligence-­‐led	  crime	  control	  in	  the	  UK”,	  International	  Criminal	  Justice	  Review	  (14)	  pp.	  1-­‐14.	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Disruption	  is	  then	  an	  important	  tactical	  option	  for	  Prevent	  policing.	  Analysis	  of	  the	  interview	  data	  suggests	  that	  perhaps	  insufficient	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  how	  disruptive	  interventions	  can	  be	  applied	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  Prevent.	  Respondents	  talked	  in	  far	  more	  detail	  about	  how	  they	  were	  working	  towards	  many	  of	  the	  other	  aims.	  There	  was	  far	  less	  discussion	  of	  how	  to	  be	  disruptive	  or	  examples	  of	  this	  occurring	  in	  practice.	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  second	  formal	  aim	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme	  is	  to	  	  ‘Disrupt	  those	  who	  promote	  violent	  extremism…’.	  This	  neglect	  is	  significant.	  	  Being	  able	  to	  engage	  interventions	  to	  disrupt	  and	  disturb	  the	  activities	  of	  extremist	  individuals	  and	  groups	  is	  at	  the	  ‘harder-­‐edge’	  of	  Prevent	  working.	  And	  yet,	  it	  seems	  an	  under-­‐developed	  component.	  As	  one	  officer,	  offering	  a	  personal	  opinion,	  suggested,	  “There	  was	  a	  three	  month	  window	  of	  opportunity	  before	  Sadiq	  Khan	  and	  his	  comrades	  committed	  the	  attack…The	  reason	  why	  the	  service	  said	  they	  weren’t	  pursuing	  them	  was	  because	  they	  weren’t	  high	  enough	  on	  the	  intel	  radar.	  However,	  why	  didn’t	  we	  just	  send	  a	  couple	  of	  uniformed	  officers	  to	  knock	  on	  the	  door	  and	  say	  “Hi	  Mohammed,	  I’m	  from	  the	  counter-­‐terrorism	  unit,	  we	  really	  need	  to	  have	  a	  chat.”…They’ve	  no	  idea	  what	  level	  of	  detail	  we	  know,	  very,	  very	  powerful	  that.”	  [Police,	  2659-­‐24]11	  	  Public	  acceptance	  of	  disruption	  as	  a	  legitimate	  outcome	  of	  policing	  activity	  is	  founded	  upon	  investing	  in	  community	  relations	  to	  build	  trust.	  A	  good	  example	  of	  how	  this	  can	  be	  done	  was	  described	  by	  officers	  in	  South	  London.	  Through	  a	  community	  engagement	  methodology	  delivered	  by	  the	  Safer	  Neighbourhoods	  Team	  as	  part	  of	  their	  Prevent	  work,	  analysis	  revealed	  concerns	  expressed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  members	  of	  the	  local	  Muslim	  community	  about	  a	  particular	  public	  house	  in	  the	  Borough.	  They	  reported	  that	  when	  they	  walked	  past	  this	  pub,	  they	  would	  frequently	  be	  subject	  to	  verbal	  abuse.	  The	  police	  were	  already	  aware	  of	  other	  issues	  with	  this	  establishment,	  but	  backed	  by	  this	  community	  intelligence	  they	  decided	  to	  act.	  The	  local	  Chief	  Inspector	  described	  what	  happened	  when	  they	  went	  to	  the	  next	  ‘Partners	  and	  Communities	  Together’	  meeting	  to	  announce	  that	  they	  had	  closed	  the	  pub	  down,	  “I	  stood	  up	  and	  said	  what	  we	  had	  done	  and	  I	  got	  a	  spontaneous	  round	  of	  applause.	  They	  were	  cheering	  and	  clapping.	  That	  has	  never	  happened	  before.”	  (Police,	  D)	  Being	  directly	  responsive	  to	  community	  concerns	  in	  this	  fashion,	  was	  cast	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  investment	  that	  helped	  to	  build	  trust	  and	  confidence	  in	  the	  community.	  The	  majority	  of	  Prevent	  officers	  discussed	  how	  they	  would	  actively	  become	  involved	  in	  managing	  the	  policing	  response	  when	  Mosques	  and	  other	  buildings	  were	  attacked,	  which	  the	  interviews	  with	  community	  representatives	  suggests	  happens	  quite	  regularly.	  The	  Prevent	  officers	  saw	  their	  role	  as	  providing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Of	  course	  the	  efficacy	  of	  any	  such	  intervention	  may	  be	  limited	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  may	  not	  prevent	  the	  progression	  to	  violence	  on	  its	  own,	  but	  it	  may	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  for	  further	  dialogue	  between	  the	  police	  and	  the	  individual(s)	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  engaging	  them	  in	  additional	  Prevent	  activities.	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expertise	  and	  contacts	  for	  their	  colleagues	  to	  try	  and	  ensure	  that	  a	  professional	  policing	  response	  was	  provided	  in	  such	  cases.	  It	  was	  acknowledged	  that	  such	  a	  response	  was	  not	  always	  achieved,	  but	  because	  they	  had	  established	  personal	  relationships	  with	  key	  actors,	  the	  Prevent	  officers	  believed	  that	  they	  were	  often	  able	  to	  limit	  the	  consequences	  when	  the	  police	  response	  was	  below	  par.	  This	  notion	  of	  consequence	  management	  was	  identified	  as	  a	  potentially	  increasingly	  important	  aspect	  of	  what	  Prevent	  officers	  do.	  A	  number	  described	  being	  involved	  in	  conducting	  community	  impact	  assessments	  in	  relation	  to	  key	  events,	  and	  also	  crafting	  impact	  management	  strategies.	  This	  dimension	  of	  their	  role	  is	  both	  prospective	  and	  retrospective.	  It	  is	  being	  used	  both	  in	  relation	  to	  ‘pursue’	  enforcement	  interventions	  by	  police,	  but	  also	  occurrences	  such	  as	  EDL	  marches.	  A	  member	  of	  the	  community	  described	  how	  community	  impact	  assessment	  had	  been	  used	  following	  ‘Operation	  Gamble’,	  “The	  first	  thing	  I	  suppose	  that	  the	  community	  felt	  is	  that	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  you	  find	  that	  there’s	  people	  in	  your	  midst	  who	  may	  have	  been	  up	  to	  no	  good.	  You’ve	  got	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  media,	  you’ve	  got	  a	  house	  being	  raided	  with	  ten	  police	  vans	  and	  50	  fluorescent	  jackets	  and	  the	  raid’s	  done…and	  all	  life	  kind	  of	  stops	  because	  you’ve	  got	  all	  this	  media	  attention	  and	  everyone	  in	  the	  community	  is	  affected	  by	  it…What	  we	  were	  able	  to	  do	  with	  the	  police	  was…the	  very	  next	  day	  all	  the	  fluorescent	  jackets	  disappeared…If	  you	  stay	  the	  media	  stays	  there.”.	  (Community,	  2654-­‐01)	  The	  application	  of	  community	  impact	  assessment	  methods	  in	  this	  particular	  case	  helped	  to	  ‘take	  the	  temperature’	  of	  the	  community	  and	  to	  reduce	  ‘the	  heat’	  associated	  with	  an	  intervention	  that	  had	  to	  be	  conducted	  to	  protect	  public	  safety.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  point	  in	  that	  sometimes	  intrusive	  and	  high-­‐profile	  police	  operations	  have	  to	  be	  conducted,	  and	  part	  of	  the	  role	  of	  Prevent	  teams	  is	  to	  minimize	  the	  disturbance	  and	  social	  harm	  that	  they	  cause.	  A	  second	  intriguing	  dimension	  described	  by	  the	  respondent	  above	  is	  how	  the	  police	  and	  community	  worked	  collaboratively	  to	  reduce	  the	  ‘visibility’	  and	  sense	  of	  ‘spectacle’	  attached	  to	  the	  police	  raid.	  This	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  some	  of	  the	  preceding	  analysis	  that	  has	  focused	  upon	  how	  Prevent	  has	  deliberately	  worked	  to	  establish	  a	  more	  visible	  form	  of	  overt	  CT	  policing.	  	  	  From	  this	  brief	  outline	  of	  the	  work	  conducted	  by	  Prevent	  police	  officers	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  political	  with	  both	  a	  small	  and	  big	  “p”.	  As	  one	  of	  them	  described	  it,	  it	  is	  more	  “Brooke	  Bond,	  than	  James	  Bond”.	  That	  is,	  it	  frequently	  involved	  sitting	  down	  with	  people	  over	  a	  cup	  of	  tea,	  getting	  to	  know	  and	  understand	  them	  and	  their	  issues,	  and	  negotiating	  with	  them	  about	  their	  grievances	  and	  concerns.	  	  SUMMARY	  Although	  there	  is	  national	  guidance	  for	  the	  police	  around	  their	  role	  and	  tasks	  in	  the	  Prevent	  programme,	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  examining	  the	  four	  research	  sites	  that	  it	  is	  being	  implemented	  in	  differing	  configurations	  in	  different	  settings.	  The	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  key	  to	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  by	  the	  police	  are	  three	  principal	  tasks:	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• Community	  engagement	  and	  community	  intelligence	  collection;	  
• Disruptive	  interventions;	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CHAPTER	  3:	  COMMUNITY	  MOBILISATION	  WITHIN	  AND	  WITHOUT	  PREVENT	  Comparing	  the	  systems	  and	  processes	  underpinning	  the	  organisation	  and	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  observed	  in	  the	  present	  fieldwork	  with	  those	  described	  in	  the	  2007	  report	  (relating	  to	  data	  collected	  between	  2003-­‐05),	  there	  has	  been	  a	  noticeable	  uplift	  in	  police	  capacity	  and	  capability.	  There	  is	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  communities,	  and	  evidence	  of	  a	  better	  comprehension	  of	  where	  key	  risks	  and	  threats	  are	  located.	  However,	  there	  remain	  areas	  for	  improvement	  and	  whether	  these	  enhancements	  have	  translated	  into	  public	  benefits	  remains	  an	  important	  question.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  findings	  of	  the	  2007	  report	  was	  that	  Muslim	  communities	  viewed	  the	  police	  as	  an	  agency	  of	  last	  resort.	  There	  was	  a	  clear	  preference	  to	  solve	  problems	  using	  a	  community’s	  informal	  social	  control	  resources.	  Even	  when	  it	  was	  known	  that	  extremist	  groups	  were	  active	  in	  an	  area,	  it	  was	  intimated	  that	  community	  members	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  bring	  this	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  police.	  Respondents	  in	  the	  earlier	  study	  suggested	  that	  in	  most	  scenarios	  police	  would	  be	  involved	  only	  when	  other	  options	  had	  been	  exhausted,	  or	  when	  the	  risks	  were	  judged	  to	  be	  simply	  too	  acute.	  Set	  against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  improvements	  in	  the	  organization	  and	  focus	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  recorded	  above,	  it	  might	  be	  anticipated	  that	  a	  greater	  willingness	  to	  involve	  police	  in	  solving	  problems	  would	  be	  evident.	  However,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  collected	  on	  this	  point	  is	  ambiguous.	  For	  instance,	  a	  self-­‐defined	  ‘moderate’	  Muslim	  was	  asked	  ‘how	  the	  community	  responds	  if	  a	  problem	  with	  a	  local	  young	  person	  appears?’	  He	  described	  how,	  	  	  “They	  would	  try	  to,	  the	  family	  would	  try	  to	  engage	  an	  elder	  within	  the	  community,	  then	  get	  the	  Imam	  involved	  within	  the	  community.”	  (Community	  2633-­‐07)	  He	  continued,	  “I	  would	  suspect	  they	  wouldn’t	  want	  to	  tell	  everybody…But	  with	  the	  setup	  as	  I	  understand	  it,	  they	  would	  try	  to	  address	  it	  within	  the	  community…You	  try	  to	  solve	  it	  yourself	  and	  you	  know,	  if	  the	  danger’s	  so	  big	  then	  you	  can’t	  do	  it.”(Community,	  2633-­‐07)	  	  	  The	  intricacies	  and	  workings	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  negotiation	  were	  recalled	  in	  more	  detail	  by	  a	  member	  of	  a	  Mosque	  Committee	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  young	  Muslim	  male	  that	  the	  police	  had	  felt	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  speak	  to,	  “I	  said	  why	  should	  we,	  just	  for	  one	  individual’s	  sake	  sort	  of	  make	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  Mosque,	  where	  the	  Mosque	  will	  get	  blamed	  when	  everything	  comes	  out	  in	  the	  open.	  So	  then	  we	  spoke	  to	  the	  parent	  and	  we	  said	  you	  need	  to	  go	  to	  the	  police,	  otherwise	  we	  will	  then	  go.	  And	  at	  first	  he	  said	  no,	  no.	  I	  said	  no,	  why	  should	  we,	  we	  are	  lying	  for	  your	  son,	  and	  today	  he’s	  done	  something	  minor,	  tomorrow	  he’ll	  do	  something	  big.	  Are	  we	  still	  going	  to	  hide	  him?	  And	  then	  at	  that	  point	  he	  saw	  sense	  and	  he	  went	  himself.”	  (Community,	  2659-­‐31)	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This	  story	  provides	  important	  insights	  into	  some	  of	  the	  subtle	  ways	  in	  which	  community	  based	  informal	  social	  control	  can	  be	  enlisted	  into	  reducing	  some	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  violent	  extremism.	  It	  is	  not	  always	  dramatic	  or	  obvious,	  but	  takes	  place	  ‘backstage’	  and	  in	  fairly	  discreet	  ways.	  Police	  interviewees	  in	  Oldham	  were	  aware	  that	  a	  lot	  of	  preventative	  activity	  was	  going	  on	  locally	  outside	  of	  the	  formal	  Prevent	  mechanisms,	  “I	  think	  there	  is	  quite	  a	  lot	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  occurring	  and	  sometimes	  that	  is	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  police.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐03)	  That	  these	  self-­‐help	  community	  responses	  are	  going	  on	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  not	  had	  any	  beneficial	  effects.	  Rather	  what	  the	  qualitative	  interview	  data	  suggest	  is	  that	  many	  people	  hold	  quite	  complex	  views	  about	  it.	  In	  effect,	  they	  simultaneously	  recognise	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  dimensions.	  	  The	  principal	  reason	  given	  for	  holding	  negative	  views	  was	  that	  ‘Prevent’	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  ‘tainted	  brand’	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  community	  members.	  Underpinning	  this	  negativity	  was	  a	  feeling	  of	  frustration	  that	  Prevent	  funding	  had	  not	  been	  used	  effectively,	  “What’s	  happened	  is	  Prevent	  money	  has	  been	  used	  by	  groups	  who	  we’d	  call	  ‘poverty	  pimps’	  like	  they	  go	  to	  areas	  where	  there’s	  funding,	  take	  the	  funding,	  don’t	  really	  deliver	  anything	  meaningful	  and	  we’re	  none	  the	  wiser	  at	  the	  end	  of	  it.”	  (Community,	  2654-­‐01)	  These	  comments	  made	  by	  a	  community	  representative	  in	  the	  West	  Midlands	  were	  strongly	  echoed	  in	  Cardiff,	  “I	  think	  one	  of	  the	  dangers	  is	  that	  it	  can	  encourage	  people	  to	  involve	  themselves	  in	  this	  particular	  agenda	  just	  for	  the	  financial	  benefit…all	  of	  a	  sudden	  many	  people	  sprouting	  up	  are	  so	  called	  experts…I	  think	  it’s	  a	  waste	  of	  resources	  and	  a	  waste	  of	  peoples’	  time.”	  (Community,	  H)	  These	  frustrations	  were	  particularly	  acute	  amongst	  community	  groups	  directly	  engaged	  in	  trying	  to	  challenge	  extremist	  voices.	  The	  following	  was	  a	  fairly	  typical	  response,	  “I	  mean	  around	  2007…one	  individual	  who	  was	  saying	  that	  he	  could	  do	  this	  and	  that	  and	  the	  reality	  is	  he	  couldn’t	  really	  do	  any	  of	  it…he	  just	  jumped	  onto	  the	  bandwagon	  around	  2006/07	  and	  that	  side	  was	  lucrative	  for	  many	  people,	  people	  made	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  out	  of	  it.”	  (Community,	  2659-­‐30)	  Some	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  communities	  might	  assume	  a	  negative	  position	  were	  acknowledged	  by	  police	  interviewees.	  In	  part,	  these	  were	  attributed	  to	  the	  legacy	  created	  by	  how	  the	  Prevent	  programme	  was	  initially	  introduced	  in	  a	  hurry	  lacking	  clarity	  about	  key	  standard	  operating	  procedures	  and	  its	  public	  presentation,	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“Well	  the	  government	  shot	  itself	  in	  the	  foot	  over	  Prevent	  right	  from	  the	  outset…It	  was	  doomed	  to	  failure	  in	  terms	  of	  people	  seeing	  it	  for	  what	  it	  really	  is.”	  (Police,	  2611-­‐07)	  The	  sense	  of	  disenchantment	  expressed	  by	  interviewees	  centered	  upon	  how	  Prevent	  has	  been	  implemented.	  The	  following	  extract	  summarises	  these	  kinds	  of	  sentiment,	  “I	  want	  to	  feel	  safe,	  full	  stop.	  There’s	  no	  two	  ways	  about	  it	  and	  I	  think	  that’s	  how	  most	  people,	  if	  not	  everyone,	  would	  feel.	  So	  we	  don’t	  mind	  a	  level	  of	  checking,	  it’s	  when	  it’s	  not	  done	  properly	  which	  is	  the	  problem	  and	  it’s	  not	  done	  sympathetically.”	  (Community,	  2654-­‐01)	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  some	  people	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  Prevent	  services	  do	  hold	  negative	  views	  of	  and	  are	  suspicious	  about	  Prevent	  policing.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  clarify	  that	  such	  views	  are	  often	  not	  wholly	  negative.	  There	  are	  frustrations	  and	  negative	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  apparent	  in	  the	  accounts	  provided.	  But	  equally,	  many	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  to	  be	  addressed.	  That	  this	  is	  the	  case	  has	  helped	  to	  promote	  a	  situation	  where	  Muslim	  communities	  are	  effectively	  ‘doing	  Prevent	  outside	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme.’	  	  DOING	  PREVENT	  WITHOUT	  THE	  PREVENT	  PROGRAMME	  Many	  of	  the	  community	  representatives	  pointed	  out	  that	  their	  involvement	  in	  challenging	  violent	  extremists	  pre-­‐dated	  the	  introduction	  of	  Prevent.	  They	  recounted	  a	  long	  history	  of	  experiences	  of	  working	  at	  grass-­‐roots	  level	  that	  had	  largely	  taken	  place	  ‘under	  the	  radar’	  of	  the	  police.	  Owing	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  disenchantment	  felt	  by	  some	  individuals	  and	  groups	  with	  police	  Prevent	  methods	  and	  the	  preventing	  violent	  extremism	  programme,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  number	  of	  them	  have	  decided	  to	  continue	  to	  participate	  in	  community-­‐led	  self-­‐help	  interventions,	  but	  outside	  of	  the	  formal	  structures	  and	  processes	  of	  Prevent.	  	  Looking	  at	  how	  Muslim	  communities	  participate	  in	  delivering	  Prevent	  type	  objectives	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  differentiate	  between	  those	  efforts	  that	  are	  more	  ‘tightly’	  and	  ‘loosely’	  coupled	  to	  the	  official	  programme,	  and	  those	  that	  are	  more	  formally	  manufactured	  and	  organised,	  and	  those	  where	  responses	  are	  more	  ‘organic’.	  	  Participating	  in	  such	  work	  was	  though	  felt	  to	  involve	  negotiating	  quite	  complex	  and	  oftentimes	  contradictory	  pressures.	  The	  following	  account	  was	  fairly	  typical	  of	  how	  such	  pressures	  were	  described,	  “That’s	  the	  central	  tension,	  you	  obviously	  can’t	  compromise	  public	  safety	  in	  the	  slightest,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  if	  we	  lose	  our	  integrity	  no-­‐one’s	  going	  to	  even	  touch	  us	  with	  a	  bargepole…If	  you	  get	  labeled	  as	  an	  informant,	  it’s	  a	  very,	  very	  damaging	  label	  to	  get.”	  (Community,	  2659-­‐28)	  The	  ability	  to	  maintain	  and	  protect	  credibility	  whilst	  engaging	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  work	  was	  a	  repeatedly	  voiced	  concern	  for	  the	  community	  representatives	  interviewed.	  There	  was	  a	  general	  feeling	  that	  many	  public	  agencies	  do	  not	  really	  comprehend	  the	  delicate	  situated	  politics	  that	  have	  to	  be	  negotiated	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  and	  why	  individuals	  and	  groups	  elect	  to	  participate	  in	  particular	  ways	  with	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Prevent	  policing,	  but	  not	  others.	  Some	  groups	  that	  had	  worked	  quite	  closely	  with	  Prevent	  argued	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  be	  given	  more	  freedom	  to	  manoeuvre	  to	  ensure	  both	  their	  credibility	  and	  effectiveness.	  The	  difficulty	  for	  the	  police	  and	  their	  partners	  is	  though	  that	  the	  risks	  that	  they	  are	  aware	  of	  and	  are	  seeking	  to	  encounter	  emanate	  from	  quite	  fluid	  and	  mutable	  sources	  that	  shift	  and	  adapt	  as	  new	  community-­‐based	  coalitions	  rise	  and	  fall.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  clearly	  distinguish	  who	  are	  the	  risk	  amplifiers	  and	  mitigators.	  For	  instance,	  talking	  about	  a	  particular	  recent	  case,	  a	  Prevent	  officer	  recalled	  that,	  “Using	  [Name]	  as	  an	  example,	  what	  we	  saw	  with	  that	  was	  people	  that	  were	  known	  to	  the	  police	  and	  the	  Security	  Service	  were	  getting	  involved,	  getting	  rid	  of	  him.	  So	  is	  it	  territory	  that	  they’re	  trying	  to	  protect?	  Could	  be	  lots	  of	  different	  reasons,	  but	  we’ve	  seen	  people	  that	  are	  on	  the	  network,	  getting	  involved	  and	  arguably	  protecting	  their	  community.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐12)	  	  	  The	  presence	  of	  these	  subtle	  community-­‐based	  politics	  is	  an	  important	  feature	  in	  terms	  of	  understanding	  how	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  to	  position	  itself	  and	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  have	  to	  be	  carefully	  negotiated	  by	  officers.	  Resonating	  with	  the	  more	  general	  comment	  made	  about	  the	  preference	  to	  invoke	  informal	  social	  control	  methods,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  for	  many	  representatives	  of	  Muslim	  communities	  they	  would	  prefer	  to	  deal	  with	  issues	  themselves,	  where	  this	  is	  possible,	  “Sometimes	  I	  think	  things	  like	  that	  are	  best	  left	  to	  the	  people	  locally	  to	  deal	  with…Because	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  what	  could	  a	  law	  enforcement	  agency	  do	  in	  that	  respect?	  You	  know,	  you	  could	  stop	  the	  pamphlets	  going	  up	  but	  if	  you	  drive	  it	  underground	  I	  think	  you’re	  making	  the	  situation	  worse.”	  (Community,	  2633-­‐07)	  These	  kinds	  of	  views	  underpinned	  a	  number	  of	  interventions	  that	  were	  described	  during	  the	  interviews.	  For	  example,	  one	  interviewee	  from	  Birmingham	  told	  a	  story	  of	  how,	  when	  a	  well	  know	  extremist	  figure	  started	  proselytizing	  locally,	  the	  community	  decided	  to	  ‘push-­‐back’	  themselves,	  	  “What	  we	  done	  as	  a	  community	  we	  thought	  if	  we	  send	  the	  police	  in	  it	  looks	  heavy	  handed,	  he	  gets	  the	  publicity	  he	  want	  and	  he	  will	  get	  more	  followers.	  We	  got	  community	  people	  to	  actually	  confront	  them	  on	  their	  stalls	  and	  after	  a	  couple	  of	  weeks	  of	  coming	  here	  and	  then	  facing	  the	  confrontation,	  he	  ran	  away	  from	  this	  road.”	  (Community,	  2654-­‐01)	  This	  illustrates	  how	  communities	  are	  directly	  engaged	  in	  confronting	  extremists	  themselves.	  In	  addition	  however,	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  were	  described	  about	  how	  they	  can	  also	  invoke	  more	  indirect	  solutions.	  On	  one	  such	  occasion,	  the	  community	  took	  action	  in	  response	  to	  a	  planned	  Welsh	  Defence	  League	  (WDL)	  march.	  Fearing	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  confrontation	  between	  their	  young	  people	  and	  the	  WDL	  marchers,	  they	  described	  how	  they	  had,	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“Put	  on	  events	  to	  keep	  the	  young	  people	  away.	  Mainly,	  just	  for	  you	  know	  worrying	  about	  our	  young	  people	  getting	  involved	  and	  getting	  arrested…In	  the	  local	  park	  we	  had	  a	  football	  tournament,	  we	  had	  a	  BBQ…and	  family	  fun	  day.	  So	  it’s	  basically	  trying	  to	  get	  the	  whole	  community	  out…we	  had	  over	  100	  people	  turn	  up	  that	  day.”	  (Community,	  K)	  	  	  	  Communities	  proactively	  mobilising	  to	  reduce	  community	  tensions	  and	  ‘the	  temperature’	  of	  a	  potentially	  difficult	  situation	  was	  something	  observed	  across	  all	  four	  sites.	  This	  respondent’s	  colleague	  further	  described	  how	  one	  of	  their	  motivations	  had	  been	  to	  try	  and	  keep	  their	  young	  people	  from	  getting	  into	  trouble	  with	  the	  police	  -­‐	  something	  that	  would	  have	  ‘played	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  WDL’.	  The	  net	  effect	  of	  this	  tendency	  to	  invoke	  community	  self-­‐directed	  responses	  has	  been	  that	  an	  interesting	  challenge	  for	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  arisen.	  Based	  upon	  the	  interviews	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  now	  a	  range	  of	  groups	  engaged	  in	  counter-­‐	  and	  de-­‐radicalisation	  activities	  who	  are	  doing	  so	  outwith	  the	  Prevent	  programme.	  They	  are	  obtaining	  their	  funding	  from	  other	  civil	  society	  sources	  and	  are	  explicit	  in	  their	  view	  that	  they	  want	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  government’s	  official	  Prevent	  programme,	  “For	  the	  workshops	  there	  was	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  funding	  from	  Welsh	  Assembly…Nobody	  benefits	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  work	  we	  do,	  nearly	  all	  the	  work	  we	  do	  at	  the	  moment	  is	  done	  without	  any	  type	  of	  pay	  or	  compensation…maybe	  helps	  with	  the	  credibility.”	  (Community,	  H)	  Groups	  such	  as	  these	  maintain	  that,	  given	  the	  ‘taint’	  that	  has	  become	  attached	  to	  Prevent,	  their	  efficacy	  and	  legitimacy	  are	  predicated	  upon	  preserving	  a	  sense	  of	  detachment	  from	  it.	  	  Detailed	  probing	  through	  the	  interviews	  revealed	  however	  that	  not	  all	  groups	  or	  interventions	  were	  wholly	  divorced	  from	  police	  activity.	  For	  example,	  in	  Surrey	  an	  officer	  described	  how,	  “I	  mean	  we’ve	  had	  Hizb-­‐ut-­‐Tahrir	  and	  people	  like	  that	  outside	  the	  Mosque	  leafleting	  and	  all	  that	  sort	  of	  thing,	  but	  I	  think	  the	  Mosque	  have	  very	  quickly	  dealt	  with	  that	  kind	  of	  thing.	  We	  often	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  it,	  but	  we	  actually	  have	  never	  had	  to	  make	  an	  intervention	  because	  the	  Mosque	  deal	  with	  it	  themselves.”	  (Police,	  2611-­‐07)	  Several	  similar	  examples	  of	  this	  co-­‐productive	  method	  of	  working	  between	  police	  and	  communities	  were	  described.	  The	  police	  recognized	  the	  benefits	  of	  allowing	  communities	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  challenging	  problem	  individuals.	  From	  the	  communities’	  point	  of	  view	  though,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  know	  that	  if	  they	  needed	  it,	  they	  would	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  police.	  From	  a	  community	  point	  of	  view	  such	  interventions	  were	  not	  undertaken	  lightly.	  Several	  examples	  of	  where	  people	  involved	  in	  confronting	  extremists	  had	  encountered	  intimidation	  and	  repercussions	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  action	  were	  reported	  in	  the	  interviews.	  Whilst	  police	  sought	  to	  provide	  some	  degree	  of	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protection,	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  how	  effective	  this	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  by	  those	  on	  the	  receiving	  end.	  Such	  issues	  become	  particularly	  pronounced	  though	  where	  the	  challenge	  is	  being	  mounted	  by	  groups	  outside	  of	  formal	  Prevent	  arrangements.	  	  A	  further	  relevant	  consideration	  is	  that	  not	  all	  communities	  were	  able	  to	  act	  in	  these	  ways.	  Indeed,	  a	  striking	  finding	  is	  that	  there	  are	  often	  very	  great	  variations	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  groups	  to	  respond.	  A	  number	  of	  police	  and	  community	  respondents,	  in	  talking	  about	  their	  local	  areas,	  drew	  sharp	  differentiations	  between	  Mosques	  that	  had	  rapidly	  and	  successfully	  resisted	  the	  activities	  of	  extremist	  individuals,	  and	  those	  that	  had	  not.	  Relatedly,	  police	  interviewees	  were	  frequently	  candid	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  whilst	  many	  Imams	  and	  Mosque	  Committees	  were	  keen	  to	  engage	  and	  participate	  in	  Prevent,	  a	  number	  of	  others	  remained	  far	  more	  recalcitrant.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  point	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  captures	  how	  the	  success	  of	  Prevent	  is	  only	  partly	  premised	  upon	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  police	  and	  their	  partners.	  	  UNDERSTANDING	  THE	  POTENTIAL	  EFFECTS	  OF	  PREVENT	  POLICING	  Compared	  with	  the	  situation	  described	  in	  the	  2007	  report,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  say	  categorically	  whether	  the	  net	  amount	  of	  community	  collective	  efficacy	  has	  increased	  or	  decreased	  in	  association	  with	  the	  maturing	  of	  Prevent.	  What	  can	  be	  	  stated	  with	  more	  confidence	  is	  that	  these	  more	  sophisticated	  forms	  of	  co-­‐productive	  working	  do	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  important	  new	  development.	  They	  were	  not	  as	  prevalent	  six	  years	  ago.	  Their	  significance	  resides	  in	  how	  they	  start	  to	  outline	  the	  contours	  of	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  methodology	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  Prevent	  policing	  seeks	  to	  perform	  its	  functions.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  about	  what	  the	  police	  do	  directly,	  but	  how	  their	  interventions	  shape,	  mould	  and	  leverage	  the	  informal	  social	  control	  capacities	  residing	  within	  communities	  themselves.	  The	  community	  dynamics	  underpinning	  these	  co-­‐productive	  arrangements	  are	  interesting.	  For	  whilst	  such	  approaches	  require	  the	  commitment	  of	  police,	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  their	  success	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  range	  of	  skills	  and	  capacities	  within	  communities.	  For	  example,	  in	  relation	  to	  several	  of	  the	  narratives	  relayed	  about	  communities	  working	  with	  the	  police,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  professional	  community	  workers	  played	  a	  key	  role.	  This	  theme	  was	  pursued	  in	  several	  interviews.	  Certainly	  in	  Cardiff	  it	  was	  strongly	  present,	  “[Name	  1],	  [Name	  2],	  [Name	  3]	  are	  all	  community	  based,	  you	  know	  they	  work	  for	  various	  organisations	  in	  the	  community.”	  (Community,	  H)	  This	  was	  confirmed	  by	  a	  second	  respondent,	  “Youth	  workers	  or	  community	  workers	  so	  this	  is	  the	  core	  people	  that	  it	  actually	  comes	  out	  from…the	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  don’t	  know	  what’s	  going	  on	  outside…We’ve	  got	  a	  lot	  of	  volunteers	  active	  in	  the	  community	  who	  are	  not	  actually	  paid	  workers	  or	  anything	  like	  that,	  but	  they	  just	  want	  to	  do	  things	  for	  their	  own	  family”	  (Community,	  K)	  	  As	  this	  latter	  account	  makes	  clear	  the	  key	  Prevent	  based	  activities	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  professionals,	  many	  others	  are	  involved	  also.	  But	  what	  these	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professional	  community	  organisers	  do	  seem	  to	  provide	  is	  a	  core	  repository	  of	  ‘soft’	  skills	  that	  are	  needed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  network,	  coordinate	  and	  mobilize	  other	  interested	  actors	  in	  an	  effective	  manner.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  key	  aims	  of	  Prevent	  is	  defined	  as	  ‘addressing	  grievances’.	  The	  data	  collected	  from	  the	  interviews	  suggests	  that	  ‘on	  the	  ground’	  this	  is	  frequently	  more	  complex	  and	  involved	  than	  the	  headline	  aim	  implies.	  First,	  the	  authorities	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  what	  the	  grievances	  are.	  Often	  this	  is	  not	  easy	  given	  the	  plethora	  of	  voices	  and	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  emanating	  from	  the	  different	  cultures	  and	  cleavages	  that	  together	  constitute	  ‘the	  Muslim	  community’.	  Next,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  and	  substance	  of	  any	  such	  grievances.	  How	  much	  do	  they	  pertain	  to	  particular	  situation	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  they	  translate	  across	  different	  contexts?	  Defining	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  complaint	  frames	  the	  next	  question	  about	  who	  potentially	  is	  positioned	  to	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  leverage	  over	  the	  problem	  in	  question.	  As	  highlighted	  above,	  this	  is	  sometimes	  the	  police	  or	  one	  of	  their	  statutory	  partners,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  A	  key	  consideration	  here	  is	  negotiating	  with	  the	  community	  about	  how	  they	  want	  the	  problem	  to	  be	  solved.	  In	  some	  scenarios	  they	  might	  accept	  overt	  law	  enforcement	  interventions,	  but	  on	  many	  occasions	  they	  appear	  to	  prefer	  alternative,	  less	  visible,	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  issue.	  	  	  	  This	  complex,	  negotiated	  process,	  or	  some	  variant	  of	  it,	  underpinned	  a	  number	  of	  Prevent	  interventions	  that	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  well	  received	  by	  communities.	  The	  notion	  of	  doing	  Prevent	  with	  communities	  rather	  than	  to	  them,	  seems	  to	  alter	  community	  perceptions.	  Now	  obviously	  not	  all	  counter-­‐terrorism	  work	  can	  adopt	  this	  more	  co-­‐productive	  stance.	  The	  point	  is	  though,	  that	  where	  policing	  interventions	  were	  more	  transparent	  this	  did	  seem	  to	  positively	  influence	  community	  reactions.	  	  SUMMARY	  Taken	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  evidence	  presented	  over	  the	  past	  two	  Chapters	  suggests	  that	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  Prevent	  a	  range	  of	  different	  interventions	  are	  being	  engaged	  and	  delivered	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  actors.	  On	  some	  occasions,	  police	  are	  clearly	  in	  the	  lead	  role	  and	  assume	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  implementing	  a	  response.	  More	  interestingly	  though,	  the	  data	  evidences	  the	  routine	  utilization	  of	  more	  complex	  arrangements	  where	  police	  are	  encouraging	  communities	  to	  take	  a	  more	  active	  role.	  Additionally,	  the	  interviews	  have	  elicited	  a	  large	  number	  of	  examples	  where	  the	  police	  are	  effectively	  by-­‐standers	  to	  community	  action.	  	  From	  a	  conceptual	  point	  of	  view	  how	  are	  we	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  this?	  A	  key	  distinction	  pivots	  around	  who	  determines	  the	  presence	  and	  contours	  of	  a	  problem,	  and	  who	  delivers	  the	  response.	  Thinking	  in	  these	  terms	  helps	  to	  outline	  a	  conceptual	  map	  of	  four	  key	  intervention	  modes	  that	  can	  be	  detected	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  In	  Figure	  1	  the	  top	  row	  distinguishes	  between	  where	  police	  define	  the	  problem,	  and	  where	  a	  community	  does	  this.	  The	  left-­‐hand	  column	  separates	  out	  response	  delivery	  between	  police	  and	  community.	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   Police	  Defined	  
	  
Community	  Defined	  
Police	  Delivered	   Protective	  
	  
Type	  1	  Co-­‐production	  
Community	  Delivered	   Type	  2	  Co-­‐production	  
	  
Mobilisation	  	  Table	  2:	  The	  Four	  Prevent	  Policing	  Intervention	  Modes	  	  On	  this	  basis	  four	  modal	  Prevent	  policing	  interventions	  can	  be	  identified:	  
• Protective	  –	  is	  where	  the	  police	  clearly	  	  ‘own’	  the	  intervention.	  The	  tactics	  	  engaged	  can	  vary	  from	  disruption	  to	  law	  enforcement,	  but	  critically	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  defined	  and	  responded	  to	  by	  police.	  	  
• Mobilisation	  –	  is	  the	  converse	  to	  the	  above.	  The	  problem	  is	  identified	  by	  the	  community	  and	  they	  harness	  their	  informal	  social	  control	  resources	  to	  perform	  a	  self-­‐help	  response.	  This	  can	  range	  from	  violence,	  through	  to	  awareness	  raising.	  Critically	  though,	  police	  and	  their	  local	  authority	  partners	  are	  largely	  reduced	  to	  the	  status	  of	  by-­‐standers,	  or	  indeed	  they	  may	  be	  wholly	  unaware	  of	  the	  activity.	  
• Type	  1	  Co-­‐production	  –	  in	  some	  situations	  the	  police	  act	  to	  deal	  with	  issues	  brought	  to	  them	  by	  the	  community.	  This	  collaborative	  joint	  problem-­‐solving	  activity,	  involving	  inputs	  from	  both	  police	  and	  public,	  has	  been	  documented	  in	  other	  neighbourhood	  settings.12	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme,	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  engaged	  by	  police	  for	  two	  principal	  reasons.	  First,	  because	  a	  problem	  is	  sufficiently	  troubling	  that	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  community	  activity	  to	  impact	  upon	  it.	  Second,	  on	  some	  occasions,	  police	  can	  engage	  with	  issues	  deliberately	  in	  order	  to	  build	  community	  trust	  and	  confidence.	  
• Type	  2	  Co-­‐production	  –	  The	  final	  ideal-­‐type	  is	  where	  police	  identify	  an	  issue,	  but	  enable	  or	  encourage	  community-­‐based	  actors	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	  This	  can	  either	  be	  through	  material	  /	  practical	  support,	  or	  more	  tacit	  forms.	  Engaging	  this	  style	  of	  collaborative	  Prevent	  work	  tends	  to	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  encountered	  are	  complex	  and	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  treated	  through	  application	  of	  the	  criminal	  law.	  To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  this	  mode	  of	  intervention	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  identified	  by	  researchers.	  These	  four	  intervention	  modes	  are	  ideal-­‐types.	  They	  are	  not	  necessarily	  mutually	  exclusive	  in	  that	  there	  are	  examples	  within	  the	  data	  of	  where	  one	  mode	  has	  been	  implemented	  and	  failed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  an	  alternative	  approach	  has	  then	  been	  engaged.	  However,	  mapping	  the	  territory	  in	  this	  fashion	  does	  afford	  a	  handle	  on	  what	  Prevent	  policing	  involves	  and	  how	  it	  is	  being	  enacted.	  As	  such,	  it	  provides	  this	  report’s	  basis	  for	  looking	  at	  what	  effects	  Prevent	  policing	  might	  have.	  Perhaps	  more	  significantly	  though,	  that	  these	  different	  modal	  interventions	  can	  be	  observed	  across	  the	  sites	  indicates	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  evolved	  a	  more	  nuanced	  set	  of	  responses	  for	  countering	  the	  variegated	  range	  of	  risks,	  threats	  and	  vulnerabilities	  that	  it	  routinely	  encounters.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  For	  example	  see,	  Carr,	  P.	  (2006)	  Clean	  Streets.	  New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press.	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CHAPTER	  4:	  TWO	  CASE	  STUDIES	  OF	  PREVENT	  POLICING	  IN	  ACTION	  The	  conclusion	  of	  the	  previous	  Chapter	  outlined	  a	  conceptual	  model	  of	  four	  key	  modes	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  of	  the	  report	  is	  to	  try	  and	  show	  how	  this	  model	  affords	  new	  insights	  into	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Prevent	  policing	  takes	  place	  in	  practice.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  the	  discussion	  is	  organised	  around	  two	  detailed	  case	  studies	  of	  how	  the	  police	  and	  communities	  responded	  to	  incursions	  by	  extremist	  groups.	  Adopting	  this	  more	  detailed	  and	  in-­‐depth	  approach	  helps	  to	  illuminate	  some	  of	  the	  empirical	  complexities	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  ‘doing’	  Prevent	  policing.	  It	  can	  be	  observed	  how	  the	  implementation	  of	  police-­‐led,	  community-­‐led	  and	  more	  co-­‐productive	  interventions	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive	  but	  rather	  display	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  connectedness.	  Moreover,	  because	  the	  risk	  posed	  in	  the	  two	  communities	  is	  fairly	  similar	  in	  character,	  the	  analysis	  helps	  to	  further	  evidence	  how	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  is	  highly	  situated	  and	  responsive	  to	  local	  conditions.	  The	  first	  case	  study	  is	  drawn	  from	  Birmingham	  and	  the	  second	  from	  Cardiff.	  	  	  CASE	  STUDY	  1:	  ALUM	  ROCK,	  BIRMINGHAM	  This	  case	  study	  traces	  the	  response	  by	  West	  Midlands	  Police	  and	  the	  diverse	  Muslim	  communities	  of	  the	  Alum	  Rock	  area	  of	  Birmingham	  to	  the	  multiple	  visits	  of	  extremist	  activists	  associated	  with	  the	  proscribed	  group	  Al	  Murhajiroun	  (AM).	  These	  visits	  began	  in	  September	  2010	  and	  continued	  into	  the	  following	  year.	  It	  provides	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  processes	  involved	  in	  the	  co-­‐production	  of	  social	  control	  and	  security	  in	  communities,	  and	  reveals	  the	  centrality	  of	  effective	  community-­‐police	  relations.	  The	  case	  also	  illuminates	  the	  early	  dynamics	  and	  negotiations	  involved	  in	  decisions	  taken	  by	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  about	  how,	  when	  and	  where	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  challenging	  extremists.	  The	  introduction	  of	  an	  extremist	  group	  into	  this	  area	  of	  Birmingham	  stimulates	  a	  polarising	  process,	  whereby	  different	  groups	  come	  to	  assume	  more	  distinctive	  political	  stances	  than	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  disturbance.	  To	  place	  AM’s	  visits	  in	  context,	  this	  was	  the	  same	  area	  discussed	  previously	  in	  relation	  to	  Project	  Champion,	  where	  strident	  community	  objections	  had	  arisen	  to	  the	  installation,	  under	  false	  pretences,	  of	  numerous	  large	  and	  intrusive	  combined	  CCTV	  and	  audio	  masts	  in	  the	  locality.	  It	  was	  the	  view	  of	  many	  respondents	  that	  the	  public	  displays	  of	  grievance	  and	  anger	  had	  drawn	  high-­‐profile	  representatives	  of	  AM	  to	  the	  area,	  possibly	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  exploit	  the	  negative	  emotions	  evoked	  by	  the	  situation,	  for	  their	  extremist	  agenda.	  Such	  a	  move	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  recent	  trends	  in	  ‘AQ’	  and	  right-­‐wing	  extremist	  propaganda	  to	  exploit	  local,	  national	  and	  international	  grievances	  for	  their	  own	  ends.	  Yet	  for	  all	  the	  apparent	  damage	  to	  police	  community	  relations,	  it	  was	  observed	  that	  the	  community	  had	  in	  fact	  weathered	  many	  significant	  events	  that	  had	  tested	  its	  relations	  with	  the	  police	  over	  the	  last	  30	  years.	  This	  included	  Operation	  Gamble	  after	  9/11	  that	  involved	  the	  high	  profile	  armed	  arrest	  of	  terrorist	  suspects	  and	  the	  subsequent	  sealing	  off	  of	  streets	  and	  intrusive	  mass	  media	  coverage.	  That	  legacy	  and	  the	  learning	  on	  both	  sides	  resulting	  from	  it,	  meant	  that	  although	  relationships	  were	  seriously	  strained,	  at	  no	  time	  did	  those	  respondents	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interviewed	  consider	  abandoning	  the	  relationship.	  Indeed,	  the	  appearance	  of	  AM	  and	  the	  threat	  they	  were	  perceived	  to	  pose,	  may	  have	  helped	  to	  overcome	  community	  reluctance,	  and	  encouraged	  them	  to	  re-­‐engage	  with	  the	  police.	  It	  is	  apparent	  that	  AM	  may	  have	  significantly	  misjudged	  the	  public	  mood.	  This	  is	  evidenced	  in	  the	  community	  response	  to	  the	  stimulus	  provided	  by	  AM’s	  first	  appearance	  in	  Alum	  Rock	  Road	  sometime	  in	  September	  2010.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  stimulus	  for	  action	  that	  galvanised	  the	  community	  into	  counter-­‐activism,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  unpick	  the	  early	  sequence	  of	  events	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  that	  response.	  According	  to	  respondents,	  representatives	  of	  AM	  first	  appeared	  outside	  the	  Methodist	  Church	  in	  Alum	  Rock	  Road,	  where	  they	  deliberately	  positioned	  themselves	  so	  as	  to	  impede	  access	  to	  the	  church.	  However,	  interfaith	  partnerships	  in	  the	  area	  appear	  strong	  and	  it	  was	  through	  this	  social	  network	  that	  members	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community	  were	  first	  alerted	  to	  their	  presence.	  We	  can	  see	  here	  then	  an	  explicit	  example	  of	  the	  community	  acting	  to	  define	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  problem.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  though	  whether	  the	  police	  were	  involved	  in	  or	  even	  alert	  to	  this	  problem-­‐definition	  phase.	  There	  appears	  to	  have	  not	  been	  any	  direct	  contact	  on	  that	  occasion,	  in	  fact	  Muslim	  community	  members	  dissuaded	  members	  of	  the	  Methodist	  church	  from	  confronting	  the	  AM	  presence,	  fearing	  they	  would	  use	  any	  such	  confrontation	  to	  stir	  up	  trouble	  locally	  around	  an	  anti-­‐Christian	  narrative.	  The	  following	  Saturday,	  a	  group	  of	  AM	  supporters	  again	  appeared	  in	  Alum	  Rock	  Road,	  this	  time	  using	  a	  loud	  hailer.	  However,	  in	  the	  intervening	  period	  community	  members	  were	  now	  alert	  to	  them	  and	  were	  beginning	  to	  react,	  as	  a	  respondent	  explained,	  So	  by	  that	  time	  we	  dug	  a	  bit	  of	  information	  and	  found	  out	  this	  guy	  was	  [Name],	  Googled	  him	  and	  it	  was	  just	  wow,	  I	  was	  thinking	  oh	  my	  gosh,	  this	  guy’s	  got	  a	  history	  and	  a	  half	  behind	  him.”	  (Community,	  265)	  At	  this	  point,	  according	  to	  one	  of	  the	  police	  respondents,	  a	  Neighbourhood	  Officer	  from	  the	  Alum	  Rock	  area	  team	  had	  separately	  alerted	  the	  West	  Midlands	  CTU	  to	  AM’s	  presence.	  The	  officer	  had	  previously	  seen	  their	  leader	  on	  television	  and	  recognised	  him	  when	  he	  saw	  him	  outside	  the	  Methodist	  Church	  on	  the	  first	  Saturday,	  with	  a	  stall,	  handing	  out	  leaflets.	  This	  underscores	  the	  importance	  of	  front	  line	  patrol	  resources	  having	  basic	  visual	  recognition	  capability	  for	  key	  individuals.	  This	  requires	  such	  officers	  being	  given	  information	  in	  order	  to	  inform	  and	  develop	  their	  intelligence	  potential.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  independent	  community	  and	  police	  discovery	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  AM’s	  leader,	  a	  clear	  need	  for	  intervention	  was	  established.	  This	  was	  communicated,	  negotiated	  and	  agreed	  through	  established	  social	  networks,	  We	  sat	  with	  the	  police,	  set	  up	  a	  little	  reference	  group	  just	  on	  this	  point	  and	  we	  had	  the	  local	  churches	  involved	  and	  we	  set	  up	  a	  committee	  with	  all	  the	  local	  mosques	  in	  the	  area	  and	  the	  churches	  and	  the	  police	  and	  we	  started	  working	  as	  a	  community	  with	  the	  police	  to	  see	  how	  we	  can	  remove	  this	  menace.”	  (Community,	  189)	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Already	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  resources	  are	  being	  brought	  together	  that	  will	  facilitate	  a	  co-­‐productive	  response.	  A	  broad	  tranche	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community	  support	  was	  being	  engaged	  in	  formulating	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  response,	  	  such	  that	  key	  local	  opinion	  formers	  were	  starting	  to	  take	  a	  political	  stance	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  AM	  propaganda.	  This	  instigated	  intra-­‐community	  separation	  between	  the	  supporters	  of	  AM	  and	  its	  opponents,	  many	  of	  the	  supporters	  were	  not	  drawn	  from	  the	  local	  area,	  but	  instead	  from	  Luton	  and	  London.	  In	  essence,	  this	  created	  an	  instantly	  hostile	  environment	  for	  anyone	  espousing	  such	  views	  within	  the	  Alum	  Rock	  community.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  a	  broad	  based	  Muslim	  coalition	  was	  constructing	  the	  problem	  as	  one	  where	  they	  had	  to	  take	  the	  lead,	  We	  really	  needed	  the	  community	  to	  take	  lead	  on	  the	  whole	  thing.	  	  So	  two	  reasons;	  the	  first	  reason	  is	  because	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  in	  the	  area	  were	  Muslims,	  secondly	  because	  that	  would	  give	  [Name]	  no	  leg	  to	  stand	  on,	  because	  he	  was	  claiming	  to	  be	  standing	  up	  there	  for	  the	  Muslims	  and	  he’s	  been	  driven	  out	  by	  the	  Muslims	  because	  they	  don’t	  want	  his	  nasty	  types	  in	  the	  area.	  	  And	  that’s	  what	  happened.”	  (Community,	  265)	  From	  a	  police	  perspective,	  ‘the	  Reference	  Group’	  model	  originally	  developed	  to	  bring	  resolution	  to	  the	  Project	  Champion	  issue	  provided	  a	  valuable	  institutional	  approach.	  It	  enabled	  police	  action	  to	  be	  negotiated	  and	  integrated	  into	  a	  co-­‐produced	  response	  that	  with	  common	  support.	  This	  was	  found	  to	  be	  particularly	  important	  as	  potential	  legal	  control	  routes	  were	  explored	  by	  both	  the	  police	  and	  council	  but	  subsequently	  rejected	  for	  a	  number	  of	  pertinent	  reasons.	  The	  assessment	  was	  that	  they	  were	  likely	  to	  be:	  ineffective;	  or	  too	  longwinded	  in	  process	  terms	  (such	  as	  securing	  an	  ASBO)	  to	  be	  timely;	  or	  perceived	  by	  the	  reference	  group	  to	  be	  likely	  to	  provide	  AM	  with	  a	  valuable	  propaganda	  opportunity,	  given	  the	  media	  interest	  a	  public	  arrest	  of	  their	  members	  would	  invoke.	  This	  aspect	  of	  the	  story	  is	  important	  in	  terms	  of	  understanding	  the	  four	  ideal-­‐type	  interventions	  catalogued	  previously	  in	  this	  report.	  For	  what	  can	  be	  seen	  is	  that	  police	  tried	  other	  more	  orthodox	  routes	  to	  manage	  the	  problem,	  but	  	  resorted	  to	  a	  community	  co-­‐produced	  solution	  because	  it	  offered	  a	  better	  option.	  As	  early	  as	  the	  second	  Saturday,	  the	  community	  caucus	  had	  initiated	  direct	  confrontation	  with	  AM	  in	  the	  street.	  One	  respondent	  described	  how	  this	  counter-­‐activism	  was	  initiated,	  One	  of	  our	  friends,	  you	  know,	  him	  and	  his	  wife,	  I	  mean	  I’ll	  just	  describe	  him	  to	  you,	  he’s	  got	  a	  big	  beard,	  his	  wife	  wears	  the	  whole	  hijab	  and	  everything,	  they	  came	  round	  and	  his	  wife	  just	  told	  him	  in	  so	  many	  words	  to	  go	  and	  get	  stuffed,	  get	  out	  of	  here,	  we	  don’t	  need	  your	  type.	  	  So	  they	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure,	  so	  the	  community	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure	  on	  him,	  so	  he	  sort	  of	  diluted	  the	  whole	  thing	  that	  he	  was	  doing.	  	  And	  then	  the	  other	  thing	  we	  did	  was	  we	  set	  up	  a	  council	  of	  Mosques,	  so	  all	  the	  Mosques	  in	  the	  area,	  we	  got	  them	  all	  together	  round	  a	  table	  and	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  consensus	  that	  we	  don’t	  want	  this	  guy	  in	  the	  area,	  we’ll	  go	  and	  speak	  to	  him	  and	  get	  him	  kicked	  out,	  because	  we	  do	  not	  want	  him.”	  (Community,	  265)	  Interviews	  with	  police	  and	  CTU	  officers	  showed	  how	  the	  security	  solution	  came	  to	  be	  co-­‐produced.	  Co-­‐production	  occurs	  when	  local	  groups	  utilise	  public	  security	  resources	  to	  achieve	  an	  impact	  on	  a	  problem	  that	  neither	  could	  produce	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by	  their	  own	  means	  alone.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  arrival	  at	  a	  co-­‐produced	  solution	  was	  essentially	  pragmatic,	  as	  a	  CTU	  respondent	  explained,	  The	  community	  was	  saying	  we	  are	  going	  to	  ‘front’	  this	  guy	  and	  our	  line	  was	  we’ll	  support	  you.	  Because	  by	  that	  time	  we	  had	  explored	  the	  prosecution	  option	  and	  there	  was	  nothing	  really	  on	  the	  table.”	  (Police,	  451)	  Such	  pragmatic	  origins	  of	  co-­‐production	  nevertheless	  provide	  a	  valuable	  reference	  point	  for	  future	  police	  and	  community	  action.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  police,	  with	  the	  agreement	  and	  help	  of	  the	  community,	  began	  disrupting	  the	  venues	  where	  AM	  planned	  to	  give	  evening	  talks,	  “The	  community	  was	  telling	  the	  venues	  he	  was	  booking	  under	  different	  names.	  We	  disrupted	  the	  first	  one	  on	  the	  night	  dynamically,	  but	  then	  phoned	  round	  all	  the	  others	  and	  without	  any	  pressure	  from	  us	  they	  cancelled.	  So	  not	  only	  was	  he	  being	  approached	  on	  the	  street,	  he	  was	  turning	  up	  at	  venues	  and	  being	  told,	  look	  here’s	  you	  money	  back.	  We	  haven’t	  seen	  him	  for	  months.”	  (Police,	  451)	  	  From	  the	  community	  perspective	  there	  were	  clearly	  some	  very	  important	  reasons	  for	  joint	  activity	  with	  the	  police,	  	  “It	  is	  actually	  a	  stronger	  message	  because	  all	  that	  was	  done	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  police,	  the	  police	  were	  informed	  that	  this	  is	  going	  to	  be	  taking	  place,	  so	  we	  can’t	  just	  have	  members	  of	  the	  public	  going	  up	  and	  taking	  the	  law	  into	  their	  hands	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  if	  there	  was	  EDL	  protestors	  there	  I	  don’t	  want	  the	  anti-­‐fascist	  league	  to	  go	  and	  beat	  them	  up	  and	  vice	  versa.	  So	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  if	  you’ve	  just	  got	  two	  people	  who	  are	  going	  to	  get	  into	  a	  debate,	  there	  could	  be	  an	  argument,	  there	  could	  disorder.	  	  Not	  on	  our	  streets!	  There’s	  a	  law	  so	  you’ve	  got	  to	  play	  in	  with	  the	  law,	  so	  we	  work	  with	  the	  police	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  a)	  we	  will	  not	  escalate	  it	  or	  anything	  like,	  and	  b)	  if	  they	  are	  around	  if	  anything	  was	  going	  to	  take	  off	  they	  could	  manage	  the	  situation	  straight	  away,	  so	  it’s	  a	  partnership.”	  (Community,	  189)	  The	  quotation	  above	  shows	  that	  for	  this	  group	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  the	  limits	  and	  boundaries	  for	  such	  action	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  legitimate	  public	  protest	  under	  the	  law.	  The	  presence,	  backing	  and	  co-­‐operation	  of	  the	  police,	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  successful	  functioning	  of	  such	  acts	  of	  informal	  social	  control.	  By	  way	  of	  summary,	  	  this	  case	  study	  provides	  valuable	  insights	  into	  how	  co-­‐produced	  community	  action	  can	  frustrate,	  impede	  and	  disrupt	  the	  activities	  of	  known	  extremists.	  It	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  interventions	  can	  be	  greatly	  enhanced	  if	  CTUs	  have	  direct	  and	  meaningful	  relationships	  with	  community	  partners,	  such	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  dynamically	  and	  transparently	  negotiate	  and	  agree	  a	  plan	  to	  co-­‐produce	  effective	  social	  control.	  This	  case	  involved	  no	  recourse	  to	  criminal	  law	  enforcement,	  subterfuge	  or	  deceit.	  Instead	  it	  utilised	  police	  community	  relationships	  to	  activate	  social	  networks	  of	  counter	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activism.	  In	  this	  particular	  example,	  the	  arrival	  at	  such	  a	  solution	  was	  more	  pragmatic	  than	  planned,	  but	  it	  resonates	  with	  several	  similar	  stories	  present	  in	  the	  data.	  Such	  modes	  of	  intervention	  are	  entirely	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  legitimate	  actions	  of	  a	  democratic	  state	  and	  provide	  a	  potential	  blueprint	  for	  the	  future	  development	  of	  Prevent	  strategy.	  	  CASE	  STUDY	  2:	  CARDIFF	  The	  story	  of	  the	  second	  case	  study	  centres	  upon	  how	  several	  Muslim	  communities	  in	  Cardiff	  (Pakistani,	  Bangladeshi,	  Yemeni,	  and	  Somali)	  have	  responded	  to	  members	  of	  AM	  and	  its	  various	  offshoots	  and	  incarnations.	  Elements	  of	  this	  response	  stretch	  back	  at	  least	  ten	  years	  in	  South	  Wales,	  reflecting	  how	  non-­‐mainstream	  Islamic	  voices	  have	  been	  active	  in	  the	  city	  for	  a	  considerable	  period	  of	  time.	  However,	  within	  the	  last	  two	  years	  a	  group	  called	  Islamic	  Path	  (and	  several	  other	  aliases)	  has	  emerged	  in	  Cardiff	  and	  become	  increasingly	  visible.	  It	  appears	  that	  this	  small	  group	  of	  individuals	  first	  appeared	  in	  Barry,	  and	  has	  subsequently	  sought	  to	  migrate	  its	  activities	  towards	  Cardiff.	  Neither	  the	  size	  of	  this	  group,	  nor	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  support	  it	  can	  draw	  upon,	  are	  easy	  to	  establish.	  But	  of	  more	  direct	  interest	  to	  this	  study	  are	  the	  responses	  and	  reactions	  that	  their	  presence	  has	  provoked.	  The	  interviews	  have	  documented	  a	  number	  of	  counter-­‐radicalisation	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  several	  Muslim	  groups	  in	  the	  area.	  	  The	  Imam	  of	  one	  mosque	  and	  its	  congregation	  have	  taken	  an	  active	  decision	  not	  to	  tolerate	  members	  of	  the	  extremist	  group	  giving	  out	  leaflets	  or	  coming	  into	  the	  mosque.	  However,	  this	  active	  ‘defence’	  has	  not	  been	  without	  costs	  for	  the	  mosque.	  There	  are	  signs	  of	  intra-­‐community	  separation	  evident,	  and	  several	  mentions	  were	  made	  in	  interview	  of	  how	  the	  mosque	  community	  has	  been	  placed	  under	  some	  stress	  by	  maintaining	  this	  stance.	  In	  particular,	  the	  extremist	  group	  has	  had	  some	  success	  in	  isolating	  the	  mosque	  by	  spreading	  rumours	  at	  the	  university	  and	  elsewhere	  that	  it	  has	  sold	  out	  to	  Western	  ideology.	  There	  are	  unconfirmed	  reports	  of	  overseas	  Muslim	  students	  being	  told	  not	  to	  go	  to	  the	  mosque.	  This	  confirms	  how	  engaging	  in	  active	  defence	  is	  an	  ongoing	  process	  and	  commitment,	  and	  involves	  costs	  to	  those	  involved.	  The	  approach	  at	  this	  first	  mosque	  can	  be	  directly	  contrasted	  with	  that	  of	  a	  second	  mosque	  no	  more	  than	  250m	  away.	  This	  second	  mosque	  follows	  a	  different	  theology	  and	  whilst	  it	  dislikes	  the	  extremists,	  the	  management	  and	  congregation	  have	  not	  stopped	  them	  entering.	  Consequently,	  they	  have	  been	  less	  successful	  at	  insulating	  themselves	  from	  the	  extremist	  group’s	  incursions.	  There	  have	  been	  some	  minor	  confrontations	  in	  the	  mosque,	  but	  these	  have	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  group	  being	  banned.	  Comparing	  the	  positions	  adopted	  by	  these	  two	  mosques	  is	  insightful	  inasmuch	  it	  captures	  how,	  even	  within	  a	  small	  area,	  there	  can	  be	  very	  different	  needs	  for	  support.	  This	  raises	  an	  important	  question	  for	  police	  and	  their	  partners	  engaged	  in	  Prevent	  delivery	  work	  in	  terms	  of	  accurately	  diagnosing	  where	  the	  kinds	  of	  support	  they	  can	  provide	  is	  required	  and	  of	  what	  kind.	  There	  has	  been	  some	  success	  in	  doing	  this	  in	  Cardiff.	  In	  particular,	  in	  an	  example	  of	  ‘Type	  2	  co-­‐
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production’	  local	  community	  groups	  were	  empowered	  through	  some	  subtle	  assistance	  to	  help	  disrupt	  a	  proposed	  visit	  by	  AM	  to	  Cardiff.	  In	  relation	  to	  this	  event,	  several	  community	  groups	  involved	  in	  counter-­‐radicalisation	  work	  in	  the	  city	  mobilised	  effectively.	  They	  organised	  a	  public	  meeting	  and	  barbeque	  for	  young	  people	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  event.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  the	  leader	  of	  AM	  cancelled	  his	  visit,	  and	  virtually	  no	  one	  attended	  the	  rally	  near	  to	  the	  university	  (this	  can	  be	  seen	  clearly	  in	  videos	  posted	  on	  You	  Tube).	  	  Two	  particular	  issues	  are	  of	  note	  in	  respect	  of	  this	  particular	  response.	  Even	  though	  the	  visit	  was	  successfully	  disrupted,	  it	  still	  achieved	  propaganda	  value	  for	  AM.	  The	  video	  posted	  on	  You	  Tube	  was	  cleverly	  edited	  so	  as	  not	  to	  reveal	  that	  there	  was	  no	  audience	  for	  the	  speakers.	  Thus	  for	  an	  internet	  audience	  it	  conveys	  the	  impression	  of	  radical	  street	  preaching	  taking	  place	  with	  impunity	  in	  the	  City.	  The	  second	  issue	  is	  that,	  in	  preparing	  a	  response	  to	  the	  AM	  provocation,	  the	  Prevent	  policing	  team	  attempted	  to	  access	  funds	  quickly	  enough	  to	  support	  the	  response	  of	  local	  community	  groups,	  but	  were	  not	  able	  to	  do	  so	  .	  In	  the	  end,	  funding	  for	  the	  diversionary	  events	  came	  from	  the	  local	  mosques	  themselves.	  Since	  this	  time,	  the	  more	  extremist	  groups	  have	  continued	  to	  probe	  into	  the	  area.	  For	  example,	  on	  10th	  July	  2010,	  ‘Ummah	  Rise’	  held	  a	  static	  demonstration	  in	  Cardiff	  purportedly	  concerning	  the	  banning	  of	  the	  wearing	  of	  head	  scarves	  in	  France	  and	  Belgium.	  Several	  formal	  and	  informal	  interventions	  took	  place	  to	  reduce	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  this	  event.	  Formally,	  members	  of	  the	  Prevent	  team	  were	  involved	  in	  awareness	  raising	  activities	  in	  and	  around	  the	  local	  mosques	  and	  through	  trusted	  youth	  service	  providers.	  Informally,	  a	  small	  local	  group	  of	  young	  Muslims	  prepared	  some	  ‘counter-­‐narratives’	  designed	  to	  undermine	  the	  propaganda	  of	  Ummah	  Rise	  and	  disseminated	  these	  locally.	  The	  story	  provided	  from	  within	  the	  community	  about	  the	  state	  of	  Prevent	  in	  Cardiff	  is	  one	  where	  there	  is	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  reliance	  upon	  the	  internal	  capacities	  and	  capabilities	  residing	  within	  the	  community	  itself.	  Albeit	  there	  are	  	  some	  subtle	  police	  interventions	  taking	  place	  behind	  the	  scenes,	  the	  community	  views	  proffered	  are	  that	  these	  Prevent	  activities	  are	  only	  lightly	  coupled	  to	  the	  ‘real’	  counter-­‐radicalisation	  work	  being	  performed.	  This	  is	  demonstrative	  of	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  co-­‐producing	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  In	  some	  cases	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  police-­‐led	  activity	  does	  not	  impede	  or	  inhibit	  the	  forms	  of	  ‘organic’	  informal	  social	  control	  that	  emanates	  from	  within	  resilient	  communities.	  This	  is	  freighted	  with	  significant	  implications	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  recognises	  that	  in	  some	  instances	  it	  is	  best	  for	  police	  to	  ‘get	  out	  of	  the	  way’	  and	  cede	  responsibility	  to	  communities.	  On	  other	  occasions	  though,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  police	  to	  more	  directly	  seed	  and	  empower	  communities,	  but	  in	  fairly	  low	  visibility	  ways.	  This	  may	  involve	  providing	  some	  protection	  to	  key	  individuals	  without	  them	  knowing	  what	  interventions	  are	  being	  performed.	  An	  additional	  problem	  for	  the	  police	  is	  actually	  working	  out	  which	  groups	  they	  should	  be	  partnering	  with,	  and	  the	  potential	  ramifications	  for	  their	  connections	  to	  other	  communities.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  inherently	  political	  with	  both	  a	  big	  and	  small	  ‘p’.	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CHAPTER	  5:	  ASSESSING	  THE	  GENERAL	  EFFECTS	  OF	  PREVENT	  POLICING	  Having	  examined	  the	  processes	  and	  structures	  used	  to	  organize	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  and	  some	  of	  the	  situational	  variations	  pertaining	  to	  these,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  analysis	  now	  shifts.	  This	  Chapter	  details	  some	  of	  the	  broad	  outcomes	  and	  effects	  associated	  with	  the	  conduct	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  The	  focus	  is	  upon	  mapping	  some	  of	  the	  general	  patterns	  and	  trends	  that	  can	  be	  detected.	  These	  are	  refined	  and	  elaborated	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  However,	  the	  value	  of	  setting	  out	  these	  higher-­‐level	  assessments	  now	  is	  that	  they	  start	  to	  contest	  and	  challenge	  a	  number	  of	  assumptions	  and	  claims	  that	  have	  dominated	  public	  debates	  about	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  approach	  to	  counter-­‐terrorism	  and	  its	  implications.	  	  Contrary	  to	  some	  such	  claims	  suggesting	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  Prevent	  has	  contributed	  to	  widespread	  alienation	  of	  the	  UK’s	  Muslim	  communities,	  the	  data	  drawn	  from	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  suggest	  that	  any	  such	  effects	  are	  more	  nuanced.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  many	  of	  the	  qualitative	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  community	  representatives	  where	  balanced	  perspectives	  on	  Prevent	  and	  its	  effects	  were	  articulated.	  Frequently	  for	  instance,	  interviewees	  would	  talk	  about	  the	  problems	  they	  perceive	  with	  Prevent,	  whilst	  later	  on	  in	  the	  same	  interview,	  describing	  the	  difficulties	  that	  the	  authorities	  face	  and	  recounting	  examples	  of	  effective	  practice.	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  one	  respondent	  described	  the	  general	  cynicism	  pervading	  community	  attitudes,	  “Take	  this	  Prevent	  agenda	  for	  example,	  the	  community	  out	  there	  generally	  says	  they’re	  only	  paying	  attention	  to	  us	  because	  they	  think	  we’re	  a	  terrorist	  and	  that’s	  why	  they’re	  doing	  it.	  They’re	  not	  doing	  it	  because	  they	  need	  us	  or	  want	  us,	  but	  they’re	  doing	  it	  because	  they’re	  worried	  about	  us.”	  Continuing	  on	  this	  theme	  he	  went	  on	  to	  acknowledge	  that,	  “I	  do	  understand	  the	  police,	  the	  government,	  the	  enforcement	  agencies	  are	  in	  a	  difficult	  position	  how	  to	  really	  engage	  the	  community.	  It	  is	  a	  challenge.”	  [Community,	  2633-­‐07]	  A	  second	  respondent	  in	  a	  different	  part	  of	  the	  country	  also	  accented	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  dimensions	  of	  policing,	  “I	  think	  the	  police	  have	  obviously	  shown	  great	  interest…We	  still	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  problems	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  anti-­‐social	  behaviour,	  which	  the	  local	  people	  think	  the	  police	  is	  not	  doing	  anything	  about…I	  think	  these	  Community	  Support	  officers,	  visually	  they	  are	  out	  and	  about…They’re	  not	  just	  doing	  policing,	  they’re	  also	  building	  community	  relationships…It’s	  not	  just	  about	  police	  getting	  in	  there	  and	  doing	  the	  business…	  these	  officers	  I	  think	  they’re	  doing	  the	  leg	  work,	  the	  ground	  work,	  which	  is	  changing	  peoples’	  perceptions.”	  (Community,	  2654-­‐05)	  	  As	  this	  man	  notes,	  building	  trust	  and	  confidence	  necessitates	  engaging	  around	  a	  fairly	  broad	  agenda	  beyond	  just	  counter-­‐terrorist	  issues.	  It	  requires	  building	  community	  relationships	  in	  order	  to	  start	  to	  influence	  peoples’	  hearts	  and	  minds.	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Similarly	  complex	  views,	  albeit	  differently	  focused	  can	  be	  detected	  in	  the	  following	  quotation	  from	  a	  third	  respondent	  who	  started	  off	  by	  discussing	  the	  limitations	  he	  saw	  with	  community	  responses,	  “So	  the	  ultimate	  truth	  here	  is	  that	  we	  haven’t	  mobilised	  ourselves	  properly	  and	  we’ve	  not	  been	  able	  to	  tackle	  even	  simpler	  things	  that	  really	  should	  be	  simple	  for	  us.”	  He	  then	  extended	  this	  critique	  from	  a	  focus	  upon	  the	  community	  to	  include	  the	  police’s	  position,	  “The	  police	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  don’t	  think	  they	  don’t	  help	  themselves,	  because	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  police	  issues	  are	  tick	  box	  objectives.”	  Overall,	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  community	  representatives	  interviewed	  set	  out	  quite	  complex	  perspectives	  on	  Prevent	  policing,	  acknowledging	  the	  presence	  of	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  dimensions.	  Thus,	  a	  realistic	  assessment	  of	  Prevent,	  and	  what	  it	  is	  and	  is	  not	  achieving,	  needs	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  refined	  to	  reflect	  the	  suppleness	  of	  the	  public’s	  actual	  views.	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  Chapter	  combines	  cross-­‐sectional	  and	  trend	  analyses	  of	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey.	  The	  former	  uses	  data	  from	  the	  2008-­‐09	  survey.	  The	  trend	  analysis	  is	  based	  upon	  data	  from	  the	  BCS	  between	  the	  years	  2004-­‐09.	  	  By	  combining	  these	  approaches	  the	  analysis	  is	  able	  to	  describe,	  in	  detail,	  perceptions	  and	  attitudes	  towards	  policing	  and	  crime	  among	  the	  Muslim	  faith	  community	  and	  the	  general	  population	  living	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  track	  how	  these	  have	  evolved	  over	  time.	  This	  trend	  analysis	  is	  important	  in	  affording	  insights	  into	  whether	  the	  experiences	  and	  perceptions	  of	  Muslim	  communities	  in	  relation	  to	  crime,	  disorder	  and	  policing	  have	  been	  improving,	  declining	  or	  diverging	  from	  those	  of	  other	  groups	  in	  society,	  as	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  been	  implemented.	  	  It	  should	  be	  clarified	  that	  the	  BCS	  does	  not	  include	  any	  questions	  directly	  addressing	  social	  reactions	  to	  Prevent	  policing	  or	  terrorist	  risks.	  As	  such,	  the	  survey	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  direct	  measures	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  activity	  or	  its	  impacts,	  nor	  are	  there	  any	  comprehensive	  publicly	  available	  data	  on	  this.	  The	  BCS	  does	  though	  include	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  array	  of	  questions	  relating	  to	  more	  general	  police	  performance.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  report,	  these	  are	  applied	  as	  indicators	  that	  integrate	  Prevent	  policing	  activity	  with	  other	  local	  policing	  interventions.	  The	  presumption	  is	  that	  such	  indicators	  will	  reflect	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  though,	  that	  in	  a	  recent	  Rapid	  Evidence	  Assessment,	  albeit	  one	  grappling	  with	  a	  limited	  evidence-­‐base,	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  Muslims	  may	  have	  stronger	  negative	  perceptions	  of	  current	  CT	  legislation.13	  	  	  FRAMING	  THE	  ANALYSIS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  DSTL	  (2010)	  What	  perceptions	  do	  the	  UK	  public	  have	  concerning	  the	  impact	  of	  counter-­‐terrorist	  legislation	  implemented	  since	  2000?	  London:	  Home	  Office.	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The	  analysis	  of	  the	  BCS	  has	  been	  designed	  to	  accomplish	  the	  following	  aims:	  (1) To	  help	  make	  visible	  the	  characteristics	  of	  adults	  living	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  who	  self-­‐identify	  with	  the	  Muslim	  faith.	  To	  show	  how	  faith	  and	  ethnic	  group	  may	  shape	  where	  and	  how	  you	  live,	  not	  only	  for	  Muslims	  but	  also	  for	  other	  ‘visible’	  minority	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  our	  society.	  	  (2) At	  a	  national	  level,	  to	  compare	  the	  current	  surveyed	  attitudes	  and	  experiences	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  with	  the	  general	  population	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  their:	  a. Perceptions	  of	  and	  confidence	  in	  the	  police;	  	  b. Experiences	  and	  perceptions	  of	  social	  and	  physical	  disorder;	  c. Exposure	  to	  crime	  risks	  and	  threats;	  d. Levels	  of	  community	  cohesion.	  	  (3) To	  track	  how	  key	  attitudes	  in	  each	  of	  the	  domains	  identified	  above	  have	  changed,	  if	  at	  all,	  among	  the	  Muslim	  and	  general	  population	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  using	  previous	  years	  of	  data	  from	  the	  BCS.	  	  	  (4) To	  utilise	  the	  geographical	  data	  in	  the	  BCS	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  attitudes	  and	  experiences	  of	  Muslims	  vary	  by	  Police	  Force	  Area.	  	  This	  study	  utilises	  the	  same	  analytic	  approach	  as	  employed	  in	  recent	  Citizenship	  Survey	  reports	  of	  Muslim	  communities	  in	  the	  UK	  by	  comparing	  a	  self-­‐identified	  ‘Muslim’	  faith	  group	  with	  the	  general	  adult	  population.14	  The	  intention	  is	  not	  to	  reduce	  any	  observed	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  to	  faith	  per	  se.	  It	  is	  well	  documented	  that	  socio-­‐demographic	  and	  material	  factors	  have	  a	  fundamental	  impact	  in	  shaping	  the	  experiences	  of	  different	  faith	  groups	  in	  our	  society.	  	  Rather,	  attention	  is	  focused	  upon	  the	  Muslim	  group	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  descriptive	  data	  on	  how	  their	  unique	  physical	  and	  social	  position	  in	  society	  may	  shape	  their	  exposure	  to,	  and	  experiences	  of,	  crime	  and	  policing.	  	  Building	  upon	  the	  analysis	  provided	  in	  the	  preceding	  Chapter,	  the	  current	  analysis	  commences	  by	  examining	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  of	  policing.	  This	  is	  developed	  by	  moving	  on	  to	  examine	  crime,	  disorder	  and	  fear	  of	  crime	  in	  Muslim	  communities.	  The	  final	  section	  considers	  how	  all	  of	  these	  factors	  shape	  and	  configure	  levels	  of	  community	  cohesion.	  	  PERCEPTIONS	  OF	  POLICING	  The	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  provides	  several	  measures	  of	  local	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  police.	  One	  of	  these	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  question	  ‘how	  good	  a	  job	  are	  police	  in	  
this	  area	  doing?’	  	  Using	  this	  question,	  ratings	  were	  given	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  ‘excellent’	  through	  to	  ‘very	  poor’.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  A	  discussion	  of	  the	  caveats	  associated	  with	  this	  approach	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  Appendix.	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• Muslim	  respondents	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  the	  general	  population	  to	  give	  a	  positive	  appraisal	  of	  the	  police	  (excellent	  or	  good)	  and	  least	  likely	  to	  rate	  the	  police	  as	  ‘poor’	  or	  ‘very	  poor’.	  	  	  These	  positive	  attitudes	  were	  evident	  for	  both	  sexes,	  with	  7	  out	  of	  10	  Muslim	  women	  giving	  a	  high	  endorsement	  of	  the	  police	  compared	  to	  55	  percent	  of	  women	  in	  the	  general	  population	  (figures	  for	  men	  were	  56	  percent	  and	  51	  percent	  respectively).	  	  Unlike	  the	  general	  population	  where	  endorsement	  of	  local	  police	  as	  ‘excellent’	  or	  ‘good’	  was	  static	  according	  to	  age	  group,	  younger	  Muslims	  under	  the	  age	  of	  35	  had	  a	  less	  positive	  attitude	  towards	  the	  local	  police	  than	  their	  elder	  peers	  (Table	  3).15	  	  However,	  despite	  this	  difference	  among	  Muslims,	  the	  attitude	  of	  young	  Muslim	  men	  remained	  more	  positive	  than	  for	  the	  young	  general	  adult	  population.	  	  	  Table	  3:	  Percentage	  Rating	  Local	  Police	  as	  ‘Excellent’	  or	  ‘Good’	  by	  Age	  Age	   Muslim	   General	  Population	  16-­‐34	   59%	   53%	  n	   474	   9658	  35-­‐54	   66%	   52%	  n	   393	   15524	  55+	   66%	   54%	  n	   94	   19095	  Source:	  BCS	  2008/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  	  Figure	  2:	  Percentage	  Rating	  Local	  Police	  as	  ‘Excellent’	  or	  ‘Good’	  by	  Inner	  City	  Locale	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2008/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  For	  Muslims,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  lived	  in	  an	  inner-­‐city	  area	  of	  England	  or	  Wales	  did	  not	  affect	  their	  ratings	  of	  local	  police.	  	  Approval	  ratings	  remained	  above	  60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  base	  data	  for	  this	  and	  all	  the	  following	  Tables	  and	  Figures	  are	  provided	  in	  a	  Technical	  Appendix	  available	  on	  request	  from	  upsi@cardiff.ac.uk.	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percent	  regardless	  of	  their	  type	  of	  locale.	  	  For	  the	  general	  population,	  however,	  ratings	  of	  the	  local	  police	  were	  less	  positive	  for	  inner	  city	  residents	  than	  for	  those	  residing	  outside	  the	  inner	  city	  (Figure	  2).	  	  Available	  data	  were	  examined	  to	  further	  investigate	  whether	  differences	  existed	  in	  the	  visibility,	  familiarity	  or	  contact	  with	  local	  police	  between	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  	  	  	  
• The	  percentage	  having	  ‘any	  type	  of	  contact’	  with	  the	  police	  in	  the	  last	  12	  months	  was	  identical	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  at	  36	  percent.	  	  
• There	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  ‘initiated	  contact’	  with	  the	  police	  for	  the	  two	  groups,	  at	  23	  percent	  over	  the	  same	  time	  period.	  	  	  	  Attitudes	  to	  local	  policing	  were	  also	  explored	  in	  the	  survey	  by	  analysing	  responses	  to	  a	  series	  of	  seven	  questions	  about	  police	  effectiveness	  and	  performance	  (Table	  4).	  	  The	  overall	  pattern	  in	  the	  table	  shows	  similarities	  for	  the	  Muslim	  and	  general	  population.	  Both	  give	  the	  greatest	  endorsement	  to	  the	  police	  in	  areas	  of	  respect	  (2),	  understanding	  of	  community	  issues	  (5)	  and	  public	  confidence	  (7).	  Police	  performance	  on	  dealing	  with	  minor	  crime	  (4)	  was	  least	  likely	  to	  be	  positively	  appraised	  by	  both	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population,	  and	  public	  reliance	  on	  local	  police	  (1)	  was	  poorly	  perceived	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  areas,	  especially	  for	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Table	  4:	  	  Appraisals	  of	  Local	  Police	  Effectiveness	  	   Police	  in	  this	  area...(strongly	  agree	  or	  agree)	   Muslim	   General	  	  Population	  1	   ...	  can	  be	  relied	  on	  to	  be	  there	  when	  you	  need	  them	   64	   47	  2	   ...would	  treat	  you	  with	  respect	  if	  you	  had	  contact	  	   81	   84	  3	   ...	  treat	  everyone	  fairly	  regardless	  of	  who	  they	  are	   67	   65	  4	   ...	  can	  be	  relied	  on	  to	  deal	  with	  minor	  crimes	   57	   45	  5	   ....	  understand	  the	  issues	  that	  affect	  this	  community	   70	   65	  6	   ...are	  dealing	  with	  things	  that	  matter	  to	  this	  community	   63	   53	  7	   I	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  police	  in	  this	  area	   75	   67	  	  N	   	   	  963	   	  44601	  Source:	  BCS	  2008/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  There	  were	  differences	  between	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  endorsement	  they	  gave	  the	  different	  measures	  of	  police	  performance.	  Muslims	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  endorse	  local	  police	  on	  6	  out	  of	  7	  of	  the	  indicators.	  In	  particular,	  64	  percent	  of	  Muslims	  agreed	  that	  the	  police	  can	  be	  relied	  on,	  compared	  with	  less	  than	  half	  of	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Approximately	  7	  out	  of	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10	  Muslims	  also	  expressed	  confidence	  in	  their	  local	  police	  and	  agreed	  that	  they	  understand	  local	  community	  issues	  –	  higher	  than	  for	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Muslims	  were	  less	  likely	  than	  the	  general	  population	  to	  agree	  local	  police	  treat	  people	  with	  respect	  (although	  overall	  endorsement	  was	  high	  at	  over	  80	  percent).	  There	  was	  little	  difference	  between	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  concerning	  the	  ability	  of	  police	  to	  ‘treat	  everyone	  fairly’	  and	  this,	  combined	  with	  respect,	  may	  be	  areas	  where	  Muslims	  are	  more	  questioning	  of	  their	  local	  police	  relative	  to	  the	  general	  population.	  Further	  analysis	  of	  local	  police	  confidence	  showed	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  respondents	  born	  in	  the	  UK	  Figure	  3).	  	  	  Approximately	  65	  percent	  of	  UK	  citizens	  expressed	  confidence	  in	  police	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  were	  Muslim.	  Confidence	  remained	  significantly	  higher	  among	  those	  born	  outside	  the	  UK,	  especially	  for	  Muslims	  (79	  percent).	  	  	  Figure	  3:	  	  Percentage	  Who	  Had	  Confidence	  in	  Local	  Police	  by	  Country	  of	  Birth	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2008/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  	  In	  thinking	  about	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  age	  is	  an	  important	  consideration	  given	  that	  most	  Prevent	  interventions	  are	  directed	  towards	  young	  people.	  Across	  all	  groups,	  respondents	  in	  the	  oldest	  age	  band	  (55+)	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  express	  confidence	  in	  local	  police	  and	  this	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  Muslims.	  Reported	  confidence	  became	  lower	  with	  younger	  age	  (Figure	  4)	  and	  this	  was	  clear	  for	  Muslims,	  although	  overall	  confidence	  outweighed	  that	  of	  the	  general	  population	  across	  all	  age	  groups.	  	  For	  both	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population,	  confidence	  in	  local	  police	  was	  higher	  for	  women	  than	  men,	  but	  the	  gender	  gap	  in	  confidence	  was	  widest	  among	  Muslims.	  	  Being	  the	  victim	  of	  any	  crime	  in	  the	  preceding	  12	  months	  was	  associated	  with	  lower	  police	  confidence	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population,	  but	  endorsements	  of	  police	  confidence	  remained	  above	  60	  percent	  for	  Muslims	  compared	  to	  57	  percent	  for	  the	  general	  population.	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  relationships	  between	  confidence	  and	  age,	  gender,	  country	  of	  birth	  and	  victim	  status	  were	  the	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same	  for	  Muslims	  as	  for	  the	  population	  in	  general,	  but	  Muslims	  had	  a	  much	  higher	  baseline	  level	  of	  confidence	  in	  local	  police.	  	  Figure	  4:	  Percentage	  Who	  Had	  Confidence	  in	  Local	  Police	  by	  Age	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2008/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  Reliability	  testing16	  of	  the	  seven	  attitude	  items	  in	  Table	  4	  showed	  that	  it	  was	  appropriate	  to	  combine	  them	  into	  a	  single	  summed	  scale	  of	  ‘police	  effectiveness’.	  	  Positive	  responses	  (agree)	  were	  scored	  +3,	  negative	  responses	  (disagree)	  were	  scored	  +1,	  summed	  for	  all	  items	  and	  then	  divided	  by	  7	  to	  give	  a	  scale	  ranging	  from	  1	  (low	  police	  effectiveness)	  to	  3	  (high	  police	  effectiveness).	  	  	  One-­‐third	  (34	  percent)	  of	  Muslims	  agreed	  with	  each	  of	  the	  seven	  attitude	  statements	  about	  local	  police,	  meaning	  they	  had	  a	  maximum	  score	  of	  3	  on	  the	  police	  effectiveness	  scale.	  This	  compared	  with	  23	  percent	  of	  the	  general	  population.	  	  	  	  	  
• Among	  Muslims,	  those	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  highly	  satisfied	  with	  local	  police	  effectiveness	  were	  aged	  35-­‐54,	  female	  and	  living	  in	  an	  inner-­‐city	  area.	  	  	  	  	  For	  the	  general	  population,	  inner	  city	  locale	  and	  age	  did	  not	  impact	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  scoring	  high	  on	  police	  effectiveness,	  but	  women	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  men	  to	  be	  in	  this	  category.	  	  	  	  Using	  a	  number	  of	  attitude	  statements	  included	  in	  the	  BCS	  for	  a	  four	  year	  time	  period,	  from	  2005-­‐6	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  examine	  public	  perceptions	  of	  local	  policing.	  	  	  Figure	  5	  shows	  that	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  agreed	  that	  ‘police	  in	  this	  area	  would	  treat	  you	  with	  respect	  if	  you	  had	  contact	  with	  them’.	  	  The	  trend	  over	  time	  was	  very	  stable	  and	  there	  was	  little	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  groups,	  particularly	  in	  2007-­‐08	  where	  positive	  appraisal	  of	  local	  police	  peaked	  in	  this	  regard,	  before	  dipping	  very	  slightly	  for	  Muslims	  in	  2008-­‐9.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Chronbach’s	  Alpha=0.8.	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Figure	  5:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Respect	  by	  the	  Police	  	  
	  	  When	  the	  issue	  centred	  on	  how	  far	  ‘police	  in	  this	  area	  understand	  issues	  that	  affect	  this	  community’,	  agreement	  was	  lower	  for	  both	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Between	  2005-­‐6	  and	  2007-­‐8,	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  percentage	  agreeing	  with	  this	  statment	  at	  approximately	  61	  percent.	  	  In	  2008-­‐09	  there	  was	  	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  percentage	  endorsing	  this	  statement	  for	  both	  groups,	  but	  this	  rise	  was	  greatest	  among	  Muslims	  with	  approxiamtely	  70	  percent	  now	  in	  agreement	  that	  police	  had	  an	  understanding	  of	  their	  local	  community	  issues.	  	  	  Taken	  together	  these	  initial	  findings	  about	  perceptions	  of	  policing	  are	  important	  because:	  
• Contrary	  to	  some	  polemics,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  causing	  widespread	  or	  wholesale	  disengagement	  and	  disenchantment	  within	  Muslim	  communities.	  	  
• Young	  Muslims	  are	  less	  confident	  in	  policing	  than	  their	  older	  peers,	  but	  they	  are	  more	  confident	  than	  young	  people	  in	  general.	  	  
• Across	  a	  range	  of	  other	  indicators	  their	  attitudes	  display	  a	  broadly	  similar	  profile.	  	  If	  Prevent	  was	  having	  an	  acutely	  detrimental	  impact	  upon	  police-­‐community	  relations	  this	  is	  not	  a	  pattern	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  see.	  	  	  EXPERIENCES	  AND	  PERCEPTIONS	  OF	  DISORDER	  The	  analysis	  in	  the	  preceding	  Chapter	  identified	  that	  there	  is	  often	  a	  strong	  alignment	  between	  Prevent	  and	  Neighbourhood	  Policing.	  Many	  interviewees	  recognised	  that	  dealing	  effectively	  with	  local	  community	  concerns	  was	  important	  in	  building	  trust	  and	  confidence.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  investigate	  the	  relative	  impacts	  that	  crime	  and	  disorder	  problems	  are	  having	  within	  Muslim	  communities.	  The	  BCS	  includes	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  relating	  to	  physical	  disorder	  (damage	  to	  the	  physical	  environment)	  and	  social	  disorder	  (interpersonal	  or	  antisocial	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problems).	  Three	  social	  disorders	  stand	  out	  as	  being	  perceived	  as	  a	  problem	  by	  over	  one-­‐third	  of	  Muslims.	  They	  were:	  	  (1)	  Teenagers	  hanging	  around	  on	  the	  streets;	  	  (2)	  Drug	  use;	  and	  	  (3)	  Public	  drinking.	  	  	  These	  same	  three	  issues	  were	  also	  perceived	  as	  a	  problem	  among	  the	  general	  population,	  but	  to	  a	  much	  lesser	  degree.	  	  Other	  social	  disorders	  were	  a	  problem	  of	  lower	  magnitude	  for	  both	  groups,	  but	  concern	  among	  Muslims	  remained	  considerably	  higher	  for:	  noisy	  neighbours;	  being	  pestered	  or	  intimidated;	  and	  racial	  discrimination.	  	  	  
• Muslims	  were	  much	  more	  likely	  than	  the	  general	  population	  to	  perceive	  wide-­‐ranging	  social	  and	  physical	  disorders	  in	  their	  local	  environment	  as	  problematic.	  	  This	  has	  potentially	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  policing.	  Engaging	  Neighbourhood	  Policing	  assets	  around	  these	  specific	  issues	  that	  Muslim	  communities	  find	  particularly	  troubling	  and	  disturbing,	  may	  be	  important	  in	  building	  trust,	  confidence	  and	  resilience	  within	  these	  groups.	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  6:	  Percentage	  Rating	  Social	  Disorders	  as	  a	  Problem	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2008/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  	  When	  responses	  to	  the	  six	  questions	  on	  social	  disorder	  in	  Figure	  6	  were	  combined	  to	  give	  a	  single	  summed	  scale,	  we	  found	  that	  only	  1	  percent	  of	  the	  general	  population	  saw	  every	  issue	  as	  a	  problem.	  For	  Muslims,	  this	  figure	  rose	  to	  4	  percent.	  This	  confirms	  that	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  Neighbourhood	  Policing	  strategy	  may	  be	  important	  in	  Muslim	  communities	  in	  helping	  to	  shape	  the	  conditions	  where	  more	  explicitly	  Prevent	  focused	  activities	  can	  be	  effectively	  conducted.	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Those	  who	  perceived	  social	  disorder	  in	  their	  neighbourhood	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  perceive	  physical	  disorder	  in	  the	  same	  area	  and	  this	  inter-­‐relationship	  was	  strongest	  for	  Muslims.	  Thirty	  nine	  percent	  of	  Muslims	  in	  the	  top	  third	  for	  reporting	  social	  disorder	  also	  reported	  high	  physical	  disorder.	  For	  the	  general	  population,	  the	  corresponding	  percentage	  was	  33.	  In	  sum,	  Muslims	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  perceive	  social	  and	  physical	  disorders	  in	  their	  neighbourhood	  as	  a	  problem.	  However,	  key	  areas	  of	  reported	  concern	  (teenagers,	  drinking	  and	  drug	  use)	  were	  the	  same	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  Issues	  that	  were	  more	  specific	  to	  the	  Muslim	  population	  included	  race	  hate,	  being	  pestered	  or	  intimidated	  and	  noisy	  neighbours.	  On	  the	  basis	  that	  that	  three	  particular	  forms	  of	  anti-­‐social	  behaviour	  appear	  to	  be	  impacting	  comparatively	  strongly	  upon	  Muslims,	  we	  examined	  in	  more	  detail	  how	  their	  attitudes	  had	  developed	  over	  time.	  For	  Muslims,	  drugs	  and	  teenagers	  hanging	  around	  were	  of	  foremost	  concern	  and	  showed	  a	  similar	  trend	  over	  time	  (Figures	  7	  and	  8).	  	  	  Approximately	  44	  percent	  of	  Muslims	  rated	  each	  of	  these	  issues	  as	  a	  ‘very’	  or	  ‘fairly’	  big	  problem	  in	  2004-­‐5.	  	  This	  then	  fell	  slightly	  in	  2005-­‐6	  before	  reaching	  a	  peak	  of	  48	  percent	  in	  2006-­‐7	  for	  drugs	  and	  47	  percent	  in	  the	  same	  year	  for	  teenagers	  hanging	  around.	  	  In	  the	  years	  that	  have	  followed	  there	  was	  a	  gradual	  but	  consistent	  decrease	  in	  the	  percentage	  of	  Muslims	  rating	  either	  issue	  as	  a	  problem.	  	  In	  2008-­‐9,	  reports	  of	  these	  issues	  as	  a	  problem	  were	  at	  their	  lowest	  level	  over	  the	  time	  period	  (42	  percent).	  	  For	  the	  general	  population,	  a	  higher	  percentage	  viewed	  teenagers	  hanging	  around	  as	  a	  problem	  than	  drugs,	  but	  the	  overall	  trend	  was	  unchanged	  over	  time.	  	  	  Figure	  7:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Drug	  Dealing	  a	  Problem	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Figure	  8:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Teenagers	  a	  Problem	  	  
	  	  	  Figure	  9:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Drunkeness	  and	  Being	  Rowdy	  a	  Problem	  	  
	  	  	  Although	  concern	  about	  drunk	  or	  rowdy	  behaviour	  was	  of	  a	  lower	  magnitude	  for	  both	  groups	  compared	  with	  teenagers	  hanging	  around	  or	  drugs,	  the	  data	  showed	  an	  upward	  trend	  in	  concern	  among	  the	  general	  population	  (Figure	  9).	  	  	  In	  2004-­‐5,	  approximately	  2	  in	  10	  of	  the	  general	  population	  viewed	  this	  as	  a	  ‘big’	  or	  ‘fairly	  big’	  problem	  but	  this	  has	  gradually	  increased	  over	  the	  time	  period	  to	  its	  highest	  level	  of	  26	  percent	  in	  2008-­‐9.	  	  For	  Muslims,	  the	  trend	  over	  time	  was	  more	  variable	  and	  concern	  in	  2004-­‐5	  was	  much	  greater	  than	  among	  the	  general	  population	  at	  35	  percent.	  	  The	  following	  year	  however	  saw	  a	  sharp	  fall	  in	  the	  percentage	  of	  Muslims	  viewing	  this	  issue	  as	  a	  problem	  before	  increasing	  levels	  through	  2006-­‐7	  and	  2007-­‐8.	  The	  most	  recent	  data	  for	  2008-­‐9	  shows	  perceptions	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  have	  converged	  slightly:	  there	  has	  been	  a	  fall	  in	  concern	  about	  drunken	  behaviour	  among	  Muslims	  at	  a	  time	  when	  concern	  is	  at	  a	  high	  among	  population	  in	  general.	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The	  key	  finding	  from	  this	  analysis	  is	  that	  Muslims	  are	  consistently	  more	  likely	  to	  view	  certain	  forms	  of	  ASB	  as	  a	  local	  problem	  compared	  with	  the	  general	  population.	  	  	  FEAR	  OF	  CRIME	  The	  BCS	  asks	  respondents	  to	  judge	  how	  much	  crime	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  crime	  impacts	  on	  their	  quality	  of	  life.	  	  This	  was	  ranked	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  10,	  where	  1	  was	  minimal	  impact	  and	  10	  was	  maximal.	  	  To	  illustrate	  changes	  in	  these	  measures	  over	  time,	  Figures	  10	  and	  11	  use	  a	  mean	  score	  on	  this	  scale,	  calculated	  separately	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  For	  the	  general	  population,	  the	  impact	  of	  fear	  of	  crime	  on	  quality	  of	  life	  was	  fairly	  static	  across	  the	  five	  year	  time	  period.	  Mean	  scores	  were	  a	  little	  above	  3	  for	  each	  year,	  showing	  that	  fear	  of	  crime	  had	  a	  generally	  low	  impact	  on	  people’s	  quality	  of	  life.	  	  Mean	  scores	  for	  Muslim	  respondents	  were	  higher	  than	  for	  the	  general	  population	  -­‐	  indicating	  that	  fear	  of	  crime	  had	  a	  greater	  perceived	  impact	  on	  quality	  of	  life	  -­‐	  but	  were	  more	  variable	  across	  the	  time	  period.	  In	  2005-­‐6	  for	  example,	  mean	  scores	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  converged	  but	  in	  the	  two	  years	  that	  followed,	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  fear	  of	  crime	  on	  quality	  of	  life	  was	  greater	  for	  Muslims,	  reaching	  a	  mean	  score	  of	  4	  in	  2007-­‐8.	  	  The	  most	  recent	  data	  for	  2008-­‐9	  shows	  that	  the	  mean	  score	  has	  decreased	  somewhat,	  to	  about	  that	  seen	  in	  2004-­‐5,	  although	  it	  still	  remains	  above	  the	  general	  population.	  When	  we	  examined	  the	  impact	  of	  crime,	  rather	  than	  fear	  of	  crime,	  on	  people’s	  perceived	  quality	  of	  life,	  a	  very	  consistent	  picture	  for	  the	  population	  in	  general	  was	  again	  found.	  	  Figure	  11	  shows	  that	  mean	  scores	  were	  lower	  than	  for	  fear	  of	  crime,	  recorded	  at	  just	  below	  3.	  	  In	  2004-­‐5,	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  scores	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  at	  a	  mean	  of	  2.8,	  indicative	  of	  crime	  having	  a	  low	  impact	  on	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  both	  groups.	  	  There	  was,	  however,	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  crime	  on	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  Muslims	  in	  2005-­‐06	  (mean	  3.7),	  a	  year	  where	  the	  impact	  of	  fear	  of	  crime	  had	  actually	  decreased	  for	  this	  group	  (Figure	  10).	  Crime	  had	  a	  lesser	  impact	  on	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  Muslims	  in	  the	  following	  year,	  but	  climbed	  again	  in	  2007-­‐8	  and	  has	  remained	  at	  a	  comparable	  level	  in	  2008-­‐9.	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  data	  show	  that:	  
• Crime	  has	  had	  a	  disproportionately	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  Muslims	  since	  2005-­‐6,	  with	  mean	  scores	  remaining	  elevated	  for	  this	  group	  in	  2008-­‐9.	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Figure	  10:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Impact	  of	  Fear	  of	  Crime	  on	  Quality	  of	  Life	  
	  	  Figure	  11:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Impact	  of	  Crime	  on	  Quality	  of	  Life	  	  
	  	  	  Coherent	  with	  the	  previous	  figure	  showing	  perceived	  quality	  of	  life	  was	  more	  adversely	  impacted	  by	  crime	  for	  Muslims,	  Figure	  12	  displays	  how	  Muslims	  were	  consistently	  most	  likely	  to	  judge	  the	  crime	  rate	  in	  their	  local	  area	  as	  having	  become	  a	  ‘lot’	  or	  a	  ‘little’	  worse	  over	  the	  last	  two	  years.	  	  	  However,	  for	  both	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population,	  the	  overall	  trend	  over	  the	  five	  year	  period	  was	  in	  a	  downward	  trajectory,	  falling	  by	  approximately	  10	  percent	  between	  2004-­‐5	  and	  2008-­‐9.	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Figure	  12:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Perceptions	  of	  Local	  Crime	  Rate	  	  
	  	  The	  crime	  perception	  gap	  between	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  was	  much	  more	  evident	  when	  worry	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime	  was	  examined.	  	  	  	  
• A	  majority	  of	  Muslims	  were	  ‘very’	  or	  ‘fairly’	  worried	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime	  throughout	  the	  5	  year	  time	  period.	  	  	  Recorded	  levels	  of	  worry	  have	  remained	  fairly	  static	  over	  this	  time	  at	  approximately	  55	  percent,	  with	  a	  slight	  dip	  over	  the	  past	  couple	  of	  years	  to	  51	  percent	  in	  2008-­‐9.	  	  For	  the	  population	  in	  general,	  worry	  about	  crime	  followed	  a	  very	  similar	  overall	  trend,	  but	  at	  a	  lower	  baseline.	  	  	  Levels	  of	  worry	  never	  exceeded	  40	  percent	  among	  the	  general	  population	  between	  2004-­‐5	  and	  2008-­‐9,	  and	  have	  eased	  off	  slightly	  in	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  years	  to	  33	  percent	  in	  the	  most	  recently	  available	  data	  (Figure	  13).	  	  Figure	  13:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Victimisation	  Worry	  	  
	  	  	  Despite	  their	  perceptions	  of	  a	  higher	  crime	  rate	  and	  greater	  worry	  about	  being	  victimised,	  Figure	  14	  shows	  Muslims	  were	  substantially	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  reported	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  crime	  to	  the	  police.	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  general	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population,	  where	  crime	  victim	  status	  was	  consistently	  above	  50	  percent,	  levels	  of	  crime	  reporting	  among	  Muslims	  was	  at	  approximately	  one-­‐third	  (33	  percent)	  between	  2004-­‐5	  and	  2006-­‐7.	  	  	  	  In	  2007-­‐8,	  crimes	  reported	  to	  police	  increased	  to	  40	  percent,	  but	  in	  the	  following	  year	  returned	  to	  its	  pre-­‐existing	  level	  of	  around	  33	  percent.	  	  This	  data	  may	  be	  indicative	  of	  a	  reporting	  effect	  for	  Muslims	  relative	  to	  the	  population	  in	  general,	  that	  is,	  Muslims	  are	  not	  necessarily	  experiencing	  far	  lower	  levels	  of	  crime	  as	  individuals,	  but	  are	  more	  reticent	  about	  officially	  reporting	  it	  to	  the	  police.	  	  Figure	  14:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Crime	  Reporting	  Behaviour	  	  
	  	  Respondents	  were	  asked	  how	  worried	  they	  are	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime,	  on	  a	  scale	  ranging	  from	  ‘not	  at	  all	  worried’	  to	  ‘very	  worried’.	  	  	  
• Over	  half	  of	  Muslims	  (52	  percent)	  were	  ‘fairly’	  or	  ‘very’	  worried	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime,	  compared	  with	  35	  percent	  of	  other	  adults.	  	  	  	  Reported	  worry	  was	  higher	  among	  women	  than	  men	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  individual	  was	  Muslim	  or	  not,	  but	  Muslim	  women	  were	  much	  more	  likely	  than	  other	  women	  to	  report	  worry	  (56	  percent	  and	  39	  percent	  respectively).	  	  For	  both	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population,	  worry	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime	  was	  fairly	  stable	  according	  to	  age,	  although	  Muslims	  had	  a	  much	  higher	  baseline	  level	  of	  worry	  in	  each	  age	  group	  at	  50	  percent	  or	  above.	  	  Worry	  was	  more	  commonly	  reported	  among	  residents	  of	  inner-­‐city	  areas,	  but	  the	  difference	  between	  inner	  city	  and	  non-­‐inner	  city	  residents	  was	  much	  smaller	  for	  Muslims	  than	  for	  the	  general	  population.	  In	  the	  general	  population,	  worry	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime	  had	  a	  negative	  association	  with	  reported	  confidence	  in	  the	  police–	  that	  is,	  only	  58	  percent	  of	  the	  worried	  endorsed	  the	  statement	  ‘I	  have	  confidence	  in	  police	  in	  this	  area’,	  compared	  with	  71	  percent	  of	  the	  unworried.	  	  	  
• By	  contrast,	  we	  found	  that	  worry	  and	  police	  confidence	  had	  no	  relationship	  for	  Muslims.	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Reported	  police	  confidence	  was	  at	  77	  percent	  for	  those	  worried	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime	  and	  78	  percent	  for	  those	  unworried.	  A	  similar	  finding	  emerged	  when	  a	  measure	  of	  public	  ratings	  of	  confidence	  in	  their	  local	  police	  was	  used.	  	  Worry	  status	  made	  little	  difference	  to	  the	  percentage	  of	  Muslims	  who	  rated	  their	  police	  as	  ‘excellent’	  or	  ‘good’	  at	  approximately	  63	  percent.	  	  Among	  the	  general	  population,	  those	  who	  were	  worried	  about	  crime	  were	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  give	  the	  police	  a	  positive	  rating	  (45	  percent)	  compared	  with	  the	  unworried	  (56	  percent).	  Worry	  among	  Muslims,	  as	  for	  the	  general	  population,	  was	  greatest	  when	  they	  reported	  high	  levels	  of	  social	  or	  physical	  disorder	  in	  their	  local	  area.	  	  	  Figure	  15:	  Percentage	  Reporting	  High	  Social	  and	  Physical	  Disorder	  in	  Their	  Neighbourhood	  by	  Worry	  About	  Being	  the	  Victim	  of	  Crime.	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2008/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  Figure	  15	  shows	  that	  the	  percentage	  reporting	  high	  social	  disorder	  was	  concentrated	  among	  those	  worried	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime	  (62	  percent	  of	  the	  general	  population	  and	  64	  percent	  of	  Muslims).	  	  High	  reported	  social	  disorder	  was	  approximately	  halved	  among	  the	  general	  population	  when	  people	  were	  unworried	  and	  was	  substantially	  reduced	  among	  the	  Muslim	  population.	  	  The	  same	  pattern	  was	  found	  for	  physical	  disorder,	  although	  the	  overall	  percentage	  who	  perceived	  levels	  of	  physical	  disorder	  in	  their	  neighbourhood	  to	  be	  ‘high’	  was	  much	  lower	  than	  for	  social	  disorder.	  	  	  Nonetheless,	  worry	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime	  was	  associated	  with	  reports	  of	  high	  physical	  disorder	  more	  than	  two	  times	  greater	  than	  if	  worry	  was	  absent,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  individual	  was	  Muslim.	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  16	  shows	  how	  respondents	  appraised	  individual	  crimes	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  worry	  about	  them.	  The	  key	  areas	  of	  worry	  were	  the	  same	  for	  Muslims	  as	  for	  the	  general	  population,	  namely	  burglary,	  being	  mugged	  or	  robbed	  and	  having	  a	  car	  stolen.	  	  Overall	  levels	  of	  worry	  about	  these	  crimes	  were	  much	  more	  elevated	  for	  Muslims	  however,	  with	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  expressing	  some	  worry	  compared	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with	  around	  one	  third	  of	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Muslims	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  report	  worry	  about	  other	  crimes	  too,	  with	  around	  1	  in	  4	  worried	  about	  being	  insulted,	  pestered	  or	  physically	  attacked	  by	  strangers,	  and	  1	  in	  3	  worried	  about	  being	  raped.	  By	  contrast,	  levels	  of	  reported	  worry	  for	  these	  crimes	  were	  approximatley	  10	  percent	  lower	  for	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Figure	  16:	  Percentage	  Reporting	  Worry	  About	  Specific	  Crimes	  	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2009/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  	  The	  analysis	  examined	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  specific	  crimes	  by	  focusing	  on	  key	  correlation	  pairs	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  	  For	  Muslims	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  worry	  about	  being	  mugged	  or	  robbed	  and	  burglary	  (R2=.61,	  p<.001).	  	  It	  was	  also	  the	  case	  that	  Muslims	  who	  worried	  about	  being	  mugged	  or	  robbed	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  worry	  about	  their	  car	  being	  stolen.	  The	  only	  correlation	  pair	  that	  emerged	  for	  both	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  was	  worry	  about	  physical	  attack	  and	  being	  insulted	  or	  pestered	  by	  anybody.	  	  	  Unlike	  for	  Muslims,	  where	  concerns	  centre	  on	  personal	  attack	  and	  theft,	  the	  correlation	  pairs	  for	  the	  general	  population	  indicate	  that	  foremost	  are	  worries	  around	  sexual	  attack	  (being	  raped)	  in	  conjuction	  with	  mugging	  or	  physical	  attack.	  Figure	  17	  shows	  that	  worry	  about	  home	  burglary	  for	  Muslims	  was	  just	  under	  60	  percent	  between	  2004-­‐5	  and	  2008-­‐9	  	  –	  a	  high	  level	  of	  worry	  exceeding	  that	  found	  for	  attack	  due	  to	  skin	  colour	  and	  physical	  attack.	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Figure	  17:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Worry	  About	  Burglary	  	  
	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  other	  neighbourhood	  problems	  so	  far	  examined	  for	  Muslims,	  worry	  about	  burglary	  was	  static	  across	  the	  time	  period	  and	  had	  fallen	  by	  only	  3	  percentage	  points	  over	  the	  five	  year	  time	  period.	  For	  the	  general	  population,	  there	  was	  a	  lower	  baseline	  of	  worry	  about	  home	  burglarly	  at	  approximately	  45	  percent	  between	  2004-­‐5	  and	  2006-­‐7.	  	  Thereafter	  there	  was	  a	  consistent	  downward	  trend	  in	  worry	  with	  levels	  at	  their	  lowest	  in	  2008-­‐9	  at	  40	  percent.	  	  CRIME	  VICTMISATION	  Levels	  of	  fear	  of	  crime	  are	  considerably	  higher	  than	  actual	  victimization	  experiences	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  Figure	  18	  below	  shows	  that	  the	  prevalence	  of	  crime	  was	  very	  low	  at	  less	  than	  5	  percent	  of	  the	  population.	  Men	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  women	  to	  have	  experienced	  the	  threat	  of	  violence	  or	  deliberate	  violence,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  were	  Muslim.	  Women	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  report	  personal	  theft	  over	  the	  last	  year.	  There	  is	  some	  suggestion	  that	  burglary	  was	  more	  commonly	  reported	  by	  Muslims	  than	  the	  general	  population,	  although	  these	  differences	  were	  small.	  This	  does	  though	  connect	  to	  the	  qualitative	  research	  findings	  where	  there	  is	  a	  suggestion	  that	  there	  are	  particular	  concerns	  about	  burglary	  in	  at	  least	  some	  Muslim	  communities.	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Figure	  18:	  Reported	  Experience	  of	  Crime	  in	  Last	  Year	  by	  Gender	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2008/09	  England	  and	  Wales	  	  Hate	  crime	  and	  intimidation	  	  Worry	  about	  perceived	  attack	  due	  to	  skin	  colour	  (Figure	  19)	  was	  at	  a	  much	  higher	  base	  for	  Muslims	  compared	  with	  the	  general	  population	  and	  were	  more	  variable	  across	  the	  same	  time	  period.	  	  In	  2004-­‐5,	  approximately	  one	  quarter	  of	  Muslims	  perceived	  attack	  due	  to	  skin	  colour	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  of	  some	  magnitude.	  The	  most	  recently	  available	  data	  for	  2008-­‐9	  does	  however	  suggest	  that	  the	  percentage	  of	  Muslims	  perceiving	  skin	  colour	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  attack	  has	  fallen	  to	  19	  percent.	  	  Figure	  19:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Race	  Hate	  Crime	  as	  a	  Problem	  	  
	  	  	  A	  similar	  pattern	  was	  evident	  when	  we	  examined	  peoples’	  worry	  about	  attack	  due	  to	  skin	  colour,	  rather	  than	  its	  perception	  as	  a	  problem.	  	  For	  both	  Muslims	  and	  the	  population	  in	  general,	  levels	  of	  worry	  are	  at	  a	  much	  higher	  level	  than	  reporting	  the	  issue	  as	  a	  problem.	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  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  documented	  fall	  in	  worry	  and	  problem	  appraisal	  for	  attack	  due	  to	  skin	  colour	  among	  Muslims	  was	  also	  evident	  when	  other	  measures	  of	  personal	  intimidation	  and	  attack	  were	  considered.	  This	  carries	  over	  into	  worry	  about	  being	  assaulted	  (Figure	  20).	  	  Figure	  20:	  Time	  Trends	  in	  Worry	  About	  Physical	  Attack	  	  
	  	  Comparing	  worry	  among	  Muslims	  with	  other	  faith	  groups	  in	  the	  ethnic	  category	  ‘Asian’,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  worry	  among	  Muslims	  was	  comparable	  with	  Hindus	  (38	  percent)	  but	  higher	  than	  for	  Sikhs	  (33	  percent).	  	  When	  other	  ethnic	  groups	  were	  included	  in	  the	  analysis,	  the	  greatest	  worry	  about	  racial	  attack	  was	  found	  for	  Black	  Caribbean	  respondents	  at	  40	  percent,	  with	  the	  same	  level	  among	  ‘Other’	  ethnic	  groups.	  	  For	  adults	  of	  ‘mixed’	  ethnic	  group,	  1	  in	  3	  were	  worried	  about	  racial	  attack	  with	  the	  lowest	  worry	  for	  white	  adults	  at	  9	  percent.	  	  	  
• Therefore,	  whilst	  levels	  of	  reported	  worry	  were	  clearly	  elevated	  among	  Muslims,	  they	  do	  not	  predominately	  worry	  about	  attack	  because	  of	  their	  skin	  colour	  relative	  to	  other	  ethnic	  and	  faith	  groups.	  By	  way	  of	  summary,	  Muslims	  tend	  to	  perceive	  more	  crime	  and	  ASB	  problems	  and	  these	  issues	  have	  a	  greater	  impact	  upon	  them	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  general	  population.	  However	  they	  simultaneously	  express	  higher	  levels	  of	  confidence	  and	  trust	  in	  the	  police.	  This	  is	  intriguing	  and	  understanding	  how	  and	  why	  this	  is	  so	  is	  important	  in	  comprehending	  how	  response	  and	  neighbourhood	  policing	  shapes	  the	  social	  context	  in	  which	  Prevent	  is	  performed.	  In	  order	  to	  try	  and	  investigate	  it	  further,	  we	  need	  to	  examine	  how	  such	  patterns	  relate	  to	  the	  state	  of	  Muslim	  communities.	  	  COMMUNITY	  COHESION	  In	  the	  ntroduction	  to	  this	  report	  it	  was	  identified	  that	  propagating	  community	  cohesion	  has	  been	  a	  key	  task	  performed	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme	  to	  date.	  Although	  such	  activities	  tend	  to	  fall	  more	  within	  the	  remit	  of	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local	  authorities,	  it	  is	  widely	  recognized	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  activities	  do	  influence	  community	  cohesiveness.	  In	  the	  2008/09	  survey,	  the	  indicator	  relating	  to	  cohesion	  focused	  on	  respect,	  namely:	  ‘thinking	  about	  your	  local	  area,	  how	  
much	  of	  problem	  are	  people	  not	  treating	  other	  people	  with	  respect	  and	  
consideration?’	  	  
• Overall,	  Muslims	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  perceive	  lack	  of	  respect	  as	  a	  ‘big’	  or	  ‘fairly	  big’	  problem	  than	  the	  general	  population,	  but	  this	  difference	  was	  restricted	  to	  Muslim	  men	  (51	  percent)	  relative	  to	  other	  men	  (44	  percent).	  	  It	  was	  not	  evident	  among	  women,	  for	  whom	  concerns	  about	  respect	  were	  of	  a	  lower	  magnitude	  than	  for	  men.	  For	  all	  respondents,	  concerns	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  respect	  were	  most	  prevalent	  among	  the	  younger	  age	  group	  (16-­‐34),	  where	  over	  half	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  problem.	  Muslim	  adults	  born	  in	  the	  UK	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  their	  counterparts	  born	  overseas	  to	  have	  concerns	  about	  respect	  and	  consideration.	  Inner-­‐city	  residents	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  perceive	  respect	  as	  a	  problem	  if	  they	  were	  non	  Muslim	  to	  some	  degree,	  but	  unlike	  the	  general	  population,	  Muslims	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  this	  as	  an	  issue	  if	  they	  did	  not	  live	  in	  an	  inner	  city.	  	  In	  some	  ways,	  the	  respect	  question	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  inverse	  of	  the	  ‘classic’	  measure	  of	  community	  cohesion	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  ‘people	  from	  different	  backgrounds	  get	  on	  well	  together’.	  Figure	  21	  uses	  data	  from	  the	  2007/08	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  to	  show	  that	  overall	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people	  endorsed	  this	  statement,	  particularly	  Muslims.	  Further	  analysis	  showed	  that	  this	  difference	  was	  due	  to	  the	  greater	  propensity	  of	  Muslim	  women	  to	  endorse	  community	  cohesion	  (89	  percent)	  compared	  to	  women	  in	  the	  general	  population	  (81	  percent)	  and	  Muslim	  men	  (82	  percent).	  	  	  Among	  Muslim	  men,	  where	  concerns	  about	  respect	  were	  at	  their	  greatest,	  reported	  community	  cohesion	  on	  this	  measure	  was	  comparable	  with	  the	  male	  population	  in	  general,	  but	  still	  very	  high	  at	  over	  80	  percent.	  	  	  Community	  cohesion	  was	  greatest	  among	  Muslims	  living	  in	  inner	  city	  areas	  whereas	  for	  the	  general	  population,	  living	  in	  an	  inner	  city	  was	  associated	  with	  lower	  cohesion	  (78	  percent).	  	  Notably,	  there	  was	  no	  suggestion	  that	  community	  cohesion	  among	  Muslims	  was	  lower	  among	  the	  younger	  age	  group,	  despite	  the	  earlier	  finding	  of	  greater	  concern	  about	  respect	  at	  age	  16-­‐34.	  	  	  Lower	  community	  cohesion	  was	  linked	  with	  younger	  age	  for	  the	  general	  population	  however,	  with	  78	  percent	  agreeing	  ‘people	  get	  on	  well	  together’	  at	  age	  16-­‐34	  compared	  with	  82	  percent	  in	  the	  35-­‐54	  age	  group	  and	  85	  percent	  of	  those	  55+	  years.	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Figure	  21:	  Profile	  of	  Respondents	  Who	  Agreed	  ‘This	  Area	  is	  a	  Place	  Where	  People	  From	  Different	  Backgrounds	  Get	  on	  Well	  Together’.	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2007/08:	  England	  and	  Wales	  	  Figure	  22:	  Profile	  of	  Respondents	  Trusting	  ‘Many’	  or	  ‘Some’	  People	  in	  Their	  Neighbourhood	  
Source:	  BCS	  2007/08:	  England	  and	  Wales	  Figure	  22	  uses	  the	  2007/08	  data	  to	  focus	  on	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐personal	  trust,	  that	  is,	  how	  likely	  people	  are	  to	  feel	  they	  can	  trust	  people	  living	  in	  their	  neighbourhood.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  community	  cohesion	  found	  among	  Muslims,	  particuarly	  Muslim	  women,	  they	  were	  less	  likely	  than	  the	  general	  population	  to	  display	  trust	  in	  their	  neighbours.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  community	  cohesion	  in	  Figure	  21,	  gender	  differences	  in	  trust	  were	  very	  small	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Lower	  levels	  of	  trust	  were	  associated	  with	  younger	  age	  for	  all	  respondents,	  but	  this	  age	  pattern	  was	  more	  marked	  for	  Muslims	  than	  for	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Whereas	  reported	  trust	  was	  near	  univeral	  among	  Muslims	  aged	  55	  and	  above,	  	  interpersonal	  trust	  was	  much	  lower	  at	  approximately	  6	  out	  of	  10	  Muslims	  aged	  16	  to	  34.	  	  	  Country	  of	  birth	  made	  no	  difference	  to	  levels	  of	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trust	  among	  Muslims	  at	  70	  percent,	  but	  being	  born	  in	  the	  UK	  was	  associated	  with	  greater	  trust	  for	  the	  general	  population	  	  These	  data	  suggest	  the	  presence	  of	  intra-­‐community	  concerns	  for	  Muslims	  about	  levels	  of	  trust	  in	  their	  fellow	  citizens.	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  attribute	  this	  as	  either	  a	  cause	  of	  consequence	  of	  their	  perceptions	  of	  Prevent.	  However,	  it	  is	  supported	  to	  some	  degree	  by	  the	  qualitative	  data	  where	  concerns	  about	  fissures	  and	  fractures	  in	  terms	  of	  inter-­‐generational	  community	  relations	  were	  mentioned	  repeatedly.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  unpick	  this	  issue	  a	  little	  more,	  analysis	  of	  perceived	  respect	  was	  conducted.	  Figures	  23	  and	  24	  report	  data	  for	  males	  and	  females	  separately.	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  overall	  the	  numbers	  perceiving	  issues	  of	  respect	  as	  problamtic	  in	  some	  way	  are	  broadly	  similar	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  The	  exception	  is	  for	  Muslim	  men	  aged	  24-­‐34	  where	  60	  percent	  in	  this	  sub-­‐set	  identify	  problems	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  respect.	  Figure	  23:	  	  Men	  and	  Perceived	  Lack	  of	  Respect	  by	  Age	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2006/7-­‐2008/9	  	  Figure	  24:	  Women	  and	  Perceived	  Lack	  of	  Respect	  by	  Age	  
	  Source:	  BCS	  2006/7-­‐2008/9	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Between	  2004-­‐08	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  asked	  respondents	  what	  is	  often	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  ‘classic’	  cohesion	  question:	  ‘whether	  they	  agreed	  that	  this	  is	  a	  place	  where	  people	  from	  different	  backgrounds	  get	  on	  well	  together?’	  (Figure	  25).	  Tracing	  out	  the	  pattern	  of	  responses	  over	  this	  time	  period	  reveals	  a	  striking	  and	  highly	  significant	  phenomenon.	  In	  the	  2006-­‐07	  survey	  there	  was	  a	  dramatic	  decline	  in	  perceived	  cohesiveness	  for	  Muslims.	  No	  similar	  fall	  is	  evident	  for	  the	  general	  population,	  and	  the	  figure	  has	  subsequently	  recovered.	  	  	  Figure	  25:	  Trends	  in	  Community	  Cohesion	  
	  	  It	  can	  be	  hypothesized	  that	  this	  significant	  effect	  might	  possibly	  be	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  bombings	  in	  London	  in	  2005	  and	  the	  subsequent	  response.	  It	  seems	  entirely	  plausible	  to	  suggest	  that	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  events	  of	  7/7	  and	  21/7	  that	  intra-­‐	  and	  inter-­‐community	  relations	  became	  more	  difficult.	  This	  link	  cannot	  be	  proven,	  but	  it	  may	  be	  an	  important	  indicator	  that	  the	  kinds	  of	  measure	  utilized	  in	  the	  BCS	  are	  shaped	  by	  developments	  directly	  relevant	  to	  the	  conduct	  of	  CT	  policing.	  	  SUMMARY	  Based	  upon	  cross-­‐sectional	  and	  time	  trend	  analyses	  of	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  this	  chapter	  has	  sought	  to	  compare	  and	  contrast	  the	  attitudes	  and	  perceptions	  of	  Muslims	  with	  the	  general	  population,	  in	  relation	  to	  crime,	  disorder,	  policing	  and	  community	  cohesion.	  It	  has	  been	  found	  that:	  
• Muslim	  communities	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  their	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  perceptions	  of	  neighbourhood	  being	  negatively	  influenced	  by	  crime	  and	  fear	  of	  crime;	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• Reported	  experience	  of	  crime	  in	  the	  last	  twelve	  months	  was	  low	  for	  all	  respondents.	  
• When	  they	  were	  victims	  of	  crime,	  Muslims	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  report	  the	  incident	  to	  the	  police	  
• Muslim	  concerns	  gravitated	  around	  problems	  of	  burglary	  drugs,	  public	  drinking	  and	  hate	  crime.	  
• Muslims	  had	  a	  higher	  baseline	  level	  of	  confidence	  in	  local	  police	  compared	  to	  the	  general	  population,	  but	  variables	  including	  young	  age,	  being	  male	  or	  the	  victim	  of	  crime	  in	  the	  last	  year	  had	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  police	  confidence	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  
• High	  police	  visibility	  but	  low	  police	  familiarity	  was	  exaggerated	  for	  Muslims	  who	  were	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  report	  seeing	  police	  or	  PCSO	  patrols	  in	  their	  area,	  but	  less	  likely	  to	  know	  individual	  officers	  by	  name	  or	  sight	  than	  the	  general	  population.	  
• The	  time-­‐trend	  data	  suggest	  that	  overall	  Muslim	  attitudes	  and	  perceptions	  have	  been	  tracking	  those	  of	  the	  general	  population,	  albeit	  at	  an	  elevated	  level.	  There	  is	  though	  a	  mild	  effect	  in	  the	  2005/06	  survey	  where	  the	  views	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  shifted	  slightly	  expressing	  less	  worry	  about	  volume	  crimes	  and	  a	  very	  slight	  increase	  in	  victimisation	  reporting.	  
• Relatedly,	  in	  the	  year	  following	  the	  2005	  London	  bombings,	  levels	  of	  community	  cohesion	  amongst	  Muslims	  declined	  markedly.	  This	  suggests	  that	  indicators	  contained	  in	  the	  BCS	  may	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	  issues	  that	  Prevent	  is	  focused	  upon.	  
• Levels	  of	  community	  cohesion	  within	  the	  Muslim	  community	  have	  subsequently	  recovered,	  intimating	  that	  Prevent	  is	  not	  having	  a	  uniformly	  negative	  impact	  upon	  community	  attitudes	  and	  perceptions.	  	  The	  indicators	  derived	  from	  the	  BCS	  seek	  to	  provide	  a	  holistic	  form	  of	  assessment	  that	  understands	  Prevent	  policing	  as	  an	  integrated	  component	  within	  a	  local	  policing	  system.	  Indeed,	  the	  particular	  strength	  of	  this	  approach	  	  may	  be	  that	  such	  data	  accesses	  mainstream	  Muslim	  community	  voices,	  rather	  than	  those	  who	  are	  already	  enmeshed	  in	  the	  highly-­‐charged	  and	  contentious	  politicised	  debates	  that	  Prevent	  attracts.	  The	  patterns	  detected	  across	  the	  cross-­‐sectional	  and	  time	  trend	  analyses,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  consistency	  evident	  across	  a	  range	  of	  indicators	  and	  over	  time,	  supports	  the	  contention	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  trigger	  for	  widespread	  alienation	  and	  disenchantment.	  Indeed,	  if	  anything,	  overall	  the	  majority	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  confident	  in	  and	  have	  higher	  opinions	  of	  the	  police	  than	  the	  general	  population.	  This	  is	  despite	  them	  being	  more	  concerned	  and	  effected	  by	  routine	  crime	  and	  disorder	  issues.	  Of	  course,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  are	  not	  individuals	  and	  groups	  who	  are	  more	  negatively	  disposed,	  only	  that	  we	  should	  not	  assume	  that	  such	  views	  are	  widely	  prevalent.	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CHAPTER	  6:	  THE	  LOCAL	  AND	  SPECIFIC	  EFFECTS	  OF	  PREVENT	  POLICING	  A	  key	  consideration	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  that	  the	  configuration	  of	  assets	  should	  reflect	  levels	  of	  local	  need	  and	  risk.	  This	  contextually	  sensitive	  approach	  to	  delivery	  necessarily	  raises	  issues	  of	  comparative	  effectiveness.	  That	  is,	  given	  that	  there	  are	  variations	  in	  how	  Prevent	  Policing	  is	  being	  organised	  and	  conducted,	  are	  these	  reflected	  in	  public	  facing	  outcomes?	  Or	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  are	  these	  different	  approaches	  working	  equally	  well	  in	  different	  local	  circumstances?	  These	  questions	  require	  that	  we	  move	  beyond	  the	  general	  patterns	  and	  trends	  reported	  in	  the	  previous	  Chapter,	  and	  ‘drill	  down’	  in	  more	  detail	  into	  the	  data.	  	  	  LOCAL	  RISK	  ASSESSMENT	  The	  ACPO	  implementation	  plan	  (2008:4)	  states	  that,	  It	  is	  important	  that	  the	  local	  response	  to	  Prevent	  is	  proportionate	  to	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  and	  vulnerability	  in	  the	  area,	  as	  determined	  by	  risk	  assessment…delivery	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  intense	  and	  comprehensive	  in	  those	  areas	  where	  risk	  and	  vulnerability	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  greatest.	  	  The	  construction	  of	  judgments	  about	  relative	  risks	  and	  vulnerability	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  ‘richer	  picture’	  process	  with	  such	  information	  contributing	  to	  the	  production	  of	  ‘Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Local	  Profile’	  (CTLP)	  documents	  to	  be	  shared	  between	  key	  actors	  involved	  in	  delivering	  Prevent.	  Detailed	  guidance	  about	  how	  to	  construct	  a	  CTLP	  has	  been	  issued	  to	  local	  forces	  and	  partners.17	  Such	  guidance	  notwithstanding,	  the	  interview	  data	  intimate	  that	  there	  are	  varying	  degrees	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  validity	  and	  reliability	  of	  CTLPs	  across	  different	  areas.	  	  Where	  concerns	  were	  expressed,	  they	  centered	  upon	  the	  documents	  being	  more	  descriptive	  than	  analytic.	  The	  essence	  of	  such	  limitations	  are	  illustrated	  by	  the	  comments	  of	  a	  member	  of	  staff	  from	  one	  CTU,	  “What	  Chief	  Executives	  are	  saying	  is	  that’s	  great	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  tell	  me	  a	  great	  deal	  that	  I	  couldn’t	  pick	  up	  from	  the	  Sunday	  Times…they	  were	  bland.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐07)	  Developing	  this	  theme,	  the	  respondent	  described	  how	  they	  had	  been	  working	  to	  find	  ways	  of	  moving	  beyond	  CTLPs	  that	  had	  been	  produced	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  information	  agencies	  were	  willing	  to	  share,	  to	  documents	  that	  set	  out	  what	  service	  deliverers	  need	  to	  know,	  “At	  your	  commissioning	  meeting	  it	  won’t	  just	  be	  analysts	  from	  within	  the	  CT	  world	  sitting	  down	  and	  going	  right,	  what	  are	  we	  going	  to	  tell	  them…it’ll	  be	  around	  sitting	  down	  with	  the	  partnership	  and	  saying	  ‘right	  what	  do	  you	  want	  to	  know?’…so	  hopefully	  the	  next	  iteration	  will	  be	  a	  lot	  more	  focused	  and	  a	  lot	  more	  useful.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐07)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Home	  Office	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  Counter	  Terrorism	  Local	  Profiles:	  	  An	  Updated	  Guide	  for	  Local	  Partners	  [Restricted].	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An	  officer	  from	  a	  different	  police	  force	  described	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  the	  CTLP	  and	  how	  it	  should	  be	  informed	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  sources	  of	  public,	  police	  and	  local	  authority	  data,	  “It	  will	  be	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  intelligence	  logs	  that	  have	  come	  in,	  number	  of	  Rich	  Picture	  locations…	  number	  of	  CT	  operations	  in	  certain	  areas.	  It	  will	  be	  based	  on	  other	  factors,	  sort	  of	  vulnerability	  indicators,	  deprivation	  indicators	  and	  all	  that	  was	  put	  into	  a	  formula	  by	  our	  analysts	  and	  they	  came	  up	  with	  a	  threat	  map,	  and	  then	  we	  allocated	  resources	  as	  we	  were	  able	  to	  that	  threat	  map.”	  (Police,	  2611-­‐11)	  However,	  doubts	  were	  expressed	  by	  several	  respondents	  that	  although	  the	  locally	  constructed	  threat	  assessments	  may	  describe	  the	  state	  of	  a	  community	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  visible	  problems,	  they	  are	  not	  informed	  by	  a	  conceptually	  robust	  model	  of	  radicalisation	  and	  risk	  factors	  for	  radicalization,	  	  	  “It’s	  been	  a	  significant	  challenge	  to	  the	  analytical	  community,	  the	  production	  of	  these	  documents	  and	  I	  think	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  so.”	  (Police,	  2659-­‐07)	  Acknowledging	  the	  combination	  of	  practical	  and	  conceptual	  difficulties	  encountered	  in	  preparing	  CTLP	  threat	  and	  vulnerability	  assessments	  is	  important	  in	  terms	  of	  crafting	  a	  realistic	  local	  narrative	  about	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  occurring	  within	  a	  community.	  	  Relatedly,	  the	  concept	  of	  risk	  may	  have	  been	  operationalised	  in	  too	  static	  a	  form,	  particularly	  at	  a	  strategic	  level.	  It	  appears	  that	  in	  deciding	  which	  areas	  of	  the	  country	  rated	  as	  comparatively	  high	  and	  low	  risk,	  and	  thus	  warranting	  higher	  intensity	  policing,	  the	  original	  assessments	  were	  based	  upon	  little	  more	  than	  relative	  population	  densities.	  In	  effect,	  the	  more	  Muslim	  residents	  there	  were	  in	  an	  area	  the	  greater	  the	  presenting	  risk.	  However,	  a	  particular	  defining	  quality	  of	  terrorist	  risk	  assessment	  is	  that	  it	  invariably	  involves	  imperfect	  information	  about	  a	  very	  rare	  phenomenon.	  Moreover,	  terrorist	  risks	  are	  especially	  dynamic.	  If	  one	  is	  able	  to	  reduce	  the	  threat	  posed	  to	  one	  particular	  target,	  then	  assuming	  a	  steady	  stream	  of	  motivated	  potential	  assailants,	  the	  risk	  profile	  of	  other	  potential	  targets	  is	  raised.	  Translated	  into	  practice,	  if	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  instigated	  in	  a	  particular	  high	  intensity	  form	  in	  a	  particular	  locale,	  then	  those	  sympathetic	  to	  terrorist	  causes	  will	  simply	  shift	  their	  activities	  to	  where	  they	  perceive	  greater	  vulnerability.	  	  This	  process	  is	  arguably	  illustrated	  by	  a	  case	  that	  was	  ongoing	  whilst	  the	  fieldwork	  was	  being	  conducted.	  The	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  the	  risks	  being	  treated	  was	  articulated	  by	  a	  community	  member	  who	  described	  how,	  “In	  [City	  name]	  we	  haven’t	  had	  any	  problems	  before,	  but	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  now	  there	  is	  	  talk	  about	  there	  is	  a	  problem,	  whereas	  before	  it	  wasn’t	  seen.”	  (Community,	  K).	  This	  is	  perhaps	  suggestive	  that	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  Prevent	  policing	  would	  benefit	  from	  introducing	  a	  differentiation	  between	  ‘steady-­‐state’	  chronic	  risk	  dispositions,	  and	  more	  dynamic	  and	  acute	  forms.	  Such	  distinctions	  are	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potentially	  important	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  suggest	  different	  patterns	  of	  response.	  Steady	  state	  risks	  relate	  to	  circumstances	  that	  are	  generative	  of	  ongoing	  threats,	  tensions	  and	  problems	  to	  be	  controlled.	  Managing	  such	  risks	  requires	  ongoing	  longer-­‐term	  interventions	  to	  reduce	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  presenting	  risks.	  In	  contrast	  however,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  over	  recent	  years	  indicating	  that	  extremist	  groups	  are	  increasingly	  trying	  to	  induce	  problems	  in	  groups	  and	  areas	  outside	  of	  the	  established	  risk	  profiles	  in	  a	  deliberate	  fashion.	  These	  necessitate	  a	  different	  form	  of	  policing	  and	  community	  response	  that	  is	  flexible,	  fluid	  and	  adaptable.	  	  Consequently,	  CTLPs	  might	  be	  enhanced	  by	  thinking	  more	  rigorously	  about	  the	  concepts	  of	  threat	  and	  vulnerability	  as	  different	  types	  of	  risk,	  and	  how	  they	  should	  be	  translated	  into	  different	  local	  postures.	  The	  national	  guidance	  on	  the	  production	  of	  CTLPs	  locates	  considering	  risk,	  threat	  and	  vulnerability	  as	  a	  core	  component	  of	  the	  CTLP	  process.	  Some	  practitioners	  remained	  concerned	  though,	  that	  at	  a	  local	  level	  understanding	  of	  such	  issues	  remained	  fuzzy,	  and	  was	  not	  transparently	  connected	  to	  different	  modes	  of	  response.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  degree	  of	  vulnerability	  is	  detected	  then	  the	  emphasis	  should	  be	  upon	  invoking	  ‘defensive’	  measures.	  Contrastingly,	  treating	  a	  more	  direct	  threat	  requires	  more	  ‘offensive’	  interventions.	  	  These	  defensive	  and	  offensive	  interventions	  can	  be	  police-­‐led,	  community-­‐led,	  or	  co-­‐produced,	  depending	  upon	  local	  circumstances.	  A	  well	  written	  CTLP	  provides	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  evidence-­‐led	  approach	  to	  deciding	  upon	  particular	  combinations	  of	  defensive	  and	  offensive	  measures,	  according	  to	  the	  vulnerabilities	  of	  local	  communities	  and	  the	  ‘steady-­‐state’	  and	  ‘dynamic’	  threats	  posed	  to	  them.	  	  Developing	  an	  evidence-­‐led	  understanding	  of	  conditions	  at	  a	  local	  level	  in	  this	  way	  requires	  that	  we	  considerably	  refine	  and	  extend	  the	  analysis.	  	  This	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  Chapter.	  It	  continues	  by	  looking	  in	  a	  detailed	  fashion	  at	  demographic	  effects	  in	  the	  UK	  Muslim	  population,	  before	  then	  examining	  what	  the	  BCS	  can	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  performance	  of	  Prevent	  in	  different	  police	  force	  areas.	  The	  Muslim	  population	  in	  the	  UK,	  in	  common	  with	  a	  number	  of	  other	  minority	  groups,	  has	  a	  characteristically	  more	  ‘youthful’	  age	  profile	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  population	  in	  general.	  	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  women,	  whose	  life	  experience,	  roles	  and	  use	  of	  public	  space	  is	  also	  markedly	  different	  from	  that	  of	  men	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  how	  they	  feel	  about	  the	  police	  in	  their	  area	  and	  the	  crimes	  that	  affect	  them.	  	  	  For	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  analyses	  reported	  here,	  two	  years	  of	  the	  British	  Crime	  survey	  were	  combined	  for	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9	  in	  order	  to	  boost	  the	  sample	  size	  of	  Muslims.	  (The	  exception	  was	  for	  those	  questions	  asked	  to	  the	  entire	  sample	  for	  2008/9	  where	  this	  was	  not	  an	  issue).	  	  	  	  A	  combined	  sample	  of	  over	  1500	  Muslims	  also	  permitted	  more	  in-­‐depth	  reporting	  at	  area	  or	  PFA	  level.	  	  (For	  further	  information	  about	  the	  sample,	  see	  Appendix).	  	  DEMOGRAPHIC	  EFFECTS	  ON	  ATTITUDES	  TO	  POLICING	  Figure	  26	  illustrates	  how	  age	  is	  related	  to	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  local	  police	  for	  men.	  	  For	  Muslim	  men:	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• Those	  in	  the	  youngest	  age	  group	  (16	  to	  24	  years)	  were	  least	  likely	  to	  rate	  their	  local	  police	  as	  ‘excellent’	  or	  ‘good’.	  	  
• Less	  than	  half	  of	  young	  Muslim	  men	  gave	  the	  police	  a	  positive	  appraisal	  and	  this	  was	  lower	  than	  for	  men	  of	  the	  same	  age	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  	  	  Attitudes	  towards	  the	  local	  police	  remained	  fairly	  stable	  with	  age	  for	  men	  in	  the	  general	  population,	  with	  about	  half	  giving	  a	  positive	  rating.	  For	  Muslim	  men	  there	  was	  a	  substantial	  age-­‐related	  increase	  in	  positive	  attitudes	  that	  peaked	  at	  70	  percent	  for	  those	  aged	  45	  to	  55,	  and	  leveled	  off	  thereafter	  for	  the	  oldest	  age	  group	  (55+).	  	  	  Age	  differences	  were	  thus	  magnified	  in	  older	  age	  groups	  of	  men;	  7	  out	  of	  10	  Muslim	  men	  aged	  45	  and	  above	  gave	  positive	  ratings	  of	  local	  police	  compared	  with	  5	  out	  of	  10	  men	  of	  the	  same	  age	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Figure	  26:	  Percentage	  of	  Men	  Rating	  Local	  Police	  as	  ‘Excellent’	  or	  ‘Good’	  	  
	  Source:	  	   British	  Crime	  Survey	  2008/9	  This	  is	  potentially	  a	  very	  important	  finding	  for	  Prevent	  policing.	  For	  although	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  Chapter,	  overall	  Muslims	  display	  a	  similar	  profile	  to	  the	  general	  population,	  in	  terms	  of	  attitudes	  to	  the	  police,	  young	  men	  actually	  have	  slightly	  more	  negative	  views.	  This	  may	  then	  be	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  focus	  of	  much	  Prevent	  policing	  and	  also	  street-­‐policing	  in	  general.	  However,	  whilst	  acknowledging	  this,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  clarify	  that	  over	  45	  percent	  of	  young	  	  Muslim	  men	  gave	  a	  positive	  assessment	  of	  local	  policing.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  point	  made	  previously,	  this	  evidence	  strongly	  supports	  the	  contention	  that	  whilst	  there	  may	  be	  concerns	  about	  Prevent	  policing	  and	  it	  may	  impact	  moderately	  negatively	  upon	  the	  views	  of	  some	  groups,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  strongly	  anti-­‐police	  position	  detectable	  in	  the	  mainstream	  Muslim	  population.	  The	  same	  analysis	  for	  Muslim	  women	  showed	  a	  markedly	  different	  picture,	  with	  ratings	  of	  the	  local	  police	  lowest	  at	  either	  end	  of	  the	  age	  spectrum	  but	  rising	  to	  a	  plateau	  of	  80	  percent	  for	  those	  in	  the	  24-­‐34	  and	  35-­‐44	  age	  groups	  (Figure	  27).	  	  	  The	  very	  high	  satisfaction	  with	  police	  for	  these	  age	  groups	  of	  women	  far	  exceeded	  that	  of	  Muslim	  men	  but	  was	  reversed	  by	  age	  45	  and	  above18,	  a	  time	  when	  positive	  ratings	  soared	  among	  men.	  	  Overall,	  women	  in	  the	  general	  population	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  men	  to	  give	  positive	  ratings	  of	  the	  police,	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Owing	  to	  the	  small	  sample	  size	  of	  older	  women,	  the	  45-­‐54	  and	  55+	  age	  groups	  were	  combined.	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in	  marked	  contrast	  to	  Muslim	  women,	  there	  was	  little	  variation	  in	  attitudes	  with	  age.	  Figure	  27:	  Percentage	  of	  Women	  Rating	  Local	  Police	  as	  ‘Excellent’	  or	  ‘Good’.	  
	  Source:	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  2008/9	  	  A	  different	  indicator	  of	  peoples’	  views	  about	  policing	  centres	  on	  how	  much	  confidence	  they	  have	  in	  them.	  Figure	  28	  shows	  the	  percentage	  of	  men	  who	  agreed	  that,	  having	  taken	  everything	  into	  account,	  they	  had	  confidence	  in	  the	  police	  in	  their	  local	  area.	  	  	  Unlike	  police	  ratings,	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  police	  confidence	  among	  young	  men	  aged	  16-­‐24,	  with	  just	  over	  60	  percent	  of	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population	  agreeing	  that	  they	  were	  confident	  in	  their	  local	  police.	  	  However,	  the	  same	  trend	  of	  more	  positive	  attitudes	  with	  older	  age	  was	  then	  found	  for	  Muslim	  men,	  albeit	  more	  modestly	  than	  for	  ratings	  of	  the	  police.	  	  	  Figure	  28:	  Percentage	  of	  Men	  with	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Local	  Police	  
	  Source:	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  2008/9	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Figure	  29:Percentage	  of	  Women	  with	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Local	  Police	  
	  Source:	  British	  Crime	  Survey,	  2008/9	  Police	  confidence	  among	  Muslim	  women	  was	  higher	  than	  for	  men	  in	  the	  younger	  age	  groups,	  starting	  at	  over	  70	  percent	  for	  16-­‐24	  year	  olds	  and	  peaking	  at	  86	  percent	  for	  the	  35-­‐44	  age	  group	  (Figure	  29).	  	  	  However,	  in	  common	  with	  the	  profile	  for	  police	  ratings	  among	  Muslim	  women,	  those	  aged	  45+	  were	  less	  likely	  than	  other	  age	  groups	  to	  give	  a	  positive	  appraisal	  of	  the	  local	  police.	  	  	  Police	  confidence	  for	  Muslim	  women	  at	  this	  age	  was	  also	  slightly	  below	  confidence	  among	  women	  aged	  45+	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Although	  objectively	  confidence	  in	  the	  police	  remains	  high,	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  attitudes	  dramatically	  change	  for	  the	  worse	  on	  both	  indicators	  of	  police	  attitudes	  at	  this	  age.	  	  	  Having	  established	  that	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  police	  differ	  markedly	  with	  age	  for	  Muslim	  men	  and	  women,	  we	  now	  use	  a	  multivariate	  logistic	  regression	  modeling	  technique	  to	  simultaneously	  control	  for	  the	  main	  effects	  of	  age	  and	  gender	  on	  attitudes	  among	  the	  Muslim	  and	  general	  population.	  	  Figure	  30	  displays	  a	  series	  of	  ‘Odds	  Ratios’	  (ORs)	  for	  Muslim	  men	  and	  women	  that	  compare	  them	  with	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  An	  OR	  greater	  than	  1	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  higher	  likelihood	  of	  Muslims	  giving	  the	  police	  a	  positive	  rating	  relative	  to	  the	  population	  in	  general,	  whilst	  an	  OR	  less	  than	  1	  shows	  a	  lower	  likelihood	  (for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  method	  see	  the	  Appendix).	  	  	  The	  blue	  bars	  in	  the	  figure	  show	  how	  Muslim	  men	  in	  each	  age	  group	  were	  likely	  to	  rate	  the	  police	  relative	  to	  general	  population	  men.	  	  	  
• For	  16-­‐24	  year	  olds,	  the	  blue	  bar	  falls	  below	  the	  value	  1.00,	  indicating	  that	  young	  Muslim	  men	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  give	  positive	  police	  ratings	  that	  their	  general	  population	  counterparts	  at	  this	  age.	  	  	  This	  was	  reversed	  for	  each	  age	  group	  thereafter,	  with	  the	  OR’s	  steadily	  increasing	  with	  age	  for	  Muslim	  men.	  	  	  Muslim	  men	  in	  the	  oldest	  age	  group	  (55+)	  were	  more	  than	  2.5	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  rate	  the	  police	  as	  ‘excellent’	  or	  ‘good’	  than	  men	  in	  general.	  	  The	  greatest	  differential	  between	  Muslim	  women	  and	  women	  in	  general	  was	  at	  age	  24-­‐34	  (OR	  2.25).	  Muslim	  women	  in	  all	  age	  groups	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  other	  women	  to	  rate	  the	  police	  positively,	  although	  this	  effect	  was	  very	  modest	  in	  the	  oldest	  age	  group	  (55+)	  –	  at	  the	  same	  age	  of	  such	  marked	  differences	  among	  men.	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Figure	  30:	  Logistic	  Regression	  Ratios	  Showing	  Likelihood	  of	  Muslims	  Rating	  the	  Local	  Police	  as	  ‘Excellent’	  or	  ‘Good’	  Relative	  to	  the	  General	  Population	  by	  Gender	  and	  Age	  Group	  
	  Source:	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9	  The	  same	  method	  was	  used	  to	  run	  separate	  logistic	  regression	  models	  for	  white	  and	  Black	  African	  Caribbean	  respondents	  in	  order	  that	  age	  and	  gender	  differences	  in	  police	  perceptions	  could	  be	  compared.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  models	  (not	  shown)	  revealed	  a	  pattern	  that	  differed	  to	  Muslims.	  Young	  white	  or	  Black	  African	  Caribbean	  men	  (aged	  16-­‐24)	  had	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  police	  that	  were	  comparable	  to	  the	  population	  in	  general.	  	  Older	  age	  among	  white	  men	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  more	  negative	  attitude	  towards	  the	  police	  relative	  to	  the	  general	  population	  and	  for	  Black	  African	  Caribbean	  men	  attitudes	  tended	  to	  be	  relatively	  more	  positive	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  24	  to	  34	  age	  group.	  	  For	  white	  and	  Black	  African	  women,	  the	  ORs	  were	  often	  more	  negative	  relative	  to	  the	  population	  in	  general,	  particularly	  for	  young	  Black	  women	  and	  white	  women	  over	  the	  age	  of	  25.	  	  In	  neither	  of	  these	  groups,	  were	  the	  stark	  gender	  differences	  found	  for	  Muslims	  replicated	  namely	  greater	  positivity	  in	  older	  age	  for	  men	  but	  the	  opposing	  trend	  for	  women.	  A	  degree	  of	  support	  for	  this	  contention	  that	  some	  young	  Muslim	  men	  express	  negative	  views	  is	  present	  within	  the	  qualitative	  interview	  data.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  discussions	  in	  Cardiff	  with	  young	  people	  and	  with	  youth	  workers	  it	  was	  identified	  that	  some	  individuals	  were,	  in	  their	  private	  conversations	  with	  each	  other,	  voicing	  very	  negative	  sentiments	  and	  radical	  ideas.	  They	  were	  interpreting	  both	  local	  and	  international	  events	  in	  ways	  that	  resonated	  with	  aspects	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  single	  narrative.	  Locally	  the	  communities	  were	  mobilising	  to	  challenge	  these	  views	  and	  provide	  a	  counter-­‐narrative.	  Using	  the	  survey	  data,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  untangle	  whether	  the	  age	  effects	  on	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  police	  are	  generational	  or	  reflect	  a	  life-­‐course	  effect,	  that	  is,	  both	  the	  accumulated	  experiences	  and	  current	  living	  situation	  of	  people	  in	  a	  particular	  stage	  of	  life.	  	  Older	  generations	  of	  men,	  for	  example,	  may	  more	  readily	  accept	  and	  value	  police	  authority	  than	  subsequent	  generations	  whose	  living	  circumstances	  and	  life	  opportunities	  differ	  markedly	  from	  their	  predecessors.	  	  	  From	  a	  life-­‐course	  perspective,	  women’s	  attitudes	  may	  change	  as	  they	  become	  mothers	  and	  as	  their	  children	  grow	  up	  in	  the	  local	  community.	  	  Support	  for	  this	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interpretation	  is	  provided	  by	  some	  of	  the	  in-­‐depth	  interviews.	  For	  example,	  one	  woman	  discussed	  how,	  “My	  mum,	  she’s	  like	  over	  60,	  yet	  she’s	  very	  negative	  about	  the	  police,	  yet	  she’s	  not	  had	  a	  bad	  experience…She	  just	  keeps	  saying	  the	  police	  are	  racist…So	  she’s	  not	  had	  a	  bad	  experience	  and	  I	  don’t	  know	  whether	  it’s	  just	  hearsay	  or	  rumours…because	  my	  younger	  brother,	  who’s	  now	  in	  his	  early	  30s,	  when	  he	  was	  a	  teenager	  he	  kind	  of	  went	  off	  the	  rails	  and	  he	  was	  always	  getting	  into	  trouble	  with	  the	  police	  and	  maybe	  my	  mum	  thinks	  back	  to	  that	  period	  in	  her	  life.”	  (Community,	  2659-­‐26)	  The	  marked	  attitude	  change	  among	  older	  Muslim	  women	  may,	  in	  some	  cases,	  reflect	  a	  time	  when	  their	  own	  children	  reach	  adolescence	  or	  young	  adulthood	  and	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  local	  police.	  	  It	  is	  important	  then	  to	  consider	  how	  people’s	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  police	  may	  be	  formed,	  changed	  or	  sustained	  through	  their	  own	  experience	  and	  those	  of	  others	  close	  to	  them.	  Attitude	  Clustering	  We	  now	  investigate	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  any	  evidence	  of	  a	  ‘clustering’	  of	  negative	  attitudes	  among	  Muslim	  men	  and	  women	  concerning	  the	  police.	  This	  was	  based	  on	  responses	  to	  the	  two	  key	  attitudes	  analysed	  in	  this	  chapter	  so	  far,	  namely:	  police	  ratings	  (how	  would	  you	  rate	  the	  police	  in	  your	  local	  area);	  police	  confidence	  (how	  confident	  are	  you	  that	  they	  are	  doing	  a	  good	  job);	  and	  another	  attitude	  focusing	  on	  whether	  police	  understand	  issues	  affecting	  the	  local	  community.	  	  	  The	  first	  analysis	  centres	  on	  those	  who	  gave	  any	  negative	  response	  to	  all	  of	  these	  three	  items,	  that	  is,	  they	  ‘disagreed’,	  ‘strongly	  disagreed’	  or	  responded	  that	  the	  police	  were	  ‘poor’	  or	  ‘very	  poor’.	  	  Figure	  31	  shows	  how	  responses	  clustered	  by	  age	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  	  The	  first	  thing	  to	  note	  for	  all	  groups	  is	  that	  the	  percentage	  displaying	  any	  negative	  attitude	  across	  these	  three	  attitudes	  was	  very	  low	  –	  less	  than	  1	  in	  10.	  Negativity	  among	  Muslim	  men	  was	  concentrated	  among	  those	  aged	  34	  and	  under,	  with	  the	  percentage	  giving	  any	  negative	  response	  across	  attitudes	  markedly	  lowering	  after	  this	  age.	  For	  Muslim	  women,	  the	  opposite	  trend	  was	  observed	  with	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  women	  in	  the	  35-­‐44	  and	  45-­‐54	  age	  groups	  displaying	  a	  negative	  attitude	  than	  younger	  women.	  	  For	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  general	  population,	  any	  negativity	  was	  greatest	  in	  the	  youngest	  age	  group	  (16-­‐24)	  and	  in	  older	  age	  remaining	  higher	  among	  men	  than	  women.	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Figure	  31:	  ‘Any	  Negative’	  Responses	  Across	  Three	  Attitudes	  on	  Policing	  by	  Age	  
	  Source:	  	  British	  Crime	  Survey,	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9	  When	  the	  same	  questions	  were	  examined,	  but	  only	  ‘extreme’	  negative	  responses	  to	  all	  three	  items	  examined	  (‘strongly	  disagree’	  or	  ‘very	  poor’),	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  sample	  included	  was	  less	  than	  three	  percent	  (Figure	  32).	  	  The	  results	  did	  not	  suggest	  that	  extreme	  negativity	  concentrated	  among	  young	  Muslims,	  rather	  the	  most	  disaffected	  group	  of	  Muslims	  on	  this	  indicator	  was	  women	  aged	  45	  to	  54	  years.	  	  For	  young	  Muslim	  men,	  those	  who	  displayed	  a	  clustering	  of	  ‘very	  negative’	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  police	  was	  less	  than	  1	  percent	  and	  below	  that	  of	  men	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  Although	  negativity	  peaked	  among	  Muslim	  men	  at	  age	  35-­‐44,	  it	  disappeared	  thereafter	  with	  no	  recorded	  responses	  of	  extreme	  negative	  responses	  across	  the	  three	  attitudes.	  Figure	  32:	  ‘Very	  Negative’	  Responses	  Across	  Three	  Attitudes	  on	  Policing	  by	  Age	  
	  Source:	   	  	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9	  Such	  findings	  follow	  the	  broader	  pattern,	  previously	  established,	  that	  suggests	  that	  the	  perceptions	  and	  attitudes	  of	  individuals	  from	  the	  Muslim	  faith	  are	  not	  particularly	  remarkable	  when	  compared	  with	  people	  drawn	  from	  different	  backgrounds.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  Muslim	  communities	  have	  undoubtedly	  been	  the	  principal	  focus	  of	  Prevent	  activities,	  and	  yet	  their	  views	  are	  largely	  similar	  to	  those	  groups	  that	  have	  not	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  Prevent.	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There	  may	  be	  some	  people	  who	  are	  being	  disenfranchised	  by	  aspects	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  but	  this	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  general	  effect.	  	  Police	  contact	  An	  additional	  indicator	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Muslims	  and	  the	  police	  centres	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  have	  had	  any	  reported	  contact	  with	  them.	  	  In	  the	  BCS	  this	  measure	  focuses	  on	  respondent	  initiated	  contact	  over	  the	  last	  twelve	  months.	  	  Although	  police	  contact	  is	  not	  directly	  an	  attitudinal	  measure,	  it	  may	  go	  some	  way	  towards	  constructing	  and	  reflecting	  people’s	  feelings	  towards	  the	  police,	  and	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  level	  of	  interaction	  between	  specific	  groups	  and	  the	  police.	  	  When	  this	  measure	  was	  simply	  examined	  separately	  for	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population,	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  reported	  contact,	  with	  24	  percent	  in	  each	  group	  reporting	  police	  contact	  in	  the	  last	  twelve	  months.	  	  Figure	  33	  shows	  however	  that	  this	  result	  conceals	  wide	  age	  and	  gender	  differences	  in	  police	  contact.	  For	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  general	  population,	  police	  contact	  peaked	  for	  adults	  in	  their	  30s	  at	  approximately	  30	  percent	  of	  women	  and	  33	  percent	  of	  men.	  	  Younger	  adults	  (16-­‐29)	  or	  older	  (40	  or	  above)	  had	  equivalent	  lower	  levels	  of	  police	  contact	  at	  around	  the	  25	  percent	  mark.	  	  	  What	  is	  striking	  for	  the	  Muslim	  population	  is	  firstly	  that,	  when	  contact	  is	  broken	  down	  by	  gender,	  it	  revealed	  that	  Muslim	  men	  in	  each	  age	  group	  had	  the	  highest	  rates	  of	  police	  contact.	  The	  overall	  age	  trend	  for	  Muslim	  men	  was	  the	  same	  as	  for	  the	  general	  population	  with	  a	  peak	  in	  the	  middle	  age	  group.	  	  The	  second	  striking	  observation	  is	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  police	  contact	  for	  Muslim	  women	  is	  completely	  different	  from	  the	  other	  groups.	  	  Contact	  was	  around	  20	  percent	  for	  young	  Muslim	  women	  (16-­‐29),	  lower	  than	  for	  women	  in	  the	  general	  population	  and	  for	  men,	  but	  it	  then	  became	  substantially	  lower	  with	  older	  age.	  	  At	  age	  30-­‐39	  and	  40+,	  barely	  1	  in	  10	  Muslim	  women	  reported	  contact	  with	  the	  police,	  far	  lower	  than	  for	  any	  of	  their	  contemporaries	  in	  age,	  gender	  or	  faith	  group.	  Whilst	  one	  interpretation	  of	  this	  finding	  might	  be	  positive	  –	  that	  Muslim	  women	  initiate	  less	  contact	  with	  the	  police	  because	  they	  themselves	  experience	  less	  crime	  or	  disorder	  –	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  tail-­‐off	  in	  police	  contact	  coincides	  with	  their	  falling	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  police.	  	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  Muslim	  women,	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  have	  little	  contact	  or	  interaction	  with	  the	  police.	  Figure	  33:	  	  Reported	  Contact	  with	  the	  Police	  in	  the	  Last	  12	  Months	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THE	  LOCAL	  EFFECTS	  OF	  PREVENT	  POLICING	  The	  empirical	  analysis	  for	  this	  report	  concludes	  by	  focusing	  on	  three	  Police	  Force	  Areas	  (PFAs)	  of	  high	  density	  Muslim	  populations	  that	  also	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  qualitative	  analysis	  in	  this	  report	  –	  namely	  London,	  Greater	  Manchester	  and	  the	  West	  Midlands.19	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  is	  to	  try	  to	  integrate	  the	  findings	  about	  the	  differing	  ways	  of	  organising	  and	  delivering	  Prevent,	  with	  an	  assessment	  of	  public-­‐facing	  outcomes.	  	  Figure	  34	  uses	  multivariate	  logistic	  regression	  to	  examine	  the	  likelihood	  of	  Muslim	  men	  and	  women	  giving	  the	  police	  a	  positive	  rating	  in	  each	  locality,	  relative	  to	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  Odds	  Ratios	  were	  also	  calculated	  for	  two	  additional	  areas	  (Bedfordshire	  and	  Thames	  Valley)	  providing	  a	  bench-­‐mark	  against	  which	  to	  assess	  the	  results.	  The	  blue	  bars	  for	  the	  PFAs	  show	  that	  Muslim	  men	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  men	  in	  the	  general	  population	  to	  rate	  the	  police	  positively	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  PFAs.	  This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  Greater	  Manchester	  PFA	  (OR	  1.62)	  and	  the	  West	  Midlands	  PFA	  (OR	  1.56).	  Among	  women,	  the	  greater	  propensity	  of	  Muslims	  to	  view	  the	  police	  as	  ‘excellent’	  or	  ‘good’	  was	  even	  more	  marked.	  	  In	  the	  West	  Midlands	  PFA,	  for	  example,	  Muslim	  women	  were	  more	  than	  two	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  this	  rating	  than	  women	  in	  general.	  	  	  This	  analysis	  within	  small	  areas	  is	  therefore	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  reporting	  of	  more	  positive	  police	  ratings	  among	  Muslims	  within	  the	  sample	  as	  a	  whole.	  Figure	   34:	   Logistic	   Regression	   Ratios	   Showing	   Likelihood	   of	   Muslims	   Rating	  Local	  Police	  as	  ‘Excellent’	  or	  ‘Good’	  Relative	  to	  the	  General	  Population	  by	  Gender	  and	  PFA	  
	  Source:	  	  British	  Crime	  Survey,	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9	  	  Also	  within	  PFAs,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  investigate	  any	  clustering	  of	  negative	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  police.	  	  Figure	  35	  shows	  the	  percentage	  that	  had	  ‘any	  negative’	  responses	  across	  three	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  police:	  police	  confidence,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  The	  numbers	  of	  Muslims	  sampled	  by	  the	  BCS	  in	  Cardiff	  and	  South	  Wales	  was	  too	  small	  to	  permit	  this	  form	  of	  analysis.	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police	  ratings;	  and	  believing	  that	  the	  police	  understand	  local	  community	  issues.	  	  	  The	  percentage	  negative	  on	  all	  three	  questions	  was	  below	  10	  percent	  for	  each	  PFA.	  	  Only	  in	  London/Met	  were	  Muslim	  men	  more	  likely	  than	  any	  other	  group	  to	  express	  a	  consistently	  negative	  attitude	  and	  the	  magnitude	  of	  this	  difference	  was	  modest.	  	  In	  the	  other	  areas,	  negativity	  among	  Muslim	  men	  was	  below	  that	  observed	  for	  men	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  	  Within	  the	  West	  Midlands	  PFA,	  Muslim	  women	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  Muslim	  men	  to	  express	  a	  consistently	  negative	  attitude	  towards	  the	  police.	  	  This	  was	  evident	  in	  Figure	  35	  for	  ‘any	  negativity’	  but	  was	  particularly	  marked	  when	  ‘very	  negative’	  attitudes	  were	  examined	  (Figure	  36).	  	  Nearly	  5	  percent	  of	  Muslim	  women	  in	  the	  West	  Midlands	  PFA	  were	  very	  negative	  about	  the	  police	  across	  three	  questions.	  	  	  	  Although	  this	  represents	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  the	  sample,	  it	  was	  greater	  than	  that	  found	  among	  the	  general	  population	  and	  this	  degree	  of	  negativity	  was	  non-­‐existent	  among	  Muslim	  men	  living	  in	  the	  same	  area.	  	  Figure	  36	  confirms	  that	  the	  negativity	  among	  Muslim	  men	  in	  London/Met	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  ‘very	  negative’	  responses	  –	  when	  these	  were	  examined	  the	  percentage	  was	  lower	  for	  Muslim	  men	  than	  for	  Muslim	  women	  and	  the	  population	  in	  general.	  Figure	  35:	  	  Responses	  Across	  Attitudes	  for	  PFA’s	  –	  ‘Any	  Negative’	  
	  Source:	  	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9	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Figure	  36:	  	  Responses	  Across	  Attitudes	  for	  PFAs	  –	  ‘Very	  Negative’	  
	  Source:	  	  British	  Crime	  Survey,	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9	  The	  three	  PFAs	  differed	  in	  terms	  of	  levels	  of	  confidence	  in	  local	  policing.	  Figure	  37	  shows	  that	  overall	  confidence	  was	  high	  among	  Muslim	  women,	  with	  approximately	  three	  quarters	  in	  the	  West	  Midlands	  and	  London	  PFAs	  agreeing	  that	  they	  had	  confidence	  in	  the	  police.	  This	  was	  markedly	  lower	  for	  women	  in	  the	  Greater	  Manchester	  PFA	  at	  only	  58	  percent.	  	  	  Figure	  37:	   	   Percentage	  of	  Muslims	  With	  Confidence	   in	   the	  Local	   Police	  by	  PFA	  and	  Gender	  
	  Source:	  	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9	  	  Figure	  38	  suggests	  that	  the	  finding	  of	  lower	  police	  confidence	  among	  respondents	  living	  in	  the	  Greater	  Manchester	  PFA	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  Muslim	  population.	  	  	  Among	  the	  population	  in	  general,	  	  confidence	  was	  lowest	  for	  both	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men	  and	  women	  in	  this	  area,	  with	  both	  West	  Midlands	  and	  London	  PFAs	  eliciting	  greater	  levels	  of	  police	  confidence.	  	  Figure	  38:	  Percentage	  of	  General	  Population	  With	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Local	  Police	  by	  PFA	  and	  	  Gender	  
	  Source:	  	  British	  Crime	  Survey,	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9	  	  SUMMARY	  This	  Chapter	  has	  sought	  to	  develop	  and	  elaborate	  aspects	  of	  the	  position	  worked	  out	  in	  the	  preceding	  Chapter.	  It	  has	  identified:	  
• Specific	  demographic	  effects	  in	  that	  younger	  Muslim	  men	  and	  older	  Muslim	  women	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  express	  negative	  views	  about	  policing;	  






	   86	  
CHAPTER	  7:	  CONCLUSION	  This	  research	  is	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  study	  conducted	  to	  date,	  in	  terms	  of	  empirically	  assessing	  the	  delivery	  and	  effects	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  Informed	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  national	  BCS	  survey	  data	  and	  in-­‐depth	  qualitative	  interviews,	  it	  reveals	  that:	  	  
• The	  key	  processes	  and	  practices	  associated	  with	  Prevent	  policing	  have	  evolved	  and	  adapted	  to	  become	  more	  sophisticated	  in	  recent	  years,	  with	  new	  processes	  and	  practices	  obtaining	  increasing	  traction;	  
• Community	  reactions	  to	  this	  domain	  of	  police	  work	  are	  more	  nuanced	  and	  complex	  than	  much	  media	  and	  political	  rhetoric	  would	  suggest.	  	  
• There	  remain	  opportunities	  for	  improvement	  and	  development	  that	  possess	  the	  potential	  to	  enhance	  the	  efficacy	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  	  Detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  empirical	  data	  has	  found	  that:	  
• Consistently	  across	  a	  number	  of	  indicators	  and	  over	  time,	  UK	  Muslims	  express	  similar	  attitudes	  to	  the	  general	  population	  about	  policing.	  If	  anything,	  their	  views	  are	  more	  positive.	  
• Muslims	  are	  more	  affected	  by	  crime,	  disorder	  and	  fear	  of	  crime	  than	  the	  general	  population,	  though	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  report	  being	  a	  victim	  of	  crime	  to	  the	  police.	  
• Young	  Muslim	  men	  tend	  to	  be	  less	  positive	  about	  the	  police.	  However,	  45%	  of	  those	  surveyed	  still	  rated	  local	  policing	  as	  ‘good’	  or	  very	  good’.	  
• Muslim	  women	  aged	  45+,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Muslim	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  general	  population,	  tend	  to	  become	  more	  negative	  about	  the	  police.	  They	  also	  report	  fewer	  direct	  interactions	  with	  the	  police.	  Collectively	  these	  findings	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  assessing	  Prevent	  policing.	  It	  has	  been	  asserted	  that	  Prevent	  is	  causing	  widespread	  alienation	  and	  disenfranchisement	  within	  Muslim	  communities	  because	  of	  how	  it	  has	  cast	  them	  generically	  as	  a	  ‘suspect	  population’.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  analysed	  for	  this	  report	  does	  not	  support	  this	  claim.	  Whilst	  some	  individuals	  and	  groups	  possess	  such	  attitudes,	  this	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  majority	  position.	  The	  cross	  sectional	  and	  time	  trend	  analyses	  of	  the	  national	  survey	  data,	  covering	  the	  period	  when	  Prevent	  has	  been	  introduced	  and	  implemented,	  indicate	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  not	  causing	  detectable	  harm	  to	  police	  relations	  with	  Muslim	  communities.	  The	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  illuminate	  why	  this	  is.	  Essentially,	  many	  Muslim	  respondents	  possess	  quite	  sophisticated	  positions	  on	  Prevent.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  those	  interviewed	  accept	  the	  basic	  premise	  that	  there	  is	  a	  societal	  problem	  with	  extremism	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  that	  police	  activity	  is	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  managing	  this.	  It	  is	  relevant	  in	  understanding	  why	  they	  hold	  these	  views	  that	  11	  out	  of	  the	  12	  Mosques	  and	  Islamic	  Societies	  consulted	  as	  part	  of	  this	  research	  reported	  having	  been	  approached	  on	  multiple	  occasions	  by	  representatives	  of	  proscribed	  groups.20	  There	  was	  perhaps	  more	  ambiguity	  about	  some	  of	  the	  less	  well-­‐defined	  and	  wide-­‐ranging	  components	  of	  the	  Prevent	  programme.	  There	  was	  also	  criticism	  of	  many	  police	  interventions.	  However,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Several	  others	  declined	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  research.	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these	  were	  frequently	  tempered	  by	  other	  examples	  where	  the	  police	  had	  ‘got	  it	  right’.	  	  The	  evidence	  examined	  by	  this	  study	  suggests	  that	  broadly	  speaking,	  people	  within	  Muslim	  communities	  have	  adopted	  one	  of	  three	  main	  positions	  that	  lie	  on	  a	  continuum:	  
• Advocates:	  these	  individuals	  tend	  to	  accept	  the	  argument	  that	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  radicalisation	  within	  UK	  Muslim	  communities	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  dealt	  with.	  Whilst	  not	  uncritical	  of	  the	  police	  at	  times,	  their	  overarching	  view	  is	  that	  the	  net	  effects	  of	  policing	  are	  more	  positive	  than	  negative.	  
• Anti-­‐	  Prevent:	  at	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  continuum	  are	  those	  individuals	  who	  are	  disenchanted	  by	  and	  alienated	  from	  the	  police.	  	  
• Non-­‐aligned:	  are	  individuals	  whose	  perceptions	  and	  attitudes	  shift	  according	  to	  the	  unfolding	  of	  events.	  At	  times	  they	  are	  more	  supportive	  of	  the	  police,	  however,	  particularly	  when	  the	  police	  are	  seen	  to	  have	  over-­‐reached	  their	  remit,	  they	  adopt	  a	  more	  anti-­‐	  stance.	  This	  segmentation	  of	  community	  attitudes	  mirrors	  the	  findings	  reported	  by	  Slucka	  (1989)	  in	  his	  study	  of	  community	  reactions	  to	  terrorism	  and	  counter-­‐terrorist	  policing	  in	  Belfast.21	  	  Slucka	  identified	  a	  further	  segmentation	  effect	  in	  that	  the	  supporters	  of	  the	  terrorist	  groups	  could	  be	  differentiated	  between	  those	  providing	  ‘soft’	  and	  ‘hard’	  support.	  This	  was	  subsequently	  extended	  by	  Roberts	  (2011)	  in	  a	  fieldwork	  based	  study	  of	  gun	  crime,	  where	  a	  similar	  pattern	  was	  detected	  in	  relation	  to	  pro-­‐social	  groups.22	  By	  introducing	  this	  additional	  distinction	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  craft	  a	  more	  refined	  analysis,	  separating	  out	  those	  providing	  financial	  and	  material	  support	  to	  terrorist	  campaigns,	  from	  those	  who	  provide	  more	  subjective	  and	  moral	  impetus.	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  sense,	  based	  upon	  the	  evidence	  reviewed	  for	  the	  current	  study,	  that	  a	  similar	  framework	  can	  be	  usefully	  applied	  to	  Islamist	  violent	  extremism.	  The	  need	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  how	  Prevent	  works	  pervades	  several	  other	  issues	  that	  have	  been	  discussed.	  A	  key	  concern	  of	  the	  strategy	  has	  been	  to	  establish	  trust	  and	  engagement	  mechanisms	  that	  mean	  that	  where	  problems	  are	  presenting	  within	  a	  community	  people	  are	  willing	  to	  go	  to	  report	  them	  to	  police.	  The	  evidence,	  particularly	  from	  the	  qualitative	  research	  conducted,	  suggests	  though	  that	  Muslim	  communities	  retain	  a	  preference	  for	  dealing	  with	  problems	  internally	  using	  informal	  social	  control	  without	  involving	  the	  police.	  It	  is	  only	  if	  such	  efforts	  fail	  and	  the	  perceived	  risks	  tend	  to	  escalate	  that	  seeking	  police	  involvement	  may	  occur.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  whether	  this	  preference	  to	  invoke	  informal	  social	  control	  is	  a	  limitation	  induced	  by	  patchy	  implementation,	  or	  more	  pragmatically	  that	  this	  is	  simply	  how	  things	  are.	  If	  the	  latter,	  then	  we	  might	  need	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Slucka,	  J.	  (1989)	  Hearts	  and	  Minds,	  Water	  and	  Fish:	  Support	  for	  the	  IRA	  and	  INLA	  in	  a	  Northern	  Ireland	  Ghetto.	  JAI	  Press:	  Connecticut.	  
22	  Roberts,	  C.	  (2011)	  In	  Control?	  A	  Study	  of	  Responses	  to	  Gun	  Violence	  in	  Brixton.	  Guildford:	  University	  of	  Surrey.	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‘threshold’	  model	  for	  Prevent.	  According	  to	  such	  a	  model,	  police	  engagement	  within	  and	  across	  communities	  becomes	  particularly	  important	  so	  that,	  if	  a	  particular	  threat	  becomes	  especially	  pronounced,	  there	  is	  an	  established	  channel	  of	  communication.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary,	  under	  such	  arrangements,	  for	  police-­‐community	  communication	  channels	  to	  be	  always	  active	  and	  ‘on’.	  Rather,	  the	  critical	  requirement	  is	  that	  they	  can	  be	  easily	  activated	  when	  needed.	  The	  implementation	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  represented	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  orientations	  of	  counter-­‐terrorism	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  The	  process	  of	  implementation	  has	  proceeded	  at	  different	  paces	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  but	  broadly	  speaking	  it	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  main	  phases:	  
• Phase	  One	  –	  associated	  with	  the	  initial	  formulation	  of	  the	  CONTEST	  strategy	  sought	  to	  deliver	  the	  Prevent	  agenda	  in	  ways	  consistent	  with	  the	  established	  operating	  procedures	  for	  counter-­‐terrorism	  work.	  That	  is,	  it	  was	  low-­‐visibility	  and	  somewhat	  clandestine	  in	  nature.	  There	  was	  no	  real	  specific	  Prevent	  policing	  capacity	  or	  capability;	  
• Phase	  Two	  –	  involved	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  assets	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘refresh’	  of	  approach	  involved	  in	  CONTEST	  II.	  In	  this	  phase	  of	  activity,	  the	  organisation	  of	  Prevent	  staff	  and	  units	  was	  altered,	  but	  there	  was	  only	  limited	  innovation	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  public-­‐facing	  services	  were	  delivered.	  In	  effect,	  there	  was	  a	  growing	  of	  capacity	  but	  it	  was	  still	  lacking	  defined	  Prevent	  capabilities.	  
• Phase	  Three	  –	  more	  recently	  (over	  the	  past	  six	  to	  eighteen	  months)	  it	  appears	  that,	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  Prevent	  policing,	  new	  methods	  for	  doing	  counter-­‐terrorism	  policing	  have	  been	  emerging	  and	  are	  being	  implemented.	  Central	  to	  this	  shift	  has	  been	  a	  far	  more	  open,	  visible	  and	  overt	  way	  of	  conducting	  Prevent	  policing,	  compared	  with	  previous	  incarnations.	  	  The	  development	  of	  an	  overt	  counter-­‐terrorist	  policing	  capacity	  and	  capability	  represents	  a	  profound	  change	  in	  direction.	  As	  these	  methods	  are	  ‘bedding	  down’	  they	  are	  starting	  to	  offer	  new	  ways	  of	  countering	  the	  risks	  and	  threats	  posed	  by	  violent	  extremists.	  Just	  how	  far	  this	  is	  developing	  was	  described	  by	  an	  officer	  involved	  in	  a	  particularly	  progressive	  unit,	  “I	  shan’t	  name	  venues,	  but	  there’s	  been	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  where	  MI5	  have	  been	  looking	  at	  a	  particular	  venue	  in	  [Name]	  for	  years.	  They’ve	  done	  a	  normal	  surveillance…And	  we’re	  at	  the	  point	  now	  in	  this	  force	  where	  we’re	  being	  tasked	  to	  go	  into	  these	  venues	  as	  open	  CTU	  officers	  and	  say	  ‘Hello,	  you	  know	  we’re	  local	  CTU!’	  and	  we’ve	  done	  it	  and	  it’s	  worked.”	  	  Developing	  this	  theme	  he	  continued	  to	  discuss	  how,	  “Where	  the	  Service	  have	  got	  real	  concerns	  about	  a	  group	  of	  individuals,	  evidentially	  they	  can’t	  be	  locked	  up,	  let’s	  just	  ‘front	  them’	  and	  I’ve	  done	  a	  number	  of	  those	  where	  I	  knock	  on	  the	  door	  ‘Oh	  can	  I	  come	  in,	  I’m	  from	  the	  counter-­‐terrorism	  unit.	  I’m	  really	  concerned	  about	  what	  you’re	  doing	  or	  who	  you’re	  hanging	  around	  with,	  what	  you’re	  watching	  on	  the	  internet.	  If	  you	  carry	  on	  there’s	  a	  likelihood	  you	  might	  be	  arrested,	  but	  if	  you	  stop,	  if	  you	  want	  some	  support	  or	  if	  someone’s	  trying	  to	  get	  you	  to	  do	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something	  you’re	  not	  happy	  with,	  give	  me	  a	  call.’	  And	  I	  think	  we’re	  doing	  more	  and	  more	  of	  those	  and	  to	  get	  to	  this	  point	  from	  how	  it	  was	  two	  years	  ago.	  To	  have	  that	  level	  of	  engagement	  and	  confidence	  in	  what	  we	  do	  from	  the	  Security	  Service	  is	  a	  massive	  step.”	  [Police,	  2659-­‐12]	  It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  over-­‐state	  how	  much	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  work	  is	  actually	  taking	  place	  nor	  its	  ultimate	  potential.	  A	  number	  of	  respondents	  independently	  talked	  in	  detail	  about	  how	  they	  had	  been	  approached	  to	  become	  covert	  human	  intelligence	  sources,	  and	  the	  negative	  impacts	  this	  had	  upon	  their	  perceptions	  of	  the	  police	  and	  Prevent.	  Likewise,	  the	  more	  overt	  and	  disruption	  based	  methods	  can	  never	  wholly	  replace	  the	  use	  of	  covert	  ways	  of	  working	  that	  are	  sometimes	  required	  to	  counter	  terrorist	  threats.	  	  However,	  the	  above	  examples	  and	  others	  like	  them	  in	  the	  data	  for	  this	  study	  do	  suggest	  that	  as	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  maturing	  and	  developing	  it	  is	  starting	  to	  derive	  some	  new	  methodologies	  that	  result	  in	  covert	  policing	  not	  always	  being	  the	  default	  option	  for	  counter-­‐terrorist	  work.	  Such	  developments	  effectively	  provide	  a	  choice	  in	  how	  we	  collectively	  respond	  to	  terrorist	  threats.	  Covert	  policing	  methods	  can	  and	  will	  still	  be	  used,	  and	  the	  comparative	  advantage	  that	  they	  offer	  is	  that	  they	  take	  place	  largely	  out	  of	  sight	  and	  	  ‘below	  the	  public	  radar’	  so	  causing	  minimal	  disruption	  to	  most	  peoples’	  everyday	  routines.	  The	  alternative	  is	  a	  more	  transparent	  and	  visible	  form	  of	  counter-­‐terrorism	  policing	  that	  requires	  greater	  public	  awareness	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  issues	  and	  risks	  in	  the	  ‘dirty	  work’	  of	  defending	  democracy,	  and	  ultimately	  needs	  greater	  public	  participation	  to	  make	  it	  work.	  	  Having	  surfaced	  these	  ‘bigger	  picture’	  considerations,	  it	  is	  relevant	  that,	  whatever	  its	  proponents	  may	  consider,	  for	  many	  Prevent	  is	  a	  tainted	  brand.	  Much	  of	  the	  negativity	  attached	  to	  Prevent	  reflects	  a	  historical	  legacy	  stemming	  from	  poor	  initial	  implementation.	  Many	  of	  those	  interviewed	  stated	  that	  in	  the	  early	  set	  up	  period,	  funding	  had	  been	  inappropriately	  allocated	  to	  groups	  who	  were	  not	  delivering	  practical	  benefits.	  It	  was	  further	  asserted	  that	  in	  the	  early	  years	  Prevent	  policing	  lacked	  definition,	  method	  and	  clarity	  of	  purpose.	  Although	  many	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  situation	  has	  improved,	  Prevent	  policing	  still	  has	  to	  confront	  its	  legacy	  problems.	  The	  evidence	  is	  unequivocal	  that	  the	  initial	  rush	  to	  introduce	  Prevent,	  the	  lack	  of	  definition	  accompanying	  its	  early	  incarnations,	  the	  lack	  of	  control	  over	  funding,	  and	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  methods	  were	  being	  worked	  out	  in	  the	  field	  ‘on	  the	  run’,	  has	  left	  a	  toxic	  endowment.	  This	  was	  recognised	  by	  police	  and	  communities	  alike.	  Every	  time	  the	  police	  make	  a	  mistake	  or	  error	  of	  judgement	  (such	  as	  Project	  Champion)	  this	  reheats	  the	  concerns	  and	  complaints	  that	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  Prevent’s	  history.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  complexity	  and	  how	  public	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  have	  evolved,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  helpful	  to	  differentiate	  between	  two	  positions	  	  -­‐	  the	  ‘strong’	  and	  ‘weak’	  critiques.	  The	  ‘strong’	  critique	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  the	  more	  trenchant,	  politically	  charged	  and	  fundamental	  in	  its	  orientations.	  It	  posits	  that	  both	  the	  original	  concept	  and	  implementation	  of	  Prevent	  	  has	  been	  flawed,	  and	  has	  failed	  to	  deliver	  its	  stated	  outcomes.	  The	  evidence	  available	  for	  this	  study	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  a	  position	  held	  by	  a	  minority	  of	  individuals.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  ‘weaker’	  critique	  broadly	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accepts	  the	  concept	  of	  trying	  to	  Prevent	  and	  inhibit	  social	  processes	  of	  radicalisation,	  but	  is	  more	  questioning	  of	  some	  of	  the	  methods,	  techniques	  and	  approaches	  that	  have	  been	  applied.	  This	  position	  does	  have	  greater	  traction	  within	  UK	  Muslim	  communities.	  However,	  the	  evidence	  does	  suggest	  that,	  over	  the	  past	  three	  years,	  there	  have	  been	  improvements	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  that	  are	  proving	  more	  successful	  in	  findings	  ways	  to	  engage	  Muslim	  communities	  and	  secure	  their	  participation.	  There	  is	  a	  wider	  significance	  attached	  to	  this	  finding	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  overall	  tenor	  of	  public	  debate.	  To	  date,	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  around	  the	  Prevent	  programme	  has	  been	  about	  ‘who’	  not	  ‘how.’	  That	  is,	  concern	  has	  pivoted	  around	  questions	  about	  who	  has	  received	  funding	  and	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  authorities	  to	  work	  with.	  This	  research	  suggests	  that	  in	  fact	  what	  is	  required	  is	  more	  of	  a	  focus	  upon	  ‘how’	  Prevent	  policing	  activities	  are	  conducted	  and	  can	  be	  rendered	  more	  effective.	  	  	  	  Such	  ‘how’	  considerations	  are	  important	  for	  the	  future	  development	  of	  Prevent	  inasmuch	  as	  looking	  across	  the	  four	  research	  sites	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Prevent	  is	  being	  implemented	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  different	  key	  processes	  and	  systems.	  The	  local	  models	  display	  varying	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses,	  and	  are	  achieving	  different	  results.	  It	  is	  the	  view	  of	  the	  research	  team	  that	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  more	  robust	  in	  some	  of	  the	  areas	  than	  others.	  	  	  Set	  against	  this	  backdrop,	  the	  research	  has	  identified	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  now	  typically	  takes	  place	  through	  four	  principal	  modes	  of	  intervention:	  
• Protective	  –	  is	  where	  the	  police	  own	  the	  intervention	  in	  terms	  of	  defining	  the	  problem	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  undertaking	  the	  response;	  
• Mobilisation	  –	  where	  the	  community	  engages	  in	  self-­‐help	  behaviours	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  perceived	  threat.	  	  
• Type	  1	  Co-­‐production	  –	  is	  the	  orthodox	  notion	  of	  collaborative	  working	  wherein	  the	  community	  seeks	  police	  involvement	  to	  tackle	  a	  problem;	  
• Type	  2	  Co-­‐production	  –	  involves	  the	  police	  utilising	  community	  based	  informal	  social	  control	  resources	  to	  manage	  a	  problem.	  To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge	  this	  mode	  of	  doing	  policing	  through	  a	  community	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  identified,	  and	  may	  be	  a	  unique	  property	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  activity.	  	  That	  these	  different	  modal	  interventions	  were	  observed	  across	  the	  sites	  indicates	  that	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  evolving	  and	  developing	  rapidly	  and	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  nuanced	  in	  its	  approach	  ‘on	  the	  ground’.	  In	  particular,	  Type	  1	  and	  Type	  2	  co-­‐productions	  were	  far	  less	  evident	  when	  data	  was	  collected	  between	  2003-­‐05.	  In	  part,	  these	  adaptations	  may	  reflect	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  associated	  with	  policing	  violent	  extremism.	  Many	  of	  the	  problems	  encountered	  involve	  forms	  of	  anti-­‐social	  behaviour	  that	  are	  offensive	  and	  undesirable,	  but	  often	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  legality.	  As	  such,	  police	  are	  having	  to	  craft	  new	  forms	  of	  response.	  Hence	  their	  turn	  to	  disruptive	  interventions	  and	  increasing	  reliance	  upon	  community	  activism.	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The	  assessment	  of	  the	  research	  team	  is	  that	  more	  work	  is	  required	  to	  develop	  understanding	  of	  how	  disruptive	  interventions	  can	  be	  used	  in	  practice.	  Acting	  to	  disrupt	  the	  activities	  of	  extremist	  groups	  lies	  at	  the	  ‘harder-­‐edge’	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  However,	  when	  compared	  with	  those	  components	  utilising	  ‘soft	  power’,	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  less	  awareness	  and	  confidence	  amongst	  key	  practitioners	  about	  ‘what	  works’.	  A	  more	  subtle	  reform	  that	  may	  be	  required	  as	  Prevent	  continues	  to	  evolve	  in	  these	  ways	  relates	  to	  how	  police	  ascribe	  ‘value’	  to	  individuals	  within	  communities.	  There	  is	  a	  long	  tradition	  within	  policing	  of	  the	  ‘high	  value	  informant’	  and	  working	  to	  cultivate	  and	  protect	  certain	  individuals	  because	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  access	  particular	  kinds	  of	  information.	  The	  kinds	  of	  developments	  mapped	  out	  in	  relation	  to	  Prevent,	  particularly	  around	  the	  growth	  in	  co-­‐productive	  working,	  suggest	  that	  a	  similar	  process	  needs	  to	  be	  developed	  for	  community	  networkers.	  The	  interviews	  with	  both	  police	  and	  community	  representatives	  identify	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  individuals	  who	  are	  of	  value,	  not	  because	  of	  what	  they	  know,	  but	  who	  they	  know.	  They	  are	  effective	  social	  networkers,	  who	  can	  connect	  different	  groups	  and	  factions,	  and	  mobilise	  them	  into	  action.	  	  	  Such	  developments	  do	  however,	  present	  new	  challenges	  for	  Prevent	  practitioners.	  In	  particular,	  when	  individuals	  and	  communities	  ‘push-­‐back’	  against	  extremist	  groups,	  how	  can	  police	  act	  to	  protect	  the	  defenders?	  This	  may	  require	  new	  tactics	  and	  approaches.	  Such	  concerns	  are	  especially	  acute	  where	  communities	  are	  mobilising	  entirely	  outside	  formal	  Prevent	  programme	  structures.	  Some	  individuals	  choose	  to	  work	  outside	  of	  Prevent	  because	  they	  believe	  it	  provides	  them	  with	  more	  credibility	  and	  effectiveness.	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  such	  individuals	  sometimes	  encounter	  intimidation	  and	  threats	  to	  their	  personal	  safety.	  The	  challenge	  for	  the	  police	  is	  how	  to	  provide	  some	  form	  of	  protection	  in	  such	  circumstances	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  sustaining	  these	  forms	  of	  self-­‐help	  activism	  are	  important	  for	  underpinning	  community	  resilience.	  This	  connects	  to	  an	  additional	  conclusion	  of	  this	  work.	  Effective	  Prevent	  policing	  integrates	  defensive	  and	  offensive	  measures.	  The	  more	  defensive	  orientation	  is	  grounded	  in	  examining	  the	  state	  of	  a	  community	  and	  constructing	  interventions	  to	  reduce	  its	  vulnerability.	  This	  is	  different	  to	  working	  more	  offensively	  to	  counteract	  specific	  threats.	  Developing	  this	  more	  sophisticated	  conceptual	  apparatus	  would	  help	  to	  enhance	  the	  role	  of	  Counter-­‐Terrorism	  Local	  Profiles	  and	  render	  them	  more	  diagnostic	  than	  descriptive.	  	  Moving	  towards	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  conceptual	  framework	  reflects	  how	  the	  risks	  and	  threats	  being	  encountered	  are	  shifting,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  which	  the	  focus	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  is	  being	  required	  to	  adapt.	  One	  particular	  illustration	  of	  this,	  highlighted	  through	  the	  fieldwork,	  is	  how	  a	  specific	  Prevent	  project	  is	  being	  used	  to	  co-­‐ordinate	  a	  response	  to	  vulnerable	  adults	  with	  mental	  health	  needs.	  There	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  such	  individuals	  might	  be	  susceptible	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  extremist	  groups	  and	  as	  such	  they	  need	  support.	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  such	  individuals	  do	  not	  and	  indeed	  should	  not	  come	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  a	  counter-­‐terrorism	  programme.	  However,	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  without	  deploying	  such	  resources,	  these	  individuals	  might	  be	  overlooked	  by	  standard	  service	  providers.	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This	  connects	  to	  a	  concern	  about	  funding	  and	  budgets.	  In	  the	  past,	  Prevent	  has	  been	  comparatively	  well	  funded	  and	  resourced.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  significant	  reductions	  in	  public	  spending	  on	  policing,	  there	  is	  an	  obvious	  question	  about	  whether	  these	  funding	  levels	  can	  or	  should	  be	  sustained?	  The	  focus	  of	  concern	  in	  this	  respect	  should	  not	  just	  be	  about	  funds	  directly	  allocated	  to	  Prevent,	  but	  also	  the	  wider	  implications	  of	  funds	  being	  withdrawn	  across	  the	  public	  sector.	  For	  as	  one	  community	  respondent	  involved	  in	  intensive	  counter-­‐extremism	  interventions	  described	  it,	  ‘They’re	  not	  interested	  in	  anything	  Prevent	  related	  in	  the	  Council.	  They	  used	  to	  be.	  They	  used	  to	  be	  very	  good	  actually,	  but	  you	  know	  they’re	  in	  turmoil.	  They’ve	  had	  massive	  cuts	  and	  unfortunately	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  way	  they’re	  making	  a	  lot	  of	  their	  savings	  is	  by	  just	  stopping	  their	  funding	  to	  the	  delivery	  partners	  in	  the	  third	  sector.”	  (Community,	  2659-­‐28)	  Albeit	  the	  national	  counter-­‐terrorism	  budget	  has	  been	  relatively	  protected	  from	  funding	  cuts,	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  reductions	  will	  have	  to	  be	  made.	  This	  need	  not	  be	  disastrous,	  as	  most	  of	  those	  interviewed	  identified	  areas	  where	  the	  easy	  availability	  of	  funding	  had	  not	  ‘added	  value’.	  However,	  if	  such	  reductions	  are	  not	  to	  have	  a	  significantly	  detrimental	  impact	  upon	  service	  delivery,	  then	  the	  critical	  issue	  seems	  to	  be	  how	  available	  budgets	  are	  structured.	  	  It	  would	  help	  to	  separate	  available	  funding	  streams	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  directed	  towards	  macro-­‐,	  meso-­‐	  or	  micro-­‐	  objectives.	  Macro	  objectives	  are	  longer-­‐term	  structural	  issues	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  These	  can	  be	  differentiated	  from	  ‘meso-­‐level’	  medium	  range	  aims.	  Separate	  funding	  should	  be	  made	  available	  for	  seeding	  highly	  localised	  ‘rapid-­‐response’	  interventions.	  	  Several	  instances	  where	  these	  kinds	  of	  funding	  could	  not	  be	  secured	  were	  encountered	  in	  the	  data.	  Moving	  to	  this	  more	  structured	  funding	  arrangement	  could	  be	  further	  enhanced	  by	  distinguishing	  between	  that	  directed	  towards	  ‘offensive’	  and	  ‘defensive’	  measures.	  Re-­‐thinking	  the	  funding	  framework	  for	  Prevent	  in	  this	  way	  appears	  to	  be	  vital.	  The	  case	  examples	  identified	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  suggest	  that	  ‘pace’	  is	  frequently	  as	  important	  as	  ‘scale’	  in	  shaping	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  Prevent	  interventions.	  That	  is,	  being	  able	  to	  fund	  communities	  or	  the	  police	  to	  respond	  in	  an	  agile	  manner	  as	  and	  when	  risks	  present,	  seems	  to	  be	  important	  in	  preventing	  	  any	  such	  risks	  from	  acquiring	  traction.	  	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  constitutes	  a	  major	  system	  change	  in	  UK	  policing.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  this	  that	  it	  has	  taken	  some	  time	  for	  a	  ‘space’	  to	  be	  carved	  out,	  in	  terms	  of	  where	  Prevent	  sits	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  aspects	  of	  what	  the	  police	  do.	  Reflecting	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  change,	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  internal	  debate	  within	  the	  police	  between	  more	  progressive	  and	  established	  perspectives,	  about	  where	  the	  balance	  between	  Prevent	  and	  more	  traditional	  CT	  approaches	  lies.	  This	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  shaping	  how	  individual	  forces	  are	  implementing	  national	  guidance	  and	  their	  approach	  to	  Prevent	  overall.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  work	  conducted	  though,	  it	  does	  appear	  that	  key	  methods	  and	  tactics	  for	  conducting	  Prevent	  are,	  as	  this	  report	  has	  demonstrated,	  starting	  to	  be	  clarified	  and	  refined	  from	  practice.	  Some	  of	  these	  depend	  upon	  the	  application	  of	  ‘soft	  power’	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APPENDIX	  –	  DATA	  AND	  METHOD	  The	  research	  design	  for	  this	  study	  is	  based	  upon	  a	  mixed	  method	  approach.	  It	  combines	  quantitative	  data	  from	  a	  national	  survey	  with	  in-­‐depth	  qualitative	  interviews.	  The	  former	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  ‘broad	  brush’	  analysis	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  examine	  significant	  patterns	  and	  trends	  in	  Muslim	  perceptions	  and	  attitudes,	  and	  how	  these	  compare	  with	  those	  of	  the	  general	  population.	  	  This	  is	  important	  in	  that	  many	  studies	  of	  the	  Muslim	  faith	  community	  are	  typically	  based	  upon	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  respondents.	  These	  quantitative	  data	  are	  complemented	  by	  95	  in-­‐depth	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  Prevent	  police	  officers	  and	  community	  representatives.	  These	  data	  afford	  a	  ‘high	  resolution’	  investigation	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  Prevent	  policing,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  just	  not	  possible	  solely	  using	  survey	  data.	  	  The	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  four	  areas	  of	  England	  and	  Wales.	  These	  areas	  were	  selected	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  three	  of	  them	  had	  been	  used	  in	  the	  preceding	  empirical	  report	  published	  by	  the	  authors	  in	  2007.	  Thus	  by	  revisiting	  these	  areas,	  and	  comparing	  the	  data	  collected	  at	  the	  two	  points	  in	  time,	  the	  aim	  was	  to	  try	  and	  understand	  how	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  has	  evolved	  and	  developed	  over	  time.	  Given	  the	  focused	  investigation	  in	  these	  areas,	  when	  the	  attempt	  was	  made	  to	  use	  the	  BCS	  to	  assess	  local	  area	  effects,	  a	  decision	  was	  taken	  to	  use	  these	  same	  areas	  as	  base	  units	  for	  analysis.	  A	  fourth	  site	  (Cardiff)	  was	  though	  added	  to	  the	  original	  three.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  that	  during	  the	  preparation	  for	  the	  fieldwork	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  threat	  profile	  in	  the	  City	  had	  shifted.	  In	  particular,	  there	  were	  signs	  that	  the	  community	  were	  mobilising	  in	  interesting	  ways	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  new	  risks.	  It	  was	  therefore	  agreed	  with	  the	  project	  sponsors	  that	  this	  would	  be	  a	  good	  opportunity	  to	  study	  a	  specific	  situation	  as	  it	  unfolded	  in	  ‘real-­‐time’.	  	  	  	  QUANTITATIVE	  DATA	  ANALYSIS	  The	  survey	  data	  analysed	  in	  this	  report	  was	  from	  the	  British	  Crime	  Survey	  (BCS),	  a	  large	  and	  nationally	  representative	  survey	  of	  private	  households	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  conducted	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Home	  Office.	  	  This	  survey	  provides	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  source	  of	  information	  about	  public	  attitudes	  to	  crime	  and	  policing,	  how	  much	  they	  worry	  about	  crime(s)	  and	  their	  contact	  with	  the	  police.	  The	  BCS	  also	  contains	  geographic	  identifiers	  of	  police	  force	  area	  (PFA),	  allowing	  for	  comparison	  of	  attitudes	  within	  and	  between	  different	  areas.	  	  	  The	  survey	  allows	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  based	  on	  responses	  to	  the	  question	  ‘What	  is	  your	  religion,	  even	  if	  you	  are	  not	  currently	  
practising?’	  	  There	  were	  three	  approaches	  to	  data	  analysis:	  1. Cross	  sectional	  analysis	  of	  the	  most	  recently	  available	  BCS	  data	  for	  2008/9;	  For	  2008/9,	  the	  BCS	  sample	  contained	  983	  respondents	  who	  self-­‐identified	  with	  the	  Muslim	  faith,	  constituting	  4	  percent	  of	  the	  whole	  sample.	  	  Analysis	  of	  this	  data	  focused	  on	  identifying	  overall	  differences	  and	  commonalities	  between	  Muslims	  and	  the	  general	  population.	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  2. Combined	  sample	  analysis	  of	  age	  and	  gender	  differences	  using	  a	  merged	  file	  of	  data	  from	  2007/8	  and	  2008/9.	  The	  small	  number	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  included	  in	  any	  single	  year	  of	  the	  BCS,	  coupled	  with	  the	  youthful	  age	  structure	  of	  the	  Muslim	  population	  (over	  half	  in	  the	  2008/9	  survey	  were	  aged	  between	  16	  and	  34),	  meant	  that	  cases	  were	  combined	  from	  two	  successive	  years	  of	  the	  BCS.	  	  Merging	  data	  from	  2008/9	  and	  2007/8	  increased	  the	  overall	  sample	  size	  to	  1887	  Muslims,	  sufficient	  for	  analysis	  of	  age	  and	  gender	  differences	  in	  attitudes.	  	  It	  also	  allowed	  for	  analysis	  of	  questions	  that	  were	  only	  asked	  to	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  the	  BCS	  sample	  in	  any	  given	  year,	  such	  as	  reported	  contact	  with	  the	  police.	  	  Table	  A.1:	  Number	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  in	  combined	  file	  by	  age	  and	  gender	  	  	  
	   16-­24	   25-­34	   35-­44	   45-­54	   55+	   N	  
Muslim	  men	   159	   305	   271	   136	   113	   984	  
Muslim	  
women	  
165	   314	   248	   97	   76	   900	  
N	   324	   619	   519	   233	   189	   1884	  	  3. Time	  trend	  analysis	  of	  successive	  BCS	  surveys	  from	  2004/5	  to	  2008/9;	  Key	  attitude	  questions	  have	  been	  retained	  in	  the	  BCS	  over	  successive	  years	  of	  the	  survey.	  This	  means	  that	  time	  trends	  can	  be	  discerned	  over	  several	  years,	  in	  this	  instance	  from	  2004/5	  when	  the	  BCS	  first	  introduced	  a	  question	  allowing	  religious	  affiliation	  to	  be	  identified.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  2004/5,	  2005/6	  and	  2006/7,	  the	  BCS	  was	  designed	  to	  secure	  a	  ‘non	  white’	  ethnic	  booster	  sample.	  	  	  For	  our	  analysis,	  this	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  in	  these	  years,	  but	  it	  does	  exclude	  a	  small	  number	  of	  Muslims	  of	  white	  ethnicity	  in	  each	  year.	  	  In	  subsequent	  years,	  the	  BCS	  did	  not	  adopt	  an	  ethnic	  booster	  sample	  and	  Muslims	  were	  identified	  from	  the	  core	  sample	  only.	  	  The	  number	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  and	  those	  excluded	  in	  each	  year	  are	  shown	  in	  table	  A.2.	  Table	  A.2:	  	   Identification	  of	  BCS	  Muslim	  respondents	  for	  time	  trend	  analysis	  
BCS	  sample	   2004-­5*	   2005-­6*	   2006-­7*	   2007-­8	   2008-­9	  
N	  Muslims	   1786	   1656	   1801	   904	   983	  
N	  Muslims	  of	  
white	  
ethnicity	  excl.	  
74	   74	   94	   0	   0	  
*	  Analysis	  based	  on	  non	  white	  ethnic	  booster	  sample	  Our	  analytic	  approach	  of	  comparing	  Muslims	  with	  a	  ‘general	  population’	  (calculated	  by	  excluding	  all	  respondents	  who	  self-­‐define	  as	  affiliating	  with	  the	  Muslim	  faith)	  enables	  areas	  of	  commonality	  and	  difference	  to	  be	  identified	  and	  compared	  with	  findings	  from	  the	  qualitative	  data	  in	  this	  report.	  However,	  owing	  to	  the	  design	  of	  the	  BCS	  it	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  that	  our	  Muslim	  group	  is	  nationally	  representative	  of	  all	  Muslims	  living	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  even	  in	  those	  years	  of	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the	  BCS	  where	  an	  ethnic	  booster	  sample	  was	  applied.	  Moreover,	  the	  category	  of	  ‘general	  population’,	  will,	  by	  definition,	  be	  a	  heterogeneous	  one.	  	  The	  data	  presented	  in	  the	  report	  is,	  however,	  weighted	  in	  accordance	  with	  user	  guidelines	  for	  individual-­‐based	  analyses	  to	  account	  both	  for	  the	  equal	  probability	  of	  selection	  and	  to	  adjust	  for	  differential	  non	  response.	  	  	  Key	  Attitude	  Measures	  	  
Ratings	  of	  local	  police:	  ‘How	  good	  a	  job	  area	  this	  police	  in	  this	  area	  doing?’	  (‘Excellent’	  and	  ‘good’	  are	  combined	  to	  indicate	  positive	  ratings	  of	  local	  police).	  	  
Police	  confidence:	  ‘Taking	  everything	  into	  account,	  I	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  police	  in	  this	  area’	  (‘strongly	  agree’	  and	  ‘agree’	  are	  combined	  to	  indicate	  a	  positive	  attitude	  on	  police	  confidence).	  
Respect:	  ‘How	  much	  of	  a	  problem	  is	  people	  not	  treating	  other	  people	  with	  respect	  and	  consideration?’	  (‘Very	  big	  problem’	  and	  ‘fairly	  big	  problem’	  are	  combined	  to	  indicate	  respect	  is	  a	  problem).	  
Worry	  about	  crime:	  ‘How	  worried	  are	  you	  about	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  crime?’	  (‘Very	  worried’	  and	  ‘fairly	  worried’	  are	  combined	  to	  indicate	  worry).	  
Community	  cohesion:	  ‘This	  area	  is	  a	  place	  where	  people	  from	  different	  backgrounds	  get	  on	  well	  together’	  (‘strongly	  agree’	  and	  ‘agree’	  are	  combined	  to	  indicate	  cohesion).	  	  Note:	  this	  indicator	  was	  excluded	  from	  the	  2008/9	  survey.	  
Contact	  with	  police:	  If	  respondent	  has	  contacted	  police	  in	  the	  last	  12	  months	  (‘yes’	  used	  to	  denote	  contact).	  Derived	  Variables	  
Social	  disorder:	  A	  summed	  scale	  was	  computed	  using	  six	  questions	  on	  how	  far	  the	  following	  disorder(s)	  were	  perceived	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  local	  neighbourhood:	  (1)	  teenagers	  hanging	  around	  (2)	  noisy	  neighbours	  (3)	  attack	  because	  of	  skin	  colour	  (4)	  people	  using	  or	  dealing	  drugs	  (5)	  people	  being	  drunk	  or	  rowdy	  (6)	  people	  being	  harassed	  or	  intimidated.	  	  The	  bottom	  third	  of	  the	  scale	  were	  identified	  as	  those	  experiencing	  ‘high’	  levels	  of	  social	  disorder.	  
Physical	  disorder:	  A	  summed	  scale	  was	  computed	  using	  three	  questions	  on	  how	  far	  the	  following	  disorder(s)	  were	  perceived	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  local	  neighbourhood:	  (1)	  vandalism	  or	  graffiti	  (2)	  abandoned	  or	  burnt	  out	  cars	  (3)	  rubbish	  or	  litter.	  The	  bottom	  third	  of	  the	  scale	  were	  identified	  as	  those	  experiencing	  ‘high’	  levels	  of	  physical	  disorder.	  
Police	  effectiveness:	  	  A	  scale	  was	  computed	  from	  seven	  attitude	  items	  on	  attitudes	  to	  the	  police	  in	  the	  local	  area	  (Chronbach’s	  alpha=.8).	  	  These	  centered	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  ‘the	  police	  in	  this	  area...	  :	  (1)	  can	  be	  relied	  on	  to	  be	  there	  when	  you	  need	  them	  (2)	  would	  treat	  you	  with	  respect	  if	  you	  had	  any	  contact	  with	  them	  (3)	  treat	  everyone	  fairly	  regardless	  of	  who	  they	  are	  (4)	  can	  be	  relied	  on	  to	  deal	  with	  minor	  crimes	  (5)	  understand	  the	  issues	  that	  affect	  this	  community	  (6)	  are	  dealing	  with	  the	  things	  that	  matter	  to	  this	  community	  and	  (6)	  taking	  everything	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into	  account,	  I	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  police	  in	  this	  area’.	  Attitudes	  were	  scored	  according	  to	  whether	  they	  were	  positive	  (agree),	  negative	  (disagree)	  or	  neutral	  (neither	  agree	  nor	  disagree).	  These	  scores	  were	  summed	  across	  the	  seven	  indicators	  and	  then	  divided	  by	  seven	  to	  give	  a	  scale	  ranging	  from	  1	  (low	  police	  effectiveness)	  to	  3	  (high	  police	  effectiveness).	  
Clustering	  of	  ‘any	  negative’	  attitudes:	  any	  negative	  responses	  were	  counted	  across	  three	  attitudes:	  (1)	  ratings	  of	  local	  police	  (‘poor’	  or	  ‘very	  poor’)	  (2)	  the	  police	  in	  this	  area	  understand	  the	  issue	  that	  affect	  this	  community	  (‘disagree’	  or	  ‘strongly	  disagree’)	  and	  (3)	  I	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  police	  in	  this	  area	  (‘disagree’	  or	  ‘strongly	  disagree’).	  	  	  A	  score	  of	  3	  on	  the	  resultant	  count	  indicated	  respondents	  who	  were	  negative	  on	  all	  three	  attitudes.	  
Clustering	  of	  ‘very	  negative’	  attitudes:	  the	  same	  procedure	  was	  applied	  as	  above	  but	  only	  the	  extreme	  negative	  responses	  were	  counted,	  namely	  ‘very	  poor’	  and	  ‘strongly	  disagree’.	  	  A	  score	  of	  3	  on	  the	  resultant	  count	  indicated	  respondents	  who	  held	  a	  very	  negative	  viewpoint	  on	  all	  three	  attitudes.	  Police	  Force	  Areas	  The	  analysis	  by	  PFA	  focused	  on	  those	  areas	  where	  the	  number	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  was	  great	  enough	  to	  ensure	  analysis	  by	  age	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  gender	  (base	  numbers	  equal	  50	  or	  above).	  These	  areas	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  A.3:	  Table	  A.3:	  Number	  of	  Muslim	  respondents	  in	  each	  PFA	  by	  BCS	  year.	  
PFA	   BCS	  2007/8	   BCS	  2008/9	   Total	   in	  
combined	  file	  
Met/	   City	   of	  
London	  
	  








73	   67	   140	  
West	  Yorkshire	  
	  
72	   67	   139	  
Thames	  Valley	  
	  
27	   55	   82	  	  Data	  Analysis	  All	  data	  was	  analysed	  using	  SPSS.	  	  Figures	  reported	  in	  tables	  and	  figures	  are	  based	  on	  data	  weighted	  by	  IndivWgt.	  	  Base	  numbers	  in	  the	  report	  are	  based	  on	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unweighted	  data	  and	  no	  analyses	  are	  reported	  when	  the	  base	  number	  for	  any	  cell	  was	  less	  than	  50	  cases.23	  	  	  	  A	  variety	  of	  data	  analysis	  methods	  are	  used	  including:	  	  the	  crosstabulation	  of	  two	  or	  more	  variables;	  presentation	  of	  mean	  scores	  and	  correlation	  coefficients	  (Pearson’s	  R	  squared)	  to	  show	  the	  direction	  and	  strength	  of	  association	  between	  two	  variables	  ranging	  in	  value	  from	  0	  (no	  correlation)	  to	  1	  (perfect	  correlation).	  	  	  	  	  Multivariate	  analysis	  was	  conducted	  using	  the	  method	  of	  logistic	  regression.	  	  This	  requires	  a	  binary	  outcome	  or	  dependent	  variable	  and	  a	  number	  of	  independent	  or	  predictor	  variables	  are	  added	  to	  the	  model	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  their	  effects.	  	  In	  this	  analysis,	  key	  attitudes	  were	  examined	  by	  age	  (as	  a	  continuous	  variable),	  religion	  and	  PFA	  (as	  categorical	  variables)	  and	  run	  separately	  for	  men	  and	  women	  to	  illustrate	  gender	  differences.	  	  	  	  	  QUALITATIVE	  INTERVIEWS	  	  Across	  the	  four	  sites	  the	  original	  plan	  set	  out	  in	  the	  research	  design	  was	  to	  conduct	  25	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  in	  each	  area,	  comprising	  5	  police	  and	  20	  community	  representatives.	  However,	  this	  target	  of	  completing	  a	  total	  of	  100	  interviews	  was	  not	  accomplished	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons.	  In	  particular,	  the	  process	  of	  contacting	  and	  actually	  interviewing	  community	  representatives	  transpired	  to	  be	  much	  harder	  than	  had	  been	  bargained	  for.	  Particularly	  given	  that	  the	  research	  team	  had	  previously	  conducted	  interviews	  in	  three	  of	  the	  areas	  it	  was	  anticipated	  that	  progress	  should	  have	  been	  made	  over	  a	  reasonable	  timescale.	  	  The	  plan	  had	  been	  to	  access	  a	  sample	  of	  community	  representatives	  through	  two	  principal	  routes:	  (1)	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  police	  contacts;	  (2)	  By	  re-­‐contacting	  respondents	  from	  the	  original	  study	  and	  using	  them	  to	  ‘snowball’	  new	  potential	  respondents.	  The	  latter	  component	  was	  deemed	  as	  being	  important	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  simply	  engaging	  with	  those	  individuals	  who	  were	  known	  to	  and	  sympathetic	  towards	  the	  police.	  	  	  In	  all	  of	  the	  sites	  the	  police	  provided	  a	  list	  of	  contacts	  according	  to	  an	  initial	  criteria	  established	  by	  the	  research	  team,	  reflecting	  aspects	  of	  the	  local	  situation.	  However,	  actually	  getting	  to	  talk	  to	  these	  individuals	  and	  persuading	  them	  to	  agree	  to	  be	  interviewed	  proved	  taxing.	  In	  many	  cases	  it	  took	  days	  to	  actually	  get	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  individuals	  on	  the	  telephone.	  It	  turned	  out	  that	  a	  number	  of	  these	  individuals	  had	  multiple	  mobile	  phones.	  When	  appointments	  were	  made,	  there	  were	  numerous	  occasions	  where	  the	  individual	  concerned	  did	  not	  turn	  up	  or	  cancelled	  at	  short	  notice.	  Interestingly,	  this	  exercise	  may	  be	  indicative	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  community	  engagement	  networks	  across	  the	  four	  sites.	  For	  example,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  GMP	  whose	  community	  engagement	  strategy	  is	  premised	  upon	  the	  use	  of	  a	  network	  of	  intermediaries	  struggled	  to	  supply	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  A	  Technical	  Appendix	  detailing	  all	  base	  data	  for	  Tables	  and	  Figures	  is	  available	  upon	  request	  from	  upsi@cardiff.ac.uk.	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community	  interviewees	  and	  in	  the	  end	  only	  a	  handful	  were	  ever	  spoken	  to	  from	  that	  area.	  	  Although	  the	  original	  sample	  size	  was	  not	  achieved,	  the	  aim	  of	  securing	  interviews	  with	  police	  staff	  of	  different	  ranks,	  and	  with	  community	  representatives	  both	  in	  contact	  and	  largely	  disengaged	  from	  the	  police	  was	  accomplished.	  The	  interview	  instruments	  used	  for	  the	  police	  and	  community	  representatives	  were	  slightly	  different	  as	  is	  standard	  for	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  approach.	  Questions	  covered:	  the	  individual’s	  background	  and	  position;	  their	  views	  about	  Prevent;	  the	  local	  threat	  environment;	  and	  how	  the	  delivery	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  could	  be	  improved	  in	  future.	  In	  all	  cases,	  the	  interviewing	  teams	  were	  encouraged	  to	  help	  respondents	  to	  talk	  about	  specific	  examples	  and	  cases	  that	  they	  were	  aware	  of,	  rather	  than	  relying	  upon	  abstract	  statements.	  	  Data	  from	  the	  interviews	  were	  analysed	  using	  thematic	  coding	  techniques.	  Some	  of	  the	  codes	  were	  derived	  from	  the	  previous	  2007	  report,	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  a	  loose	  comparative	  analysis.	  Other	  codes	  though	  emerged	  more	  organically	  from	  within	  the	  data.	  Verbatim	  quotations	  reported	  in	  this	  document	  are	  included	  to	  evidence	  key	  points	  and	  are	  representative	  of	  comments	  made	  by	  several	  respondents.	  Limitations	  on	  space,	  and	  the	  vast	  amounts	  of	  interesting	  and	  detailed	  data	  elicited	  from	  the	  interviews	  prohibits	  more	  extensive	  discussion.	  	  All	  of	  the	  interviews	  were	  tape-­‐recorded	  and	  fully	  transcribed.	  When	  conducting	  the	  interviews	  all	  respondents	  were	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  request	  that	  the	  recording	  device	  be	  turned	  off	  at	  any	  time.	  This	  happened	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  and	  is	  perhaps	  to	  be	  expected	  given	  the	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  want	  is	  being	  discussed.	  Overall	  though,	  the	  interviews	  are	  extremely	  insightful	  because	  of	  the	  open	  and	  honest	  way	  in	  which	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  respondents	  responded	  to	  the	  questions.	  	  	  CONSTRAINTS	  UPON	  THE	  ANALYSIS	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  considerations	  outlined	  above,	  there	  are	  several	  further	  constraints	  and	  limitations	  on	  the	  analysis.	  Foremost	  is	  that	  the	  BCS	  does	  not	  ask	  any	  direct	  questions	  about	  experiences	  or	  perceptions	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  Indeed,	  in	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  general	  population	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  do	  so,	  given	  the	  likely	  low	  levels	  of	  overall	  awareness.	  Accordingly,	  in	  this	  research	  the	  BCS	  is	  used	  to	  derive	  some	  indicators	  rather	  than	  direct	  measures	  of	  Prevent	  policing.	  They	  are	  indicators	  that	  treat	  Prevent	  policing	  interventions	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  a	  wider	  package	  of	  policing	  services.	  The	  presumption	  underpinning	  the	  study	  is	  that	  in	  their	  application	  in	  this	  way,	  these	  general	  indicators	  will	  be	  shaped	  and	  influenced	  by	  the	  performance	  of	  Prevent	  policing	  initiatives	  and	  interventions.	  Some	  support	  for	  this	  view	  can	  be	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  established	  research	  literature	  around	  the	  impacts	  upon	  general	  attitudinal,	  perceptual	  and	  experiential	  measures	  of	  policing,	  from	  negative	  police-­‐public	  
	   100	  
interactions.24	  The	  point	  being	  that	  specific	  policing	  strategies	  and	  interventions	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  impact	  upon	  general	  indicators.	  Where	  it	  is	  possible	  and	  appropriate	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  quantitative	  analysis	  is	  supported	  by	  data	  drawn	  from	  the	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews.	  Within	  the	  overarching	  framework	  for	  the	  study’s	  research	  design,	  the	  quotations	  provided	  in	  the	  report	  are	  used	  to	  illuminate	  and	  evidence	  key	  claims	  and	  issues.	  The	  quotations	  have	  been	  selected	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  illustrative	  and	  representative	  of	  thematic	  patterns	  present	  across	  the	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  different	  individuals.	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